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Positioning the study  
The title of this book – Making Decentralization work for Women – presents 
two sides of the same coin. Foremost, it reveals that decentralization was not 
working for women and second, it indicates that decentralization can work for 
women. How the gendered decentralized governance can be engendered is the 
central argument presented in this book.  
This chapter therefore explains the key problems of the study. This is fol-
lowed by recasting the study scope which is largely based on a case study of 
AFARD’s work on women’s political capabilities building. The chapter then 
ends with explaining the study questions and methodology. 
The central issue 
This study pivots on the euphoria with which decentralized governance is pre-
sented as a neutral arena in which women and men benefit equally. The belief 
that the localization of politics will bring governance closer to women and men 
and that government will be responsive and accountable to local needs is always 
not questioned. Instead, it is claimed that having more women in local govern-
ance is an avenue within which the traditional hegemonic power relations and 
undue gender inequalities are challenged to the benefit of women.  
This political approach to promoting gender equality has been the central 
debate in feminist political theory that has for long continued to prioritize issues 
of spaces for power (Phillips 1999; Young 2000) as Goetz & Hassim (2003) 
argue for women’s relationship with the state and Kabeer (2005) for gendered 
2  
  
citizenship. What seems to matter most is women’s representation in politics, 
what Goetz (2007: 88) terms as ‘simple access to politics’ despite its focus on 
‘women’s efficiency’ in politics (World Bank 2001; Evertzen 2001; and see 
Goetz 2007 for criticism).  
Often, it is assumed that the greater the closeness of local government to the 
people the more citizens, women and men alike, are informed about and de-
mand services from government (Tendler 1997; Cox 1997; Manor 1999; Harriss 
et al. 2005). Added to increased women in politics, it is also intractably linked 
that such representation will enhance claiming of women’s rights against socio-
political exclusions (Jackson 1999).  
While such an argument for women’s representation may bring forth local 
presence and opportunity to advocate for women’s preferential needs (Goetz 
2007: 91 citing Anne Phillips 1991: 62-63), it is prudent to note that proximity 
of government to local actors is not synonymous with effective participation of 
women on the one hand and local government responsiveness and accounta-
bility as is assumed on the other hand. Thus, the equation between women’s 
citizenship and responsible government does not automatically balance. 
Little has been done to understand the challenges of localization with respect 
to the perpetuation of cultural hegemony against women constituency. Besides, 
the ‘ambiguity of local governments’ (Rai 1996; Randall 1998) and how local 
governments are ‘antithetical to gendered local democracy and women’s poli-
tical and socio-economic rights’ (Beall 2005) is always downplayed. This is 
why critical observers as Molyneux & Razavi (2002) see women’s engagement 
in local politics as simply a ‘sweetener for the bitter pill of neo-liberal 
adjustment and rising inequality’, Harriss (2002) opposes such a depoliticiza-
tion approach and Heller (2000) notes that there are no a priori reasons why 
more localized forms of governance are more democratic and accountable.  
This study, therefore, uses decentralized local governance in Uganda as its 
case study. It focuses on exploring how women’s political participation operates 
within an already gendered political arena and whether it can become rewarding 
to grassroots women and good governance. The focus on women is because 
women’s political participation unlike that for men is conditionally expected to 
champion exclusively women’s interests. Meanwhile the need for good govern-
ance cannot be overemphasized given its vitality in foreign aid.  
Contextualizing the issue 
The situation in Uganda reflects the dilemma above regarding the benefits of 
women’s political participation both to women and good governance. As a poli-
cy, decentralization in Uganda has been made legally gender sensitive. Political 
quotas are provided for women and a parallel Women Council structure with 
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Women Council Executives (WCE) running from villages to the national level 
are in place. While this strategy of ‘inserting’ women in politics has phenome-
nally increased the numeric presence of women in political positions, the extent 
to which such inclusion benefits grassroots women through effective women’s 
participation in public policy processes as well as winning local government 
responsiveness to services delivery and accountability is debatable.  
Kapwepwe (2007: 1, 7-8) already observes that there is growing discontent 
among the poor masses (mainly women) to the increasing inaccessibility, non-
availability, inadequacy, and poor quality of government services. FOWODE’s 
(2007) study of NAADS the main government strategy for transforming sub-
sistence agriculture confirms that agriculture which employs 85% of the people 
(mainly women) instead receive less than 5% of the national budget allocation. 
And the 2007 Beneficiary Participation and Accountability assessment report 
(see summary in Box 1.1) produced by Uganda Bureau of Statistics provides 
more compelling evidence. It reveals that the multi-donor funded Local Gov-
ernment Development Programme (LGDP II), aimed at improving basic ser-
vices delivery and engendering economic growth and poverty reduction simply 
by-passed the citizens (UBOS 2007). 
 
 
Box 1.1 Community participation in local governance and access to services 
In a national study involving 1500 households, 42 key informants from private firms, 
and 62 communities, it was found that: 
 
• Only 22% of respondents heard of LGDP II of which majority were men (24.4%) 
as compared to women (19.5%).  
• Overall 75% of respondents noted that they were not consulted on what LGDP II 
should do in their areas. 
• Decisions were primarily made by political leaders (92.2%) and not the other com-
munity members (7.8%) and mainly starting at parish levels (66.7%) and not at the 
village levels. 
• Access to and utilization of basic services were considered curtailed by lack of 
drugs (57.1%) in health facilities, inadequate facilities (72.4%) in schools, and 
limited outreach (73.5%) of agricultural extension services.  
• As a result, political conflicts between politicians and technocrats were reported to 
be high at both district (67%) and lower local government (64%) levels.  
• Further, many people were dissatisfied with the services offered by government 
(water projects, 34%; health projects, 52%; education, 27%; roads, 66%; and agri-
cultural projects, 62%). 
Source: UBOS (2007) 
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The above evidences show that the political inclusion of women has raised 
mixed debates. On the one hand, such an approach is shown as a promotion of 
‘symbolic presence’ as opposed to ‘transformative presence’ for women (Ga-
venta 2002, 2004b; Goetz 1995; DENIVA 2002). The main criticisms herein is 
that in spite of the more number of women in the political arena women have 
largely lacked access to basic services they need most from government. In-
stead, government (both central and local) resource allocations are tainted with 
increasing levels of 3Cs – Corruption, Capture and Clientelism – as government 
institutional players, largely men, find themselves acting on their own will (see 
Box 1.2 and Table 1.1).  
Proponents of this view express their disillusionment that this approach is 
simply a policy show-piece given the inability of grassroots women and women 
leaders to exploit the “invited and open political space” as an avenue within 
which women’s needs could get onto political agenda setting to receive services 
delivery (Gaventa 2006; Goetz 2003). Rightly, Goetz (1997: 251) has this to 
say: 
Women’s representatives, even if their numbers expand significantly, cannot be ex-
pected automatically to be representatives of women. A feminine presence in poli-
tics is not the same as a feminist one. Getting more women into politics is a worthy 
project from the point of view of democratic justice, but the real challenge is in 
institutionalizing gender equity in government policy … Unfortunately, the first and 
the easiest project – increasing the numbers of women in politics – is often  
mistaken for the second. This is confusion between numerical and strategic repre-
sentation of women. 
Contrary to the arguments above is the practitioner-led camp which notes 
that even mere ‘symbolic presence’ is already a step towards the one thousand 
miles destination to gender equality for women. Captivatingly Kharono (2003: 
9-10) echoes that the entry of women into the various political spaces has 
‘increased their political representation in parliament and local governments 
with enhanced women’s visibility, self-confidence and legitimized position in 
public arena’. The advocates in this camp argue that it is the ‘lack of empower-
ment’ of the women political actors that continues to impede their effective re-
presentation and participation of women from which government responsive-
ness and accountability for engendered poverty reduction could be attained (de 
Wit 1997; Kurian 1999). Hassim (2004) in this view rightly calls for the need to 
consolidate the political legitimacy women have won from the national 
legislative framework. Tripp (2000) notes that women’s political engagement 
requires ‘building bridge’ for effective entry and stay in local democracy. And 
Molyneux & Razavi (2002: 4) reiterate that ‘the only effective means to 
challenge inequality and to advance programmes that would promote greater  
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Box 1.2 Corruption in Uganda central government systems 
Julius Kapwepwe in the Daily Monitor of October 6, 2008 listed a host of corruption 
related scandals that cost Uganda UGX 510 billion annually. In National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF) alone he pointed out that corruption had costed the fund UGX 
11 billion in Temangalo land; UGX 8 billion in Nsimbe housing estate, UGX 3.8 
billion in the dysfunctional Integrated Financial Management System; and UGX 120 
billion in overpricing of Pensions House. Yet more to come to the fund were the 
proposed UGX 17 billion in Alcon/Workers House contract court dub and UGX 24 
billion in the proposed deal with Uganda Revenue Authority. Further, he spelt out that 
Uganda lost about UGX 36 billion in the Nytil deal; UGX 6.5 billion in Lira Spinning 
Mill; UGX 94 billion in hosting CHOGM; UGX 40.5 billion in funds Bank of Uganda 
unauthorized overdrafts in 2005/06 let alone GAVI funds, Global Fund, and Kanathan/ 
AGOA saga.1  
 
While these financial corruption represents part of the picture of lack of transparency 
and accountability at central government level, the Office of Auditor General’s report 
for 2007 even present the scope of losses at local government levels as is shown below 
in Table 1.1.  
 
With such scopes of free rider actions, what kind of services should people expect? No 
doubt, the Auditor General report of 2006 for Ministry of Health noted that districts 
deny lower health units from participating in budget planning let alone managing most 
of the funds centrally besides failing to use ministry set formulae to allocate funds to 
health centers. As such, drugs are in short supplies, staffs are ill-managed, facilities are 
put to waste due to non-use, procurements are poorly managed and the general quality 
of health services remain wanting (Office of the Auditor General 2006). 
 
 
Table 1.1 Scope of financial mismanagement in local governments, 2007 
Areas of budget abuse  Amount (UGX) % 
Arrears of revenue 2,689,409,371  4% 
Excess expenditure 8,430,127,922  11% 
Un-accounted for administrative expenses 9,919,655,269  13% 
Unvouched payments 2,408,627,971  3% 
Procurement irregularities 2,070,903,970  3% 
Non-remittance of taxes to URA 381,314,680  1% 
Purported remittance of taxes to URA 622,481,188  1% 
Unspent balance 454,384,874  1% 
Diversion of funds 562,110,526  1% 
Board of Survey 6,124,034,518  8% 
Non-depreciation of assets 39,969,988,853  54% 
Total 73,633,039,142  100% 
Source: Office of Auditor General, 2007 (Appendix I-XI) 
                                                 
1   Julius Kapwepwe ‘Invisible hands visibly grabbing Uganda’s riches’ Daily Monitor 
of October 6, 2008. 
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social justice and more equitable development’ is to link democracy with 
human rights. Not surprising, Fraser (1989) calls for a critical shift from the 
preoccupation with conflict over competing interests into a more radical focus 
on the politics of redistribution and recognition. 
Practitioners, therefore, see as Heller, Harilal & Chanhuri (2007) that 
‘effective deepening of political democracy requires capacity building’ of po-
litical capabilities among the hitherto excluded groups. As a result, some 
practitioners have embarked on women/gender advocacy work. In Uganda, this 
lot includes Forum for Women in Democracy (FOWODE), Action for Dev-
elopment (ACFODE), Gender Resource Centre (GRC), Uganda Women Net-
work (UWONET), and the Agency for Accelerated Regional Development 
(AFARD), among others who are pre-occupied with gender budgeting, poverty 
resource monitoring, and leadership building. 
The problematic 
The contrary views expressed above where one side doubts the effectiveness of 
women’s political participation and the other expresses optimism that proactive 
interventions can give meaning to women in governance raises three cardinal 
challenges that this study takes up to explore. These challenges present a sup-
position: 
• First, that decentralized governance makes it automatic for grassroots wo-
men to effectively participate in the legitimate political spaces provided to 
them by decentralization; 
• Second, that having more women in political positions automatically makes 
women leaders’ effective women constituency representatives given that 
they are provided with mandatory spaces to advocate for women’s interests; 
and 
• Third, that undertaking to build the political capabilities of women leaders 
translates into bridging the gap of representative political failures among 
women. It is construed that doing so leads to women’s empowerment and 
responsive and accountable local governments.  
This study, therefore, unravels these three empirical gaps through an action-
oriented projects run for the last 3.8 years by AFARD (the 2007 Best Grantee 
Award Winner). The projects were funded by HURINET for a period of 1.5 
years and the 9th EDF for 2.3 years. AFARD’s case is preferred for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, the project focused on promoting a grassroots approach to 
participatory gender planning and budgeting as a way for furthering social ac-
countability. Second, the project used a constituency and not a community 
driven approach to poverty resource monitoring thereby dodging the vagueness 
  7 
 
of the term community that often is not all inclusive. Third, the project worked 
with the Women Council structure legally established by the 1993 Act of Parlia-
ment specifically to champion women’s needs without the encumbrance of any 
local council; a case already noted by Holzner & de Wit (2003) as critical in 
diverting women councilors attention away from women’s interests. Finally, the 
choice of AFARD’s project was also because it uniquely put the women leaders 
at the frontline and strengthened their capacity in search for their political voice 
unlike what many advocacy organizations do when they talk for their bene-
fitciaries implying representation within an already encumbered representation; 
something Lavalle, Houtzager & Castella (2005) term as ‘de facto representa-
tion’. 
Objectives and questions 
The core objective of this study derived from the three challenges above is to 
pragmatically engender decentralized governance wherein the politics of devel-
opment management is encumbered with policy slang and neutrality. Table 1.2 
below specifies the specific objectives that all revolve around women leaders’ 
effectiveness on the one hand and grassroots women’s participation and local 
government responsiveness and accountability on the other.  
To do so the study explores how women as a constituency are included in 
decentralized governance arena and how local government actors adapts to such 
political inclusion. It analyses in-depth: (i) the level of participation of women 
in local policy processes given that a favourable legislative framework allows 
for that; (ii) the level of political capabilities among women leaders for demo-
cratic civic engagement; and (iii) how capability enhancement does impact on 
the way the various actors – women, women leaders, and local government offi-
cials – interact within the shared political spaces.  
To meet these objectives, the study posed as its central question: 
To what extent and in what ways is women’s political capability building in Uganda 
an effective approach to empower women to claim citizenship and engender decen-
tralized local government responsiveness and accountability? 
This question hinges on the fact that the legal framework in Uganda guaran-
tees women’s political participation in decentralized local governance. As to 
whether or not their participation is effective remains a question to be answered. 
Thus, in answering this question in is also prudent that how local governments 
respond to gender equality issues underpinned by responsiveness to and ac-
countability for services delivery is explored. In so doing, this central question 
is further broken down by specific objectives into lead and sub-questions. Table 
1.2 below summarizes the study focus. 
8  
  
Data management 
This study adopted a case study approach (Berg 1995: 68-85). To elicit infor-
mation, triangulation of data sources, investigators, and methods were used 
(Denzin 1978) between 2005 and 2008 in data collection and analysis. Details 
of each data collection processes are covered under the various chapters (espe-
cially 4, 5 & 7). However, worth pointing out is that some methods like routine 
performance reviews were used more than once within the project span. Mean-
while other methods evolved out of the recursive analysis of the project imple-
mentation. Nonetheless, the following methods were used: 
a) Individual surveys: Four surveys were conducted to estimate the baseline 
and change status in the participation of women in local development plan-
ning and budgeting processes as well as the civic engagement competencies 
among women leaders. In these surveys, individual women were asked using 
both closed and open ended questions about their participation in local 
development planning processes (survey 1 & 3) and their civic engagement 
competencies (survey 2 & 4). 
b) Key Informant Interviews: This method was used concurrently with the sur-
veys but especially with key district and LLG officials as well as repre-
sentative of civil society organizations to gather information that would 
otherwise be difficult to attain from the normal surveys and “normal” chan-
nels. 
c) Focus Group Discussions: These were mainly held with the women leaders 
especially in the form of information sharing meetings when critical advo-
cacy issues were identified. During such discussions eminent advocacy pro-
cesses were also strategized. 
d) Documentary reviews: to keep pace with the project needs as well as the aca-
demic orientation of the subject under study, a number of literatures were 
studied in relation to the project and the subject. 
e) Review and feedback workshops: These were held 4 times starting with the 
discussions on the way forward to improve women’s participation followed 
by how to build women leaders’ core civic competencies. Likewise, mid-
term and end-of project reviews were also held in which project perform-
ances were assessed by the women leaders and local government officials.2 
 
                                                 
2  To note here is that as an evolving project, a number of feedback meetings were held 
to share information and strategize future actions. Details on these meetings are pro-
vided in chapters 4 & 6. 
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Data analysis 
Given the diversity of the above data collection methods, different data analysis 
methods were used in order to give meaning to the project/study. While context 
analysis helped juxtapose the study within its theoretical and geographical situ-
ation, quantitative and content analysis were used to measure and show proces-
ses of change respectively. 
Organization of the book 
This book is organized in nine chapters starting with this part that presents the 
study problem, focus, and conduct noting that while women’s political partici-
pation is seen to occur within a decentralized arena that is neutral, controversies 
abound its effectiveness. Chapter 2 dwells on the general theoretical arguments 
on decentralization. It identifies three pillars: participation, citizenship, and ac-
countability as the basic tenets why decentralization matters. Anchoring these 
pillars on social accountability as the ideal organizing principles within which 
decentralization policy can be effective, the chapter further elaborates on how 
decentralization policy has been implemented in Uganda showing how gender 
issues gained currency in the policy. 
Chapter 3 gives attention to the implementation of decentralization policy. 
Using a case study of Nebbi district, it shows how despite the increasing central 
government funding, much of the resources are sunk in administrative costs. 
In an attempt to answer questions related to why decentralized government 
are encumbered with budget mismanagement to the detriment of services de-
livery amidst the presence of grassroots women and women leaders, Chapters 4 
and 5 present case studies of assessment of grassroots women’s participation in 
decentralized development processes and the political capabilities women lead-
ers have for civic engagement. Both chapters demonstrate that generally grass-
roots women are shelved off decentralized policy arena while women leaders 
are not aware of their roles and they lack the requisite skills with which to exe-
cute their roles. 
To toe the line of the advocates who believe in the efficacy of political capa-
bilities, Chapter 6 also presents a case study of a capacity building project run 
by AFARD. It ties it with the various observations already made with regard to 
enhancing civic engagement in local politics. Thus, Chapters 7 and 8 presents 
an assessment of how political capability building works both for grassroots 
women and women leaders on the one hand and LLG responsiveness and ac-
countability practices on the other hand. It shows that enhancing the capacity of 
women leaders does not only improve their knowledge and skills about their 
roles but also improves their functionality in mobilizing more grassroots  
 
  
 
Table 1.2 Summary of the study focus 
Specific objectives Lead questions Sub-questions Data needed Methods Respondents 
Explore how women 
are utilizing the 
legitimate open and 
invited political 
space in 
decentralized 
development 
processes  
To what extent and 
with what effects are 
grassroots women 
participating in the 
decentralized 
development 
planning and 
budgeting in Nebbi 
district lower local 
governments?   
 
• How is decentralized 
development planning and 
budgeting process structured? 
• To what extent are grassroots 
women participating in these 
processes? 
• What challenges impede their 
participation?  
• What are the implications of 
such participation to women’s 
development? 
Descriptive data on the 
planning and budget cycle 
 
 
 
Quantitative data on women’s 
participation 
 
Descriptive data on challenges 
to & effects of participation 
Literature review 
Key Informant 
Interview  
 
 
 
Individual survey 
 
 
Focus group 
discussions 
 
 
LG staffs/ 
Women 
leaders/ 
Grassroots 
women  
 
 
 
 
Assess the 
effectiveness of 
women leaders’ in 
representing women 
in decentralized 
governance 
To what extent are 
women leaders 
effectively executing 
their representative 
roles? 
• Are women leaders aware of and 
performing their roles? 
• Do women leaders have the 
requisite skills to and practicing 
those skills in performing their 
roles? 
• What are the roadblocks to 
women leaders’ effective 
performance? 
Quantitative and qualitative  
data on: 
• Awareness of roles 
• Knowledge for roles 
execution 
• Implementation of roles 
• Challenges to roles 
implementation  
 
Individual survey 
 
Focus group 
discussions 
 
Women leaders 
Identify a relevant 
capability 
improvement project 
In what ways were 
women leaders’ 
political capabilities 
for transformative’ 
leadership built? 
• What did the project aim to 
address? 
• What strategies did it adopt? 
• What activities were 
implemented? 
Descriptive data on the project: 
• Justification 
• Strategies 
• Activities 
 
Literature review 
 
Project Officers 
 
 
Ctd>> 
 
  
 
Table 1.2 Summary of the study focus (continued) 
Specific objectives Lead questions Sub-questions Data needed Methods Respondents 
Assess the extent 
to which political 
capabilities’ 
building 
empowered women 
and improved local 
governance 
To what extent did 
the project empower 
women and made 
LLG responsive and 
accountable? 
• To what extent and in what ways 
did the project change women 
leaders’ knowledge and skills for 
effective civic engagement? 
• To what extent and in what ways 
did the project change women’s 
participation in the budget cycle? 
• To what extent and in what ways 
did the project change LLG 
budget responsiveness? 
• What tangible benefits have 
resulted for women from effective 
participation and LLG 
responsiveness and 
accountability? 
• To what extent and in what ways 
did the project change LLG 
transparency and accountability 
practices?  
• To what extent are LLGs gender 
responsive? 
• Levels & perceptions of 
women leaders 
knowledge and practices  
• Levels & perceptions of 
women’s participation  
• LLG budgets 
management 
• Perception of LLG 
transparency and 
accountability practices  
• Tangible projects 
identified 
• Gender Responsiveness 
Index 
Individual survey 
 
Key Informant 
Interviews 
 
Review 
workshop 
 
Documentary 
review 
 
Women leaders 
 
LLG officials 
 
Grassroots 
women 
 
Build a way 
forward for social 
accountability in 
local governance 
How can 
decentralized 
governance be 
sustainably 
engendered? 
 
• What lessons to learned from 
AFARD projects? 
• What challenges continue to 
hinder engendering decentralized 
co-governance? 
• What more needs to be done to 
sustain the current gains achieved? 
Stakeholders opinion on:  
• Performance enabling 
factors 
• Impediments to success 
• Information on what 
worked well and not 
 
 
Review 
workshop 
 
 
Project staffs 
Women leaders 
& LLG 
officials 
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women’s participation. As a result, LLG has but one choice to become respon-
sive in their plan targeting and budget allocations and disbursement for services 
delivery contrary to the hitherto favour for administrative sectors. Notable cases 
of tangible projects as well as an innovative approach to assessing the gender 
responsiveness of LLG are also presented. 
Finally, in chapter 9 lessons learnt and the ways forward are presented. In-
herent is that for women’s effective participation in local governance to result 
into their empowerment as well as LLG responsiveness and accountability, po-
litical capability building that equips people with civic competencies in order 
that they begin to think and act as citizens is inevitable. This arena, it is argued, 
requires a third part in the citizen-state equation – civil society organizations. 
 
 
  
 
2 
Decentralized governance 
This chapter focuses on presenting the rational for adopting decentralization in 
developing countries generally and Uganda in particular. It starts with the 
theory behind decentralization. This is followed by the processes of decentrali-
zation adopted in Uganda. The chapter ends by highlighting gender equality up-
take in the legal and policy framework in Uganda. 
The theoretical perspective of decentralization 
Decentralization has been defined variedly as the transfer of responsibility for 
planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the 
central government ministries and agencies to field units of central government 
ministries or agencies (deconcentration); subordinate units or levels of govern-
ment (devolution); semi-autonomous public authorities (delegation); or non-
governmental private or voluntary organizations (privatization) (Rondenelli & 
Nellis 1986: 8). These constitute the basis upon which Litvack and Seddon 
identify three main types of decentralization: (i) political decentralization that 
basically aims at a pluralistic politics and representative government whereby 
citizens or their elected representatives have more power in public decision-
making i.e., the formulation and implementation of policies; (ii) administrative 
and fiscal decentralization that seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility and 
financial resources for providing public services among different levels of 
government by the transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing and 
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management of certain public functions; and (iii) economic or market decen-
tralization where there is shift in responsibility for functions from the public to 
the private sector (for details also see Rondinelli 1981; Rondinelli et al. 1989; 
World Bank 1997; and Litvack et al. 2001). 
The 1990s witnessed what Oluwo (2001: 11) terms as a ‘forth path of demo-
cratic decentralization’ that was seen as a new way of promoting local develop-
ment. This motivation Oluwo (2001: 12-15) insists relate to the realization of 
failures of both the structural adjustment policy and centralized public sector 
management. As such, many donor agencies (World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund primarily) ignited the need for political and policy reforms with 
the demand for good governance and greater involvement of citizens in policy 
processes. To the World Bank (2000), decentralization was seen as building 
state capabilities for effective (responsive and accountable) services delivery; 
what Hickey & Mohan (2005: 243) refer to as ‘smartening the state’.  
Therefore, as a policy goal and a policy instrument, decentralization aims at 
the shifting of responsibilities for development to local authorities i.e. bringing 
decision-making process closer to the people so that they become agents of their 
own change. This reform is envisaged to contribute to democratization and im-
proved public administration so that there is effective development. Particularly 
the socially weak and excluded (as women and other marginalized groups) are 
expected to participate and gain from this policy reform as the elected leaders 
and their electorates in a ‘local-local dialogue’ co-partake in ‘participatory co-
governance’ (de Wit 1997: 3-5; Kurian 1999: 6-7; Siato 2002: 1). 
Seen in this way, it can be argued that the drive for decentralization was 
based on its four-tier merits, namely: 
(i)   For the government, it improves public sector management through im-
proved responsiveness to deliver ‘locally preferred’ services away from 
political and elite capture;  
(ii)  For the people, decentralization promotes democracy as popular partici-
pation requisite in citizenship building is promoted;  
(iii) For both the government and people, it espouses the need for transpar-
ency and accountability between central and local governments and be-
tween local governments and their constituencies; and 
(iv) For the market, it promotes private-public partnership as the roles of ser-
vices production and provisioning is delineated. 
The realization of these assumptions however requires not only ‘building a 
strong and competent local-central government institution’ (Dunleavy 1980: 
116) but also ‘a systematic return of power to the people who need government 
services most’ (Crosby & Orsini 1996). Leaders and the led should in practice 
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work as a team in determining and working towards the achievement of a com-
mon destiny – poverty reduction (Guijt & Shah 1998). 
What stands out from the above discussion is that for decentralization to 
facilitate local development three things must inevitably be in place – the pillars 
of effective democratic decentralized governance, namely; first, participation of 
people in agenda setting within the decentralized jurisdiction; second, citizen-
ship as a shift away from having people who are mere beneficiaries and/or users 
of government services to people who are citizens with rights and claims over 
government services; and finally, accountability as a response of local govern-
ment to the needs of the citizens it serves. Below I present a brief on each of 
these three vital aspects. 
 
Participation 
A lot has been written about participation to the point that others like Gaventa 
(2004a: 9) note that it has been called on to ‘perform a wide range of functions 
for differing purposes, ideologies and political project’ and Cooke and Kothari 
(2001) term it as a ‘new tyrant’ in development.1 I will therefore focus here 
only on its value-addition to public policy processes deriving from the works of 
Gaventa (2004) and Hickey & Mohan (2004) with regard to transformative par-
ticipation as an ingredient to citizen’s political participation.  
Central to the transformative political participation is the vitality of collabo-
rative agenda pursuance wherein state actors and those they are meant to serve 
cooperate and collaborate for a shared goal after dialogue on varied interests. A 
number of reasons have been cited to merit such popular participation in policy-
making process, namely, levelling off policy information asymmetry (Mehrotra 
2006); increased legitimacy of accountability seekers as rights-holder over gov-
ernment as duty bearer (Goetz & Jenkins 2005); improved plan and budget re-
sponsiveness to local priorities (Aber 1998); improved quality of services deliv-
ered (Picciotto 1995; Sharpe 1998); increased policy implementation support 
and share of manager’s dilemmas (Cernea 1991); cost-sharing through benefici-
aries’ contribution and compulsion of leaders for more efficient use of resources 
(Alesina 1994); inclusiveness of the marginalized and transparency by policy 
managers (Hydén 1992; Seragaldin 1996); empowerment of beneficiaries (Brat-
ton 1990; Frischtak 1994); and check and balance on the traditional dominance 
and power wielding by technocratic elites (Brinkerhoff, 1996). 
                                                 
1  While Chambers (1988: 9-12) identifies the basic principles of participation that Ga-
venta (1998: 13) operationalize as ‘handing over the stick’, institutional change, and 
collaboration, Pretty (1994) models a seven component typology of participation 
that Lane (1995: 183) and Mikkelsen (2005: 61) summarizes in 4-forms of participa-
tion. 
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However it is important to note that these gains from popular participation in 
policy processes entails a shift away from informative and consultative parti-
cipation to shared and collaborative approach where the leaders work hand in 
hand with their led (Blackburn & Holland 1998). This is because what gives 
real meaning to popular participation is the collective effort of the people 
concerned to pool their efforts and whatever other resources they decide to pool 
together, in order to attain objectives they set for themselves (Higgins 1996: 
447; Rondenelli 1983: 113). 
Therefore, while Keely & Scoones (2000) point to the leading role that poli-
tics play in shaping policies, Rebecca Sutton (1999) argues that policy process 
should be owned by the people and it should involve organizations outside the 
government as well. Lakwo (2003) echoes this view when he notes that policy 
makers then need to shift away from ‘closed door’ to ‘open door’ policy making 
processes so that they can ably supply the direly needed services according to 
the demands of their constituencies. 
In all, participation is seen as opening space for a common agenda through 
public dialogue so that all voices are heard. Yet, this means that those res-
ponsible for opening space are willing to do so and those to take up such space 
and echo their voices are able to do likewise. Chapters 3 and 4 will dwell on 
showing how these are uphill tasks encumbered with both the strategic ex-
clusion of grassroots women by government officials and lack of political 
capabilities among the elected women leaders. Such gaps as I will explain in-
hibit women from meaningfully taking up the available political spaces to their 
own end. Unless addressed as chapter 5 will show, having women council struc-
tures and political quota alone for women is inadequate to make decentralized 
governance responsive and accountable. 
 
Citizenship  
For a long time Cornwall (2000) notes, would-be citizens were seen as the poor, 
beneficiaries, and users of government services ascribed as good for them 
forgetting that they have rights and identity that link their people-people and 
people-state relationship. This error in part Booth (2005) attributes to the failure 
of the aid paradigm that favoured making states effective through state building 
eschewed to increasing state’s capacity to provide and regulate services rather 
than state-citizen building. 
Citizenship building is a process of building agency, identity, dignity, and 
self-respect as the organizing principles for making people gain awareness of 
their rights in order to mobilize around local and sub-national issues of im-
portance to them (de Renzio et al. 2006). Thus, the sense of citizenship does not 
start with the state but people’s own gains in their entitlements, rights and res-
ponsibilities. Hence, citizenship building is about enhanced horizontal (citizen-
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community) and vertical (citizen-state) interactions for the benefit of the local 
people through forums created by the state, NGOs, self-organized movements 
or even through parallel governance structures (DRC 2006). In this way, Ga-
venta (2005: xii- xiv) notes, ‘the hitherto poor, beneficiaries, and users of donor/ 
government services become rightful and legitimate claimants of such services’. 
Gaventa (2006 citing Luckham et al. 2000: 22-23) therefore reiterates that 
citizenship building in this light of deepening democracy aims at developing 
and sustaining more substantive and empowered citizen participation in the 
democratic process beyond representative democracy (as is in decentralized 
governance). It transcends the oligarchic and elite capture of democracy be-
cause: (i) hollow citizenship violates the enjoyment of equal rights and entitle-
ments; (ii) lack of vertical accountability enables government and political elites 
to use state power for personal gains; and (iii) weak horizontal accountability 
breads tyranny among the executives in ways of manipulating checks and bal-
ances through patronage, corruption, and stifling dissents.  
The importance of citizenship in democratic decentralization relates to the 
centrality of political space as an arena within which hitherto voiceless political 
actors express their agency power. While Hickey & Mohan (2004) see such 
dynamics as the transformation of governance system, Gaventa (2004a) elo-
quently explains that citizen participation within public spaces changes the 
essence of participation from a nuance and dictated one into a balance in the 
citizen-state relations. Fung & Wright (2001: 24-25) links these changes to the 
emergence of ‘equality of power relations between citizens and the state’ and 
Cornwall & Gaventa (2001: 2-4) sums the change as what makes people 
‘markers and shapers of the processes of governance’. Rightly Phillips (1991) 
posits that citizenship presents the active condition of struggling to make rights 
real. Mukhopadhyay (1998) elongates this observation by noting that given the 
‘othering’ and exclusion within decentralized governance, ‘democracy needs to 
be seen as a critical resource rather than a structural guarantee’ to gender equal-
ity.  
To note is that political space can according to Guijt (2005) classification be 
‘formal by right’ or ‘formal by invitation’ as where legislative provisions pro-
vide for inclusion and where leaders chose who should be included respectively. 
It can also by Gaventa (2004a) and Cornwall (2002b) be ‘closed space’ as 
where no non-state actor inclusion occur; ‘invited space’ as Guijt’s formal by 
invitation; or ‘claimed/created space’ as where hitherto excluded groups on their 
own take up part of political arena from power-holders for their own benefits or 
where power-holders exclusively provide such spaces for such categories.2 
                                                 
2   For details on location and durability of political spaces, see Cornwall (2002a, 
2002b). 
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To sum up this debate, citizenship extends democracy away from the focus 
on voters to that of employers. It brings to fore the need for recognition, rights 
and responsibilities, inclusion and entitlements of the ordinary masses in gov-
ernance. These issues renders representative democracy inadequate because 
citizen engagement means increased people’s participation in, and control over, 
collective decision-making. Besides, it manifests democratic governance where 
the society, state, and the market interact without the hegemony of rule of mi-
nority representatives. In the view of Avritzer (2002), the ‘participatory public’ 
narrows the gap between political space and political representation in the state-
society relation. This is what Ackerman (2004) terms as ‘co-governance’ given 
that citizens participate in public choices with the state.3  
 
Accountability  
The bulk of recent literature on accountability at best tie it to the responsiveness 
of the state to citizens’ voice in order to avoid ‘voice without influence’ that can 
disillusion especially the marginalized and excluded citizens from influencing 
policies and institutions (McGee et al. 2004). They also transcend accounta-
bility debates beyond the often abused supply side of financial probity (mecha-
nisms to spend money well) of government by putting forth the demand side of 
opening up budget processes both for local views on needs to be included in 
resource allocations and citizen oversight roles on budget execution. This sup-
ply and demand balance Bosworth (2005) notes make accountability dualistic in 
its objective and a power game between unequal actors. The World Bank suc-
cinctly concludes on this argument when it noted that it is important to:  
[…] fully institutionalize participative mechanisms, to involve societal actors from 
the beginning of the design stage of the process, to open up participation to a wide 
diversity of social and political actors, and to complement decentralization with cen-
tralized supervision (2004: 2). 
Failures to do so, the World Bank (2004: 4) argues from its lesson in the 
Latin America and Caribbean region drawing on the works of Ackerman 
(1999), Fox (1994), and Stigler (1971) respectively, leads to 3-Cs, namely: 
corruption (that enriches individual bureaucrats and hampers services delivery 
thus distorting the market), clientelism (where public resources are channelled 
to a specific group thus limiting political competition and effective resource 
allocation) and capture (where economic rent is provided to specific economic 
                                                 
3  Note that this society-state partnership can be opened up by either initiatives from 
above (supply side) or that from below (demand side). Participatory planning, bud-
geting, implementation and M&E are renowned ways of balancing this supply and 
demand sides as they allow for a direct citizens engagement with the state both in 
resource allocations as well as resource utilization and public accountability. 
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actors thereby jeopardizing the position of consumers, workers and the environ-
ment). 
Thus, accountability especially of state officials involves answerability (obli-
gations to inform about and explain what they are doing), enforcement (the 
capacity to impose sanctions on those who violate their public duties), and 
receptiveness/responsiveness (capacity of officials to take into account citizens’ 
knowledge and opinion). These dimensions of accountability (in the view of 
Behn 2001 cited p. 8) yield: (i) financial accountability concerned with finan-
cial accounting; (ii) accountability for fairness that focuses on adherence to 
ethical standards; and (iii) performance accountability that looks at the accom-
plishment of agreed upon public needs (pp. 7-8). While the first two dimensions 
are concerned with how the government does what it does they can be effec-
tively gauged using legal accountability measure, the third, however, requires 
an assessment of public policy (plans and budget) using relevance, efficiency, 
effectiveness, sustainability, and impact tests. 
Seen in this way, then, government accountability cannot be pursued by 
purely voting (vertical accountability) alone, given that the voters and elected 
leaders must tango before the next election when every politician/party regime 
is evaluated. Horizontal (state and non-state inter-agency) accountability adds 
to the leader-led accountability as every actor (from state and society – people 
and their support agencies) has special interest to be pursued. 
However, Fung & Wright (2003) note that the effectiveness of such state-
society relation is determined by first, the democratic space made available by 
committed bureaucrats (is the arena available?); second, the inclusiveness of 
such spaces (who can participate?); and third, the openness with which such 
space and actors therein can engage and dialogue (how is bargaining, interest 
aggregation and power shared?). These will be the focus of chapters 4, 5, 6 and 
7. 
Social accountability: The organizing principle 
I have argued above that decentralization pillars on the effective transformative 
participation of local actors in policy processes not as mere beneficiaries but as 
citizens with rights and claims over government officials who instead are ex-
pected to reciprocate by being responsive to and accountable for those needs. 
Social accountability as an umbrella concept best describes this situation where 
citizens and state actors in the words of Helmsing (2005) ‘dance on the same 
arena and to the same tune’. 
According to Laney (2003), social accountability is all about the civic en-
gagement of citizens and civil society organizations with state institutions. The 
primary aim for doing so is to ensure state accountability to its constituency. 
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And the central focus is on citizen participation in the processes of public 
resource management.4 Within the decentralization context, therefore, social ac-
countability can be seen as a process of ensuring that civic actors fully partici-
pate in the allocation, disbursement, and monitoring and evaluation of decen-
tralized resources in view of agreed upon goals.5  
Malena et al. (2004: 1) elongate this debate by arguing that besides the 
supply-side of accountability expected to be provided by duty-bearers to rights-
holders, social accountability also aims at enhancing the demand-side by en-
abling citizens to engage with government officials (public servants and politi-
cians) in a more informed, direct, and constructive manner. This is because 
overtime ‘governance crisis’ (Paul 2002) or ‘legitimacy crisis’ (Gaventa 2002) 
has characterized citizen-government relations as citizens are denied presence, 
voice, and benefits by their very elected leaders. 
The principle of social accountability according to Ackerman (2004) is that 
accountability should ideally be applied before, during, and after the exercise of 
public authority (see Table 2.1 on the how of public resource management). In 
this vein, social accountability is executable at two distinct but interlinked 
stages within the government policy processes: 
• Citizen participation during the planning and budget formulation and ana-
lysis processes. This guarantee responsiveness to local needs and dialogue 
on preferred needs from the various interest groups; and 
• Citizen participation during government plan and budget implementation. 
Herein, both actors will ensure adherence to the agreed upon projects with-
out manipulations thereby promoting a process of routine and honest moni-
toring of and reporting on the performance of approved plan and budget to 
beneficiaries as well as to the funders. 
• Such synergetic relation is why Malena et al. (2004: 4-5) echo that social 
accountability ‘improves governance’ – through enabling voice of the electo-
rates to matter in the policy board room; increases ‘development effective-
ness’ – by breaking information asymmetry between state agencies and the 
populace; and leads to ‘empowerment’ – by reactivating political space for  
 
                                                 
4   My focus on resource other than expenditure management is because the latter is 
only concerned one side of the equation (expenses) neglecting that how and why 
what is spent is generated is vital in poverty reduction. Such an insight of balancing 
income and expenditure equation now informs participatory poverty resource moni-
toring albeit is community approach dilemma. 
5   Laney (2003) enumerates a number of tools that are used in social accountability, 
namely: citizen participation in public policy making, participatory budgeting, pub-
lic expenditure tracking, citizen monitoring of public services, citizen advisory 
boards, and lobbying and advocacy campaign. 
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Table 2.1 Participatory public expenditure management scheme 
 Budget 
formulation 
 Budget  
 analysis 
Budget 
expenditure 
Performance 
monitoring 
Key process Budget conference Sectoral 
committee 
analysis 
Budget 
disbursement for 
services delivery 
Budget accounting 
and progress 
reporting 
Actors  State actors, CSOs 
and the general 
public 
Members of 
sectoral 
committees 
Technical sector 
staff and outsource 
agencies 
Elected leaders and 
technical staffs 
Pre-
occupation & 
justification 
Needs 
identification from 
public voice 
Resource 
allocation in 
adherence to 
national policy 
frameworks & 
equity concerns 
Services delivery 
in line with agreed 
upon plans 
Assessing value-for 
money, operational 
effectiveness 
 
 
the excluded in governance arena. Therefore, social accountability brings to 
light a rights-based approach to development where participation of the poor, 
government responsiveness to the needs identified, as well as upholding trans-
parency of actions undertaken become mandatory (Malena 2004: 7). 
A growing fashionable way of promoting social accountability nowadays  
is through making government spending more pro-poor. Deborah Bräutigam 
(2004: 653) lists an array of approaches such as ‘people’s budget, alternative 
budget, women’s budget, and participatory budgeting’. Of these, Participatory 
Budgeting/Gender Budgeting are the most popular.6  
                                                 
6   Matovu & Mumvuma of Municipal Development Programme for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (2007) defines participatory budgeting as a continuous, open and 
inclusive process divided into distinct stages, by which citizens and sub-national 
governments widen mechanisms for promoting direct and indirect citizen participa-
tion in identifying local needs, deciding preferences as well as the implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of the budget taking into account expenditure require-
ments and the available income resources. In short the process therefore involves de-
bating, analyzing, prioritizing, mobilizing resources, monitoring and evaluating the 
expenditure of public funds and investments. 
The May 2003 ‘Opinion on Gender Budgeting’ by EU Advisory Committee of 
Equal Opportunities for Women and Men notes that Gender budgeting is an appli-
cation of gender mainstreaming in the budgetary process. It means a gender-based 
assessment of budgets, incorporating a gender perspective at all levels of the bud-
getary process and restructuring revenues and expenditures in order to promote 
gender equality. The aim herein is to ensure that (i) expenditures are specifically 
targeted at women; (ii) women and men gain equal opportunity initiatives in the 
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The focus of these approaches on the budget is because in spite of the budget 
being a vital socio-political and economic policy instrument of government, 
traditionally its decision-making was the preserve of government officials (see 
Table 2.1 and Box 2.1 below). Citizens who contributes (in)directly to public 
resources were positioned as mere beneficiaries of budget decision. Often, this 
culminated into weak budget transparency and accountability with increased 
leakage of public resources (through corruption and ineffective services de-
livery). 
Thus, by ensuring that the budget process is participatory, Matovu & 
Mumvuma (2008: 8-13) presents an elaborate list of benefits of participatory 
budgeting to governments, citizens, and the private sector core of which are the 
credibility, legitimacy, responsiveness, and transparency of services delivery. de 
Renzio et al. (n.d.: 6) reiterates that social accountability increases the quality 
and quantity of budget information to the public, improves budget literacy to 
those who initially lacked knowledge of economic issues, and strengthens 
budget policy processes in terms of public participation. Further, Mehrotra 
(2006) points out that it challenges clientelism approach dominant in traditional 
local governance practices. And Robinson (2006: 18-26) notes that it increases 
budget allocation for social welfare expenditure overtime while concurrently 
reducing budget misallocations; something that enhances resource availability 
for development investments at the local levels. It is also noted to enhance 
answerability of political leaders thereby reducing corruption (Crook & Manor 
(1998).  
From the above alluded to gains it can be argued that social accountability is 
a vital approach for ensuring that the budget processes involve the poor and 
marginalized (participatory budgeting), budget allocations are for needed ser-
vices (allocation efficiency and effectiveness), budget utilization are in line with 
agreed upon priorities (utilization discipline), and eventually end-users are in-
                                                 
 
public sector; and (iii) public actors show gender impacts of public budget expen-
diture. 
AFARD fashions participatory and gender budgeting into Participatory Gender 
Planning and Budgeting. This is done because on the one hand participatory bud-
geting downplays the centrality of planning that is assumed to occur automatically; 
presupposes that development targeting caters for gender equality concerns; assumes 
that participation of the marginalized groups is an integral part of the participating 
public; and takes it that gender concerns are inherently covered in budgets. On the 
other hand gender budgeting focuses on budget outcomes without concerns for bud-
get formulation mechanics; approaches plans and budget in an ex ante and ex post 
manner downplaying the manipulations in budget execution; hinges on elite power 
and has tools that can not be used by illiterate populace; and suffers from govern-
ment inability to target their outreach by gender.  
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formed of what their budget actually did (budget transparency). Herein, the 
traditional notion that budgets and budget processes are technical and a preserve 
of policy-makers and their technocrats because the ordinary people do not 
comprehend budget issues is weaned off as many people access information 
about the budget. In the process, government legitimacy is improved as more 
citizens start to engage in public budget management thereby regaining their 
space and confidence in government. By so doing, government resource allo-
cation manipulations and inequalities are exposed and resolved amicably. Asso-
ciated with this is the aspect of increased responsiveness and transparency as 
more people would know what were agreed upon and question any deviation. 
This is what Goetz & Jenkins (2005: 15) term as the ‘new accountability 
agenda’. 
 
 
Box 2.1 Importance of the budget in development policy  
Elson (1997) writing on gender budgeting points out that (engendering) the budget leads 
to: 
 
1. Adherence to laws and regulations especially that of Convention for Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) thereby furthers women's and human 
rights.  
2. Policy relevance, transparency, and accountability because the consumers of gov-
ernment services deserves what they need (policy relevance), and in a more par-
ticipatory manner (transparency and accountability). 
3. Equitable share of public resources between women and men and impact-oriented 
programming given that resources are aligned to result-based specific gender needs 
rather than resource-driven planning and budgeting.  
4. Empowerment of women as more women join in to participate in and question 
public decisions wherein their political entitlements are widened. 
5. Space to advocate and lobby political support to gender equality as more results of 
unequal resource allocations and results provide avenue for dialogue on the better 
ways forward.  
Source: Elson (1997) 
 
 
Recasting this debate back to the focus of this study, it is important to point 
out that within decentralized governance grassroots women are expected to 
benefit in mainly in the form of services delivery that can improve their quality 
of life. Such gains should come through government responsiveness and ac-
countability to their needs. Women leaders are specifically positioned within 
and parallel to local government structures primarily for this interest. The cen-
tripetal avenue resides in public resource management where women’s prefer-
ential needs should also find a place on poverty resource allocation agenda, be 
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funded and reported on. As such, decentralized development should not be 
given as a handout or privilege to women by the powers that be. Rather, women 
should enter decentralized policy arena, echo out their needs and ensure that the 
needs are addressed as a matter of justified women’s rights and claims. 
Decentralization process in Uganda 
What is clear from the vast documentations about decentralization in Uganda is 
that although Uganda had through the 1919 and 1955 Local Government Ordi-
nances and District Administration Ordinances and 1962 Constitution adopted 
some partial decentralization, the 1966 coup and its 1967 Local Administration 
Act and Urban Authority Act centralized all functions hitherto devolved to local 
authorities (Burke 1964; Munyonyo 1999). 
This situation continued until 1986 when the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) took over power. The NRM was inspired to decentralize governance to 
local authorities. Mutabwire (2007: 24) closely link this desire to decentralize to 
three crises the NRM regime experienced, namely: 
An institutional crisis that had paralyzed the functioning of central government; a 
legitimacy crisis that had created a large chasm between the populace and govern-
ance; and the inconsistence between the people-centred administrative system the 
NRM had set up in liberated areas during the 1981-85 civil war and the highly cen-
tralized structures it inherited on taking power. 
No doubt, the 1987 Commission of Inquiry chaired by Prof. Mahmood 
Mamdani, among others, recommended decentralized local governance. The 
1987 Resistance Councils Statute was then enacted upon this recommendation 
and it reversed the centralized governance although it did not offer authority or 
autonomy in the management of human and financial resources. Following the 
Presidential Policy Statement of 1992, 13 pilot districts were decentralized in 
1993 under the Decentralization Statute enacted that same year with the ob-
jectives as summarized in Box 1.1. This statute was crystallized in the 1995 
Constitution (section II (iii)) and harmonized in the Local Governments Act 
(LGA) 1997 (now amended 6 times). These objectives can be summarized as 
the creation of functioning local bureaucracies under the direction of account-
able and democratically elected leaders (Councils) who take responsibility for 
the development and good governance of the people in the geographical juris-
dictions.   
The Act provided for a vertical layering of local government structures start-
ing with local council 1(village/LC 1) and 2 (parish/ward/LC 2) as administra-
tive units up to local government units 3 (sub county/town council/LC 3), 4 
(county/LC 4), and 5 (City, Municipal, and district/ LC 5). These units are filled  
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Box 2.2 Objectives of decentralization in Uganda 
According to Apollo Nsibambi (1998) the objectives of decentralization in Uganda in 
line with Statutes No. 15 of 1993 were to:  
• transfer real power to the local governments and thus reduce the work load on re-
mote and under-resourced central officials; 
• bring under control (political, managerial, and administrative) the delivery of ser-
vices to local people to improve effectiveness and accountability and to promote a 
sense of people’s ownership of local government programmes and projects; 
• free managers in local government from constraints of central authorities to allow 
them to develop organizational structures that are tailored to local conditions; 
• improve financial accountability and responsible use of resources by establishing a 
clear link between the payment of taxes and the provision of the services they fi-
nance; and 
• improve the capacity of local governments to plan, finance, and manage the deliv-
ery of services to their constituents. 
 
 
with elective positions and in some cases (unit 2, 3, 4 & 5) with technical 
staffs.7 
These legal and administrative frameworks devolved power to higher (LC 5) 
and lower (LC 3) local governments. Besides, the Act made local governments’ 
body corporate and not central government subordinates (Kuenberg & Porter 
1998). Local governments were therefore empowered to be able to sue or be 
sued; initiate and approve own plans, budgets, and bye-laws except those bye-
laws contrary to the Constitution and other laws; hire and fire staff, and to re-
voke the services of its councilors. These were roles hitherto performed by the 
Minister of Local Government.  
Equally arising from the incremental approach to administrative decentrali-
zation to local governments the following were undertaken: first, personnel 
decentralization was effected. Local governments under their District Service 
Commissions took over 70% of the national Public Service staffs and had the 
discretion to hire and retain staffs (although now tendencies of recentralization 
are evident). 
Second, fiscal decentralization was initiated with 38% of the national budget 
then spent on local governments. Sequentially, central government decentra-
lized recurrent budget starting with the vote system in 1993/94. In the next 
years, block grants and Poverty Action Funds were (and are being) transferred 
                                                 
7  According to the Auditor General’s report 2007 there are 80 districts, 13 Municipal 
councils, 91 Town councils and 897 sub counties and division of urban councils. 
Mutabwire (2007: 8) shows that there are 900 counties, 5,500 parishes/wards and 
45,000 villages. 
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through the systems of unconditional grants, conditional recurrent grants, condi-
tional development grants, and equalization grants.8 This was done to ensure: (i) 
increased responsiveness of political leaders to locally chosen development 
needs; (ii) which would stimulate community participation and trust in their 
local governance; and (iii) role segregation with central government setting the 
national statutory and regulatory frameworks as well as undertaking mentoring, 
monitoring and regulating roles.  
Lastly, financial accountability mechanisms were established. A number of 
legislations were put in place. For instance, the Inspector General of Govern-
ment Act 2002, Leadership Code Act 2002, Public Finance and Accountability 
Act 2003, Public Procurement and Disposal of Asset Act 2003. Accompanying 
these acts were the setting up of independent offices such as the Inspector 
General of Government, Public Procurement and Disposal of Asset Authority, 
District Tender Boards, (Parliamentary/Local Government) Public Accounts 
Committee, District Auditors, and Annual Performance Assessment.  
Uptake of gender concerns 
To ensure that decentralization was cognizant of gender equality, the NRM 
furthered an all-inclusive politics that recognized women’s participation. Com-
mentators like Tidemand (1994: 78-79) argues that women’s inclusion into 
NRM popular politics was because first, women’s competence during the bush 
war brought it to power and second, women being less threatening politically 
provided an avenue for secure electoral victory. With such a view, Tamale 
(1999: 19) notes that ‘the taking of women aboard the NRM political concord 
was an ex-post reward for past support to the movement and ex-ante enticement 
for future political base. 
Nonetheless, women’s inclusion met with a number of legislative and policy 
measures. First, by Act of Parliament, the 1993 Women Council Statute estab-
lished a parallel Women Council structure that run from the village to the na-
tional levels as the champions of women’s affairs.  
Second, the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution also known as a ‘wo-
men’s constitution’ according to Waliggo (2002: 138) engendered Ugandan 
society. This Constitution recognizes the full rights of women as subjects and 
not as objects. It promotes women’s involvement in decision-making such as by 
establishing 1/3 quota position for women in local governance and a district 
woman representative in parliament. It also provided for equal opportunity in 
leadership and in the job markets with equal pay and equal access to health and 
                                                 
8  Now 80-85% of local governments are central government fund dependent. 
  27 
 
education services. It opposed cultural rigidities but provided for affirmative 
action. 
The Constitution was further enriched by the 1997 national Gender Policy 
and the 1997 LGA promotion of popular participation for both men and women 
in the country’s development processes and outcomes. 
Summing up 
This chapter revealed that decentralization policy brings governance closer to 
women and men allowing them to become active agents for their improved 
quality of life either directly or through their representative. It also revealed that 
Uganda adopted mixed decentralization policies – democratic, personnel, fiscal, 
and market decentralization, and is committed to gender equality. However, 
what matters for gender equality is beyond the legal and policy statements con-
cerned with opening political spaces and providing political representation for 
women. It requires engendering development so that gender gaps and discri-
minations that bias against women are dealt with. The next chapters explore if 
this is happening.  
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Figure 3.1 Map of Uganda showing Nebbi district 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vict
oria Nil e
A
lb
er
t
N
ile
  
3 
Decentralization and services  
delivery in Nebbi district 
This chapter underscores the implementation of decentralization policy. Nebbi 
district, one of the 80 districts in the country, is used as a case study to show 
how decentralization policy is enmeshed with inability to promote local dev-
elopment. An analysis of the budget management at both the district and lower 
local government levels are presented to show how women, the majority popu-
lation, are missing out on the increasing decentralized budgets largely central 
government funded. 
About Nebbi district 
Nebbi district, located 400 kms from Kampala (the capital city) in north-western 
Uganda, is one of the 80 districts in Uganda. The district was one of the 14 
districts that were decentralized in the second phase of the decentralization 
process in the country in 1994/95. 
Administratively, Nebbi district has 16 sub-counties, 3 town councils, 89 
parishes and 1,329 villages. According to the result of the 2002 Population and 
Housing Census, the population of the district totals to 435,360 (living in 
90,040 households with an average of 6 people per household). Of these: (i) 
52% are females and 48% males; (ii) 56% are children below 18 years; (iii) 
92% live in rural areas and (iv) 85% and only 9% depends on subsistence 
farming and waged employment respectively. The active population aged 14-64 
years who are unemployed constitute up to 38% of the active population.  
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In the district, 6 in every 10 people live on less than US $ 1 a day. Literacy 
status stands at 62% and gross enrolment rate in primary schools is only 78%. 
Access to safe water and latrines is 65% and 44% respectively. Only a negli-
gible proportion of the population (0.5%) has access to (thermal) electricity and 
those who own a permanent housing unit are only 3%. There are about 44,000 
people per medical doctor and maternal mortality rates (506/100,000) and infant 
mortality rates (147/1,000) are exceptionally high. HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is 
4.4% with some cases especially among the fishing communities showing extra 
high VCT sero-positivity rate (20-30%). It is, therefore, not surprising that the 
life expectancy in the district is only 46 years. 
The functions of local governments 
The Constitution, 1995 (articles 97, 98, 176(2), 190 and the 6th schedule) as en-
shrined in the Local Governments Act, 1997 (section 7, 31, 36, 37, 38, 75, and 
the 2nd and 4th schedules) stipulates the functions of local councils in regards to 
planning (see Box 3.1 for a summary).  
 
 
Box 3.1 Functions of local governments in Uganda 
• Provide vertical and horizontal information and insights to all stakeholders; 
• Coordinate the mapping and mobilization of local capacities and resources espe-
cially the informal private sector with the expectation that this will promote local 
economic growth, employment and production of surplus that the local government 
can in turn tax; 
• Provide a domestic framework to promote the participatory formulation, conceptu-
alization and operationalization of local development plans;  
• Ensure the fair and equitable targeting of poverty reduction programmes at the local 
level;  
• Facilitate the development of socio-economic and physical infrastructure; and 
• Generate greater trust and accountability between state and its citizens by involving 
local leaders, entrepreneurs and civic organizations in democratic dialogue and in 
the workings of government. 
 
Source: LGA 1997 (Schedule 2) 
 
 
These functions are intricately linked to the various services local govern-
ments are expected to deliver to their constituencies (for details see LLG 1997, 
4th Schedule). Thus, to deliver these services as body corporate, local govern-
ments are required to: 
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• Establish a functional District Planning Unit that is charged with planning 
facilitation, coordination and negotiation roles at the district level; 
• Have functional Technical Planning Committee composed of technical per-
sonnel within the local government (from both government and NGOs); and 
• Develop a comprehensive and integrated 3-Year Development Plan incorpo-
rating the plans of the lower level councils but in recognition of national 
priorities. 
Evidently these functions indicate that generally local governments are ex-
pected to catalyze the processes of development, acting as facilitators rather 
than as controllers of the processes. As such, government officials and the elec-
torates are to co-govern through a process of participatory public policy man-
agement.  
Such an orientation to co-governance should take care of the traditionally 
“messy policy processes” (Dresang & Gosling 1989: 146-172; Juma & Clarke 
1995) by accommodating the diverse values, needs, and politics that are in-
volved in the process (Nakamura & Smallwood 1980: 46-66; Levine, Peters & 
Thompson 1990: 81-99).  
To do so, under decentralization, districts and lower local governments are 
mandated to plan for their areas of jurisdiction so that annually they deliver 
services in conformity with the local development needs. The planning function 
is to accelerate the pace and spread the benefit of growth with efficient allo-
cative geographic dimension (where to place investments); social dimension 
(who should benefit from the investments); and institutional dimension (what 
agency or who should be in charge of it) (Prud’homme 1995) basing on the 
available resource envelops (Sai 1993: 11-12). 
Programmes implemented by Nebbi district 
In order to execute the above functions, right from its decentralization in the 
financial year 1994/95, the various report from the District Planning Unit 
(DPU) revealed that Nebbi district undertook to implement a number of national 
priority area programmes together with what are prioritized locally, namely: 
 
The plan for modernization of agriculture (PMA) 
PMA is a multi-sector conditional grant meant to modernize agriculture and 
enhance agricultural productivity. In Nebbi district PMA is implemented under 
three funding arrangements – PMA in all the 19 LLGs, the private sector-led 
advisory services (NAADS) and the Northwest Smallholders Development 
Project for the West Nile sub-region (NSADP). Attention herein is given to the 
agricultural modernization where from farm households can increase their pro-
ductivity, income and livelihood security.  
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Universal primary education (UPE) and school facility grant  
As part of the universal education policy, the district receives capitation grant 
for government aided schools based on their enrolment. It also receives funds 
for infrastructural development in the neediest schools. This covers the con-
struction of permanent classroom block and VIP latrines, and supply of school 
desks. Of these funds, the district retains 5% for monitoring functions. 
 
Rural roads and rural water conditional grant 
The 530 rural roads in the district started in 1995 with road opening works but 
have now reached the stage of maintenance and rehabilitation. This is mainly 
labour based. The district also receives funds for the provision of safe water 
through establishing new points and rehabilitating old ones. It has already 
benefited from SNV gravity water scheme (in Paidha town) and from the Direc-
torate of Water development’s small town water supply (in Nebbi and Pakwach 
town councils). An alternative water supply for Alwi dryland corridor is being 
explored by the Directorate of Water Development. 
 
Peace reconstruction and development plan (PRDP) 
PRDP is a major planning framework developed by the GoU under the Office 
of the Prime Minister for districts in Northern Uganda including Nebbi. The im-
plementation of this framework started with the resettlement of displaced people 
in Acholi and Lango Sub-region. 
 
Northern Uganda social action fund (NUSAF) 
By mid-2008, NUSAF had supported 309 sub projects worth UGX 3.9 billions. 
The district has a total of uncommitted balance of UGX 4.6 billions. More sub-
projects have been appraised and submitted to NUMU for funding. The district 
has restructured NUSAF management and consolidated involvement of LLGs to 
speed up process of mobilization, desk and field appraisal, accountability, tech-
nical supervision and monitoring, training of CPMCs and CFs.The district is 
committed to absorb the balance of fund in NUMU. 
 
Development assistance to refugee hosting areas (DAR)  
DAR is a tripartite programme between the Office of the Prime Minister, the 
German Development Services (DED) and the District. It focuses on health, 
education and water project particularly in the communities where refuges from 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Southern Sudan are settled. 
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TPO – West Nile project 
This is primarily a peace-building program that is supporting the reintegration 
of ex-combatants who benefited from Amnesty in the period 2002-2005 as well 
as the local community who suffered atrocities during the period of conflict.  
 
Rural electrification programme 
Through the Ministry of Local Government, community capacity is being built 
for the increasing rural electrification program. A private company – West Nile 
Rural Electrification Co. – supports this programme through the provision of 
thermal electricity in part of Arua and Nebbi district. It is also engaged in small 
hydro-electric power dam construction besides extension into Parombo via 
Angal and Nyaravur and to Pakwach Town Council. 
 
Bonna Bagaggawale (BB) 
As part of the 2006 Presidential manifesto of Prosperity for all program (BB), 
the district has joined the nation in promoting village Banks. So far, 17 of the 19 
LLGs have established functional village banks (known as Savings and Credit 
Cooperative Society – SACCO). These banks will act as conduits for the chan-
nelling of government microfinance for the active poor. 
Budget management 
The district implementation of all the above programmes is dependent on 
funding that it raises locally as well as it receives from donors and central 
government. Central government provides districts directly with Poverty Action 
Fund (PAF), Local Government Development Fund (LGDF), and Equalization 
Grants.  
These funds are required to be allocated in an efficient way so that effective 
and equitable development is attained. That is in part why decentralization in 
Uganda is tagged to 3Es – Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Equity. This therefore 
makes local government plans and budgets critical policy instrument that guide 
local government management.  
Evident from Figure 3.2 below is that generally Nebbi district’s budget has 
been steadily increasing over the years. This increase is also associated with a 
rising per capita from UGX 9,451 in the financial year 1995/96 to UGX 33,991 
in 2007/08. It is also evident from the figure that the rise in real terms in the 
total budget is associated with drastic decline in local revenue generation es-
pecially from the financial year 1999/2000 on wards (for details see Annexes 2 
& 3 on Nebbi district and LLGs budget performance). This decline then means 
that Nebbi district is largely dependent on central government and donor fund-
ing.  
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Figure 3.2 Nebbi district: actual budget performance, 1995-2007 
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Mutabwire (2007: 8-12) already cautioned that decentralization in Uganda is 
stifled by inadequate (and often dictated) financing that does not permit local 
governments to effectively respond to and even sustain their development 
needs. This is what Helmsing (2005: 15) terms ‘unfunded mandates’ that drives 
a high tendency for upward accountability than downward and performance ac-
countability. 
Such a rosy picture does not tell us how much people are benefiting from the 
budget. Thus, a closer analysis of budget allocation and disbursement at the 
lower local government levels as is presented in Figure 3.3 clearly depicts the 
inability of local government leaders (elected and appointed) to be responsive 
to, and accountable for local development needs.1 
By examining the proportion of all lower local government budgets allocated 
to the administrative sectors and services sector2 it became clear that LLGs (and 
                                                 
1  It was difficult to analyse the district budget due to the fact that the annual accounts 
for the various years do not tally income and expenditures.  
2  While the administrative sector includes Boards, Commissions and Council, Man-
agement Support Services, and Finance and Planning, services sector includes edu-
cation and sports, health and environment, production and marketing, natural re-
source management, technical service and works, and community based services. 
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expectedly their overseer the district local governments) are dishonest to their 
populace. They do not honour their budget commitment to services delivery 
during cash budget management. For instance, while 56% of the budget was 
allocated to deliver services it turned out that only 40% was disbursed to the 
services sector in the financial year 2003/04. As funds are disbursed to them, 
they shift away from spending on their commitments to the people to meeting 
administrative cost where they benefit most as one of Sub county Chief con-
fessed: 
When we are making the budget, politicians are happy to show to the people that 
much money is allocated to meeting the various services needed by the community. 
However, when funds are posted to our accounts, they prefer their allowances to be 
paid first. Often, many unplanned for meetings and trips also crop up. All these costs 
take precedence at the expense of the services that we had promised to deliver to the 
people in the course of the financial year. 
Such practices mean that the majority of the population (who unfortunately 
are women) do not benefit from the bulk of funds that central government 
remits to the districts for local development. It can be argued that LLG officials 
in this case prefer to reward themselves with funds that they should have used 
to provide services to the people they are employed to serve. It is therefore not  
 
 
 Figure 3.3  LLG budget management practice in 2004/05  
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surprising that in Nebbi district, a wide gender gap exists between men and 
women as can be exemplified below: 
• The literacy level between men and women stands at 78% and 56% res-
pectively. This is a cumulative effect of the lack of equity approach in 
promoting education given that even with the advent of universal primary 
education the general enrolment rate continues to vary between boys (136%) 
and girls (97%) while more boys (37%) than girls (7%) complete their pri-
mary education cycle with even more boys (78%) than girls (22%) attaining 
division 1-2 in primary leaving examinations. 
• More women (506/1,000 births) continue to die during unsupervised de-
livery especially from traditional birth attendants as access to medical care is 
limited by inadequacy of drugs and disillusioned staffs whose professional 
attitudes are contrary to medical ethics. Likewise many children die before 
seeing their first birth day (147/100,000 birth). 
• Many women are confined to subsistence farming (and continue to bear the 
brunt of food insecurity) without access to improved agricultural extension 
services as male contact farmers are preferred by political targeting of PMA/ 
NAADS programmes. 
The puzzle 
From the above analysis it is evident that, first, women who lack educational 
knowledge with which to join civil service and therefore can only benefit more 
from services sector budget are denied this opportunity as much of the funds 
remitted to the district is spent on administration. Without recognition and voice 
of the women constituency it can be construed that women are denied public 
services from LLGs not entirely from the ‘sin of omission’ that LLGs do not 
have the funds with which to deliver services. Rather it is largely due to ‘sins of 
commission’ (Mehta 2005) because state power-holders prefer to fund what 
benefit them. 
It can therefore be concluded that generally decentralization has not made 
women’s quality of life and the inherent gender equality therein any better. 
Rather, it is perpetuating gender inequalities as the predominantly male politi-
cians and technical staffs prefer to reward themselves at the expense of the 
masses they ought to serve. This is what Lakwo (2003) referred to as decentrali-
zation has turned into “democratic centralism” and Schuurman (1997: 152) that 
‘decentralization in itself in no way guarantee that things will improve for the 
poor’. Local governments are simply non-responsive and non-accountable to 
their constituencies (Nerfin 1987). 
In a dialogue meeting held in 2005 to explore why LLG budgets are in-
sensitive to Services sectors from which majority of people, especially women, 
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would benefit local government officials pointed out at two critical issues, 
namely: first, women generally do not participate in policy-making processes 
where the cake (budget) is shared; and second, that women leaders do not ef-
fectively represent and push for the needs of women. While the absence of 
women in the policy arena should not be a license for them to be denied access 
to mandatory government services, such a response shows how ‘decentralized 
despotism’ (Mamdani 1996) operates within local political arena. It also shows 
how the elected leaders and technocrats have captured local governance (Van de 
Welle & Need 1995; Mehrotra 2006) to the detriment of women. Finally, it 
shows that the presence of women leaders within the local government systems 
is no automatic guarantee that women will benefit from the assumed proximity 
of decentralized governance. Unchallenged, no significant change can be ex-
pected in the quality of life of women.  
While this observation tends to present a justified case for the optimism ex-
pressed about the need for building women’s political capabilities, it remains 
unclear from local government assertion to what extent grassroots women are 
not participating in local policy-making processes as well as how ineffective 
women leaders are in representing women’ interests on the resource allocation 
agenda. Understanding these gaps provides a basis for identifying what strategy 
should be adopted in promoting women’s political engagement.  
Answers to these uncertainties are explored in-depth in the next two chapters 
that deal with individual survey of the extent to which grassroots women parti-
cipate in annual planning/budgeting processes and how effective women leaders 
are in representing women’s interest. 
 
 
  
4 
Women’s participation  
in policy processes 
This chapter deals with the earlier noted dilemma that unequal resource allo-
cation in part emanates from women’s non-participation in local decision-
making processes. It explores to what extent and how women are participating 
in the local government policy process using findings from an individual sur-
vey. Finally, the chapter presents the implications of the findings to democratic 
governance and women’s development. 
Assessing the participation of women 
It was echoed by many local government officials that women are losing out on 
budget support because of non-participation in the local policy processes. How 
true such an assertion is, more so from men who can be construed to defend 
their dividends from a lack of women’s participation, therefore called for a 
field-based empirical study. AFARD teamed up with Action Aid International 
in Uganda (Nebbi Development Initiative) to conduct this study with both 
parties providing technical and financial support respectively. 
 
Study objective and scope 
This study aimed at understanding women’s ineffective participation in the local 
government policy-making processes primarily for a pragmatic policy action. 
Doing so was seen would enable AFARD to (i) explain why women have in-
effective participation in local government planning processes so that (ii) ap-
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propriate actions can be taken to explore within the policy arena how women’s 
citizenship entitlements can be enhanced. The opening of such a space is rele-
vant to ensure that as citizens, women demand for services (by participating in 
decision-making processes) and guarantee that such services are provided time-
ly and in the right quality and quantity (by holding local government leadership 
accountable). 
 
The study question 
To achieve the above objective, this study asked a central question: to what 
extent and with what effects are grassroots women participating in the decen-
tralized development planning and budgeting in Nebbi district lower local gov-
ernments?  
Herein decentralized development planning is seen as the entire process of 
local government planning and budgeting cycle which involves planning, bud-
geting, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation.  
The central question was broken down into sub-questions as below:  
1. How is decentralized development planning and budgeting process struc-
tured? 
2. To what extent are grassroots women participating in these processes? 
3. What challenges impede their participation?  
4. What are the implications of such participation to women’s development? 
 
Data collection methods 
Answers to the above questions were got from an individual survey among 
randomly sampled grassroots women drawn from one LLG per county. Three 
LLGs of Panyimur in Jonam county, Akworo in Padyere county, and Paidha 
Town Council in Okoro county (with eleven parishes/wards - Nyakagei, Ganda, 
and Boro in Panyimur; Kasatu, Murusi, and Kituna in Akworo; and Central, 
Omua, Cana and Oturgang in Paidha TC) were covered.  
A study team composed of 6 research assistants drawn from civil society 
organizations, local government, and the District Women Council (DWC) under 
the team leadership of AFARD participated in the study. 
Methodological triangulation was used in data collection. A quantitative in-
dividual survey was conducted only among grassroots women. The interviewers 
randomly sampled these women radiating outwards from the LLG headquarters. 
The survey used a short, closed, and open-ended questionnaire that captured 
data in regards to the women’s knowledge of and participation in local govern-
ment planning processes. 
Besides, qualitative methods were also used. Focus group discussions 
(FGDs) involving 30 participants per local government were held. Participants 
  
 
40
in these meetings were women from women council I-III, women councillors, 
female youth council, female person with disabilities and representative of 
women groups. The FGDs primarily focused on the institutional analysis as to 
why the women leaders think the grassroots women don’t participate in the 
planning processes. To complement the FGD, video recording and photography 
were also done.  
Key informant interviews were conducted with LLG technical and political 
leadership especially the Sub-county chiefs/Town clerks, Sub-accountants/ 
Town Treasurers, Assistant Community Development Officers, Secretaries for 
Finance and Planning and Chairpersons LC III. In total, 12 people were inter-
viewed. These are people who spearhead the planning processes in their local 
councils. They are not only aware of the practices undertaken but also know 
why they adopt certain practices even if it does not conform to the prescribed 
guidelines of Ministry of Local Government and Ministry of Finance, Planning 
and Economic Development. 
Documentary review complemented these other methods. It involved a lite-
rature study on decentralization, participation, women, gender and development. 
LLG budgets and plans were also reviewed using the approved LLG guidelines 
to ascertain whether the prescribed processes are always followed. 
Finally, a feedback and strategy workshop was held. The workshop aimed at 
widening the understanding of the insights of how decentralized planning is 
conducted in practice in Nebbi district, why and how women are involved, and 
what ought to be done for an effective participation of women in the local 
government planning processes. Political and technical leaders from both the 
study LLGs and the district local government participated in this workshop 
together with representatives of women councils and civil society organizations. 
During the workshop, the study findings were presented and the way forward 
was discussed and agreed upon. Thus, the leaders concerned with local develop-
ment processes were made aware of the effects of their policy practices on 
women’s participation in development policy processes.  
The approved planning framework 
In order to understand how the planning/budgeting cycle is managed, it was 
imperative to explore what steps must be followed and involving which actors 
(see Table 4.1). This we found in the Local Governments Act 1997 (section 36-
3) that provides for the district as well as the LLGs to develop comprehensive 
and integrated development plans that incorporates the plans of lower council 
administrative units (parishes and villages). This mandate is exercised through 
the planning and budgeting cycles guidelines provided by Decentralization 
Secretariat (2006a, 2006b) which, emphasize that first; villages should develop 
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their plans (often by listing their priorities) for onward submission to the 
parish/ward and eventually to the LLG. Figure 4.1 presents a summary of the 
planning cycle flow. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Prescribed decentralized planning process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Lakwo (2003). 
 
 
A two way process that should work in conformity characterizes this plan-
ning cycle: bottom-up (getting opinions from villages to the higher levels) and 
top-down (respecting guidelines and options from the centre downwards). Be-
fore the plan approval and implementation, a number of interconnected acti-
vities have to be implemented. Table 4.2 presents the summary of the various 
steps that must be adhered to. It is required that the people who should parti-
cipate in the process are not only knowledgeable of when these activities take 
place but also the importance attached to these planning interventions. 
In essence, therefore, under decentralization, district planning process should 
begin at the village levels, ascending to the parish levels and to the sub-county 
levels with a preliminary plan and budget conference. At the LLG, a similar 
process should be done and an annual plan submitted to the district level for the 
formulation of a comprehensive district development plan.  
 
District Level planning 
Sub-county (16 
units) 
Town councils (3 
units) 
Parish A Parish B Ward A Ward B 
Villages/cells 
89 
units 
19 
units 
1329 
units 
Planning 
Hierarchies or 
units 
  
Table 4.1 Prescribed local government planning and budgeting schedule 
Activities When to be done  Who are involved Expected outputs 
1.   Dissemination of policy and planning guidelines 30th September District and ministries • Circulars are sent to LLGs 
2.   Consultative meeting on: Implications of policy guidelines; 
plan-ning and budgeting processes; Participation of 
development part-ners in the process and areas of 
complementarities between govern-ment and partners; and 
Indicative planning figures by all actors 
1st week of October LLG executive 
committee, LG TPC, 
Development partners 
(CSO, NGOs) 
• Plan and budget process are synchronized 
• IPFs are declared by all partners including 
CSOs 
• Consensus with other actors is built 
3.   Dissemination of consultative meeting-planning and budgeting 
programme 
2nd week of 
October 
SCC/TC • Circulars on P&B are sent to LLC 
• Harmonized approach, process and timeframe 
4.   Community (village and parish) level consultations 2nd week of 
October 
Village and parish 
councils 
• Community priorities are identified 
5.   Consolidation and submission of community proposals and 
plans to LLG 
2nd week of 
November 
Parish Chief, parish 
councils, PDCs 
• Community are proposals consolidated and 
submitted 
6.   Planning and budgeting conference to review performance and 
agree on priorities 
15th November Council, TPC, 
Development partners 
• Priorities are agreed upon by a wide spectrum 
of the stakeholders 
7.   Consolidation and costing of LG priorities 3rd week of 
November 
TPC secretariat • Priorities are costed and consolidated 
8.   Discussion of LG draft plans and estimates 15th March Sectoral committees • Draft plan and budget are synchronized 
9.   Consolidation and incorporation of sectoral committee 
recommendations 
March-April Executive committee • Recommendations are incorporated into draft 
plan and budget 
10. Consolidation and preparation of LG three year draft plan and 
annual estimate 
30th May TPC secretariat • Final three year draft plan and annual estimate 
in place 
11. Presentation of LG three year plan and budget estimates to 
council for approval 
15th June Finance secretary/ 
Speaker 
• Annual plan and budget are approved 
12. Dissemination of information in plan and budget to HLG and 
LLCs 
30th June SCC/TC • Formal submission of approvals and 
recommendations to HLG and LLC 
13. Plan and budget implementation Continuous/ 
monthly 
PMCs, LCIII, LCII, LCI • Plan and budget are implemented 
14. Plan implementation reviews Quarterly Councils, CSO, TPC • Reviews are done 
Source: MoLG (2004) 
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Table 4.2 One-sample t-test for grassroots women participation 
 N Mean Std. t df Sig. (2- 
   Deviation   tailed) 
Participated in village 271 0.06 0.229 3.98 270 0.000* 
  mobilization       
Participated in village meeting 271 0.08 0.274 4.88 270 0.000* 
Participated in parish meeting 271 0.03 0.159 2.68 270 0.008* 
Participated in LLG budget 256 0.03 0.174 2.87 255 0.004* 
  conference       
Participated in LLG budget 271 0.01 0.121 2.01 270 0.045* 
  approval       
Received village feedback 271 0.04 0.189 3.22 270 0.001* 
Received parish feedback 271 0.01 0.121 2.01 270 0.045* 
Heard of parish development 271 0.12 0.323 6.01 270 0.000* 
  plan       
Heard of LLG plan 271 0.15 0.359 6.94 270 0.000* 
Aware of any services being 271 0.35 0.477 11.97 270 0.000* 
  delivered       
Participated in village 271 0.15 0.355 6.84 270 0.000* 
  implementation       
Participated in parish 271 0.03 0.180 3.05 270 0.003* 
  implementation       
Participated in LLG 271 0.03 0.159 2.68 270 0.008* 
  implementation       
Participated in village project 271 0.08 0.268 4.76 270 0.000* 
  M&E       
Participated in parish project 271 0.02 0.147 2.47 270 0.014* 
  M&E       
Participated in LLG project 271 0.03 0.180 3.05 270 0.003* 
  M&E       
Participated in LLG budget 271 0.00 0.000 - - - 
  M&E       
Participated in LLG PIC   M&E 271 0.00 0.000 - - - 
* denotes statistically significant at 5% and 1% 
Source: Individual survey 
 
 
This process involves de-briefing the community on Budget Framework 
Paper, Annual and Medium Term Budget and Annual and Medium Term Plan. 
It also involves the review of past performance – budget, projects, and linkages 
established; soliciting for proposals for implementation in the coming year; and 
prioritizing the activities identified. This also includes problem identification, 
data collection and analysis, generation of alternatives and choices and plan 
conference. 
These processes are ideally replicated in the feedback process whereby the 
district, after the plan approval on June 30th of every financial year, should brief 
the LLGs of their projects that have been adopted in the district plan/budget. 
Similarly, the LLG should give a feedback to the parishes which in turn should 
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provide a feedback to the villages on what priority areas have been identified 
and listed for implementation in the financial year. 
When properly followed, these processes should be able to open up local 
government system for the transparent participation of all actors. It should also 
make local government interventions local priorities responsive and people 
empowering as the state-market-civil society organization relations is improved 
(Griffin 1989). 
The extent to which women are participating 
Figure 4.2 shows the extent to which grassroots women are participating in the 
various planning and budgeting processes. While 89% of the 271 women inter-
viewed considered it their human rights to participate in such processes, a ma-
jority are shelved off from the policy making arena. What is apparently clear 
from this figure is that: (i) fewer women are participating in the policy pro-
cesses; and (ii) with increasing local government levels, political space gets 
narrower for women and, women’s participation continues to be limited. 
 
 
Figure 4.2   Women who participated in the 2005/06 planning/budgeting processes (%) 
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This observation is supported by the statistical analysis shown in Table 4.2 
and in Figure 4.2. These reveal the significance of the limited extent to which 
women are effectively present in all stages of the policy-making processes. 
They are excluded from echoing out their voices. Neither are women provided 
feedback of what projects have been approved for them in order to ably expect 
services delivery from their LLGs. As a result, women are generally unable to 
engage in the implementation of LLG development or even ask the leaders to 
account for (in-)actions. 
Impediments to women’s participation  
The main obstacles to women’s effective participation identified by the FGDs 
and key informants were related to: 
• Ineffectiveness of women leaders to champion women’s needs. It was noted 
that the elected women leaders were neither mobilizing grassroots women to 
participate in the planning processes nor were they performing their roles of 
representing women well. Women Councillors and Women Council Execu-
tives were noted to exhibit conflict of interest as the former considers itself 
superior to the latter. As such, they are not unified to echo a common voice.  
 
• Limited awareness of the planning and budgeting process: While 93% of the 
interviewed women indicated that it is important to have the annual planning 
process conducted in their villages, and 83% were willing to participate in 
them, only 32.2% were aware of any such planning meetings.  
 
• Exclusionary mobilization strategy. While in every LLG Parish Develop-
ment Committees (PDC) are in place with two people (a man and a woman) 
acting as the link with the LLG, it was found out that the level of women’s 
involvement in mobilization was minimum. Only 5.5% were involved in 
mobilization because they were mainly not informed to mobilize (60.1%). 
This shows foremost the intentional exclusion of the women constituency. 
Besides, the household-to-household approach used in mobilization, done by 
men, rarely finds women at home because they are busy meeting their sur-
vival needs. Worse of all, the male mobilizers employ selective mobiliza-
tion: first giving priorities to the men; secondly, to those who they perceive 
as knowledgeable and can offer developmental ideas; and lastly, to those 
with whom they share same political ideology. 
 
• Neglect for village level planning. Many LLGs and their administrative units 
ignore community participation in village planning. Rather, they prefer, as 
short cut due to time and resource constraints they argue, the LC1 execu-
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tives, Parish Chief and Parish Development Committee representatives to 
convene the village meetings and come up with their priorities. In Akworo 
LLG, the acting Sub-county Chief confirmed that no village planning meet-
ing was held except for some parish meetings which were held in Kituna and 
Rero. In Panyimur, a woman in Paryem-east Village noted that, 
In our village no meetings are held. I have never heard or seen it taking place. 
May be others who are more important than me are invited for such meetings. 
The only meeting I know of is that where LCs sit to settle disputes and get 
money from court fees. 
• Lack of facilitation during planning meetings. Often LLGs discriminately 
provide financial support for the participation of their officials. This denial 
affects the participation of a majority of women as a woman noted in Pany-
imur, 
If meals and even drinks can be provided during burials, funeral rites, marriage 
ceremonies… why can’t the same be done for our planning meetings if at all 
these meetings are very important for our development? Yet selectively LLG 
pay only their officials some funds as facilitation allowance. 
• Livelihood insecurity. Women are the main bread earners in many homes. 
However, most of the LLG planning timing does conflict with women’s 
work. In Paidha town, the women traders commonly known as “Abicamu-
kani” (or petty traders involved in immediate buying and reselling of goods 
in the market) noted that they are always busy and when invited for meetings 
the timing is not appropriate. The Speaker Paidha town in this regard con-
cluded that: 
On many occasions women are kept out of the political domain due to their 
heavy workload. As a result they (women) remain inadequately informed and 
unaware of not only government programmes but also their right to participate 
in affairs that govern them. 
• Inaccessibility to LLG plans and budgets. It was also noted that many LLGs 
produce only 5 copies of the approved plans and budgets. These copies are 
distributed to the District Planning Unit, the LLG Chairperson and Secretary 
for Finance & Planning, and Sub county Chief/Town Clerk and the Ac-
countant. The rest of the councillors are also not given copies of the docu-
ment. Likewise, many considered the plan and budget documents too bulky 
to read and internalize. As a result, many people men and women alike are 
ignorant of what transpires in their LLGs. 
 
• Monitoring is always considered as either a technical issue or the responsi-
bility of politicians. During the FGDs and key informant’s interviews, it was 
noted that even the technocrats and politicians who conduct such monitoring 
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always produce no management reports for action points. The Town Treas-
urer of Pakwach town mentioned that:  
There is no monitoring mechanism to check on what the Councillors do and they 
do not bring any report of project monitoring and yet they are given monthly 
facilitation allowance. 
Implications of women’s ineffective participation 
The feedback workshop held to discuss the study findings pointed that such a 
very low extent of women’s participation has a number of implications (some of 
which also corroborated some of the study findings). Notably were: 
 
1. Limited awareness of the approved plans and budgets and services delivery 
Although the decentralization policy mandates local governments to develop 
and disseminate (in relevant forms and contents), their plan intentions and 
budgets to the people they serve, the results of individual women asked if they 
have ever heard of their parish and LLG development plans and budgets show 
the contrary to the policy demand. Only 11.8% and 15.1% were aware of parish 
and LLG development plans/budgets respectively. In the FGDs it was noted 
women had very scanty knowledge of these documents. For instance, in 
Akworo none of the participants knew of the LLG plan/budget. In Paidha town, 
only four out of thirty people had seen the plan and budget document without 
reading it. Even the Councillors who approved the documents were found 
neither to have copies of the plan nor read it.  
And given that plans are translated into services delivery in which direct 
financial resources are spent, women’s awareness of service delivery in the 
LLG was also significantly low (31%).  
 
2. Limited participation in planning processes 
Even if the ideal local government participatory bottom-up planning and bud-
geting processes should start at the village, parish, and LLG levels, at all the 
three levels it was found that women’s non-participation recorded an exception-
ally high 91.9%, 97.4% and 98.5% respectively. Equally, 85.5%, 96.7%, and 
97.4% did not participate in village, parish, and LLG project implementation. 
Also 92.3%, 97.8% and 96.7% did not participate in the monitoring of the vil-
lage, parish and LLG projects respectively.   
 
3. Women’s disempowerment 
That the entire planning and budgeting processes are self-managed by only local 
government officials (technocrat and politicians), it was noted that women who 
should demand for and benefit from government services are disempowered. 
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They are fenced-off from voicing their demand for services from government. A 
woman in Akworo, Sirimba village, Murusi parish reaffirms this when she 
noted that, “how do you expect us to demand for services from government 
when we are not part of the planning team that is dominated by government of-
ficials?  
 
4. Non-gender responsive plans and budgets 
It was also noted that the prevailing trend of budget allocation skewed towards 
administrative cost was not accidental. It was ‘a practice of men rewarding 
themselves for their employment in the system’ echoed a Woman Councillor. In 
such ways, negligible funds are allocated for services delivery from which the 
poor, most of whom are women, can benefit. 
 
5. Lack of accountability 
Related to the above is that lack of voice to demand for services go hand in 
hand with inability to demand for accountability for whatever services are 
offered (be it correctly or not). Indeed, plan/budget feedback meetings as a 
mechanism for providing accountability (both political and financial) to the 
population was only recognized to be provided by 3.7% and 1.5% at village and 
parish levels respectively. An elderly woman in Panyimur pointed that, ‘how 
would we question what those people (referring to sub county official) are do-
ing when we even do not know what they have in the budget document?’   
 
6. Corruption and poor quality services delivery  
Where people’s voice does not matter, ‘the jungle rule flourishes’ noted the 
District Community Based Services Officer. He argued that although LLGs in 
accordance with the Financial and Accounting Regulations Act, 1998 and the 
Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2003 works with tenderers to 
provide services, the choice of their services were questionable. Besides, often 
those services are overpriced and of poor qualities. Tenderers often linked such 
price hikes and low work qualities to contract buy-ins (bribery). Finally, com-
munity representation entrusted in Project Implementation/Management Com-
mittees (PIC/PMC) was also reported as ineffective. For instance, a woman in 
Bed-ku-wedu village, Oturgang ward, Paidha town voiced that: 
There is a big problem when the town council use tenderers to implement activities 
for us. In one case, our spring was to be constructed using the box design which we 
protested because we wanted the traditional system that works without the box. 
When we informed the tenderer, he told us that he was sent from above. Sensing that 
we have no rights over him we stopped our request. Now the spring is well protected 
but there is no water in it and when it rains, storm water gets into the box. The 
  
 
49
community has thus, abandoned the protected spring. And … this means a waste of 
resources meant for us. 
 
7. Loss of ownership and sustainability of projects  
That projects are simply handed over to the communities even when they are 
not demanded for, community response has been to delimit their support to-
wards the sustenance of such projects. Water sources are left to dry up or bore-
holes are abandoned unrepaired and classrooms are vandalized without commu-
nity intervention. The Community Development Officer Panyimur hinted that, 
Often the community say that ‘your’ [referring to LLG] water source is broken 
down. Come and repair it for us. This is contrary to the community based finance 
and maintenance system, which requires that benefiting communities from any in-
frastructural project should undertake to operate and maintain such projects. 
 
8. Loss of trust in government  
Participants also noted that where the state-society linkage is broken, there is no 
trust especially in local government officials. A member of the District Women 
Council Executive reiterated that many women actually refer to LLG officials 
(politicians and technocrats alike) as ‘those employed to enrich themselves but 
not to work for the people they lead’. 
Wrapping-up 
The case of LLG budget misallocation presented in Chapter 3 was justified by 
local government official to emanate from the ineffective participation of wo-
men in the policy making processes. While the scope of such non-participation 
was not clear, this study found out that it is true that majority of women are not 
participating in LLG public policy-making processes. While women’s self-
exclusion was a quick conclusion to explain their non-participation, to the 
contrary this study unearthed the fact that women’s non-participation was a 
result of LLG strategic institutional exclusion. 
James C. Scott (1990: chapter 3) while elaborating on public transcript as a 
respectable performance reiterated that, first, concealment is practiced in order 
not to threaten official story unless such contradictions are publicly declared. 
This is because, ‘in certain cases, certain facts, though widely known, may 
never be mentioned in public context’. What comes out is, ‘virtually a dual cul-
ture: the official culture filled with bright euphemism, silence, and platitude and 
the unofficial culture widely known are not introduced into public discourse. 
Second, euphemism and stigma are often used to obscure that which is nega-
tively valued but entirely to mask the facts of domination by giving them a 
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harmless or sanitized aspect. Notwithstanding, the political price is that it be-
comes a political cost for those who are subordinated. 
The view of Scott above reveals how LLG officials despite knowing what 
they are expected to play in decentralized development continue to ignore the 
absence of women in the policy arena; a fact that can affect the ‘dividends they 
unquestionably enjoy’ (Schneider & Goldfrank 2002). They are also less 
bothered of the myriads of implications of limited women’s participation. Yet it 
is vividly clear that excluding women from the policy arena from a human 
rights perspective, makes decentralized governance an arena where women’s 
rights are highly violated with impunity. From a gender advocacy focus such 
exclusion means that women’s needs and interest are excluded from the re-
source allocation agenda. The daunting consequence is that decentralized gov-
ernance is non participatory and non transparent/accountable to women. Instead, 
as is practiced, it perpetuates gender inequalities. Nelson & Wright (1995) sum-
marize this fact when they write that: 
Participation has ... positioned people very differently in relation to the development 
apparatus … – as a presence, as objects of a theoretical process of economic and 
political transformation; as expected ‘beneficiaries’ of programmes with pre-set 
parameters; as contributors of casual labour to help a project achieve its ends; as 
politically co-opted legitimizers of a policy; or as people trying to determine their 
own choice and direction independent of the state. 
That the found women’s exclusion takes place in essence of various women 
leaders’ presence both within and parallel to the various layers of decentralized 
governance system raises yet another fundamental question, ‘to what extent are 
the women leaders’ who are insiders of the LLG structures effective repre-
sentatives of women’s interest?’ The next chapter will attempt to answer this 
question.  
 
  
 
5 
Women representation:  
The cross-road 
This chapter focuses on assessing the effectiveness of women leaders as 
champions of women’s needs in local government policy arena. It explores the 
extent to which women leaders know their roles, are performing those roles, and 
whether they have the requisite skills and are using them to engender decen-
tralized development. Finally, it ends with an analysis of the setbacks that wo-
men leaders face in executing their roles and responsibilities. 
Assessing the effectiveness of women leaders 
In Chapter 1, I pointed out that the Constitution of Uganda provides women one 
third of local council composition. Added to this, I also stated that the 1993 
National Women Council Statute established a parallel Women Council struc-
ture that runs from the village (involving all women who are 18 years and 
above) to the national levels into a body that specifically champions women’s 
needs. This means that at every level of governance there are elected women 
leaders (Women Council Executives and Women Councillors). Such a setup 
should ideally provide women with numerical advantage over men within 
existing LLG structure. However, I also argued that political numeracy as is 
construed under the majority win the show ideal of democracy should not be 
taken for granted that it will automatically give women as a constituency any 
advantage in decentralized development. My point of contention was that 
decentralized governance is not a neutral arena; it is gendered given that the 
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male politicians armed with majority male technocrats are likely to take forth 
their traditional hegemony into local government and using informal systems 
steal the show. 
In Chapter 3 such doubts started to unveil in the taken and normal practice of 
skewing decentralized poverty resources in favour of administrative costs. Local 
government officials even had the guts to point out that the absence of women 
during dividing the ‘cake’ should be blamed for the mess. Chapter 4 confirmed 
the limited participation of women in the entire planning and budgeting pro-
cesses.  
However, both Chapters 3 and 4 pointed a finger at the ineffectiveness of 
women leaders as democratic representatives of women. They were noted not to 
be doing their role of championing women’s interests when plans and budgets 
are being formulated; a gap that has also made women’s needs to be ignored in 
LLG resource allocation. This is what Cornwall (2004: 85) refers to as citizen 
participation in any political space can only have meaning when citizens (such 
as women leaders) are able to exercise their voice therein. Failure to do so, 
Gaventa (2004a) cautions can lead to capture by prevailing power-holders. 
Below, I explore to what extent such ineffectiveness as is manifested by the 
mandated roles of women leaders. 
 
Objective, questions and scope of the assessment 
For women to receive attention in LLG development process one option is for 
them to have effective leaders who can represent their needs in the political 
spaces provided to them. However, women leaders can only succeed if it falls 
within their mandated roles and responsibilities, and if they have the ability to 
do so. This study also delved into assessing the effectiveness of Women lead-
ers’ in representing women in decentralized governance. Strengthening women 
leadership as is proposed by gender advocates requires understanding women 
leaders’ areas of core ineffectiveness. To do so, this study asked the following 
central question: 
To what extent are women leaders effectively executing their representative 
roles? 
The central question was further broken down into three sub-questions: 
• Are women leaders aware of and performing their roles? 
• Do women leaders have the requisite skills to and practicing those skills in 
performing their roles? 
• What are the roadblocks to women leaders’ effective performance? 
To answer these questions, data was collected using an individual survey of 
women leaders using semi structured questionnaire and Focus Group Discus-
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sion (FGD). Overall, 154 women leaders drawn from 12 randomly sampled 
LLGs of Pakwach Town, Pakwach, Panyimur, Panyango, Wadelai, Erussi, 
Nyaravur, Kucwiny, Parombo, Akworo, Nebbi Town, and Paidha participated.  
Both data collection instruments were administered in sequence. Women 
leaders as respondents were invited to the LLG headquarters, on dates set and 
communicated to them beforehand, where they met with a team of data 
collectors drawn from district local government and District Women Council 
office.  
The data collectors first conducted the individual interviews with all the 
invited women leaders in the study area independently. Thereafter, both the data 
collectors and the women leaders joined in a room where they had the focus 
group discussions. 
Below are the findings from this assessment. 
Knowledge of mandated roles  
Ideally, Women leaders are expected to collaborate and network in the follow-
ing areas: 
• Identifying women’s concern and assisting the local council in implementing 
them. 
• Sensitizing women and the community on national and local government 
policies/programmes and development issues. This also goes hand in hand 
with mobilizing women for development by encouraging the involvement of 
women in community activities. 
• Linking women in the community and the decision makers and mobilizing 
resources for women concerns e.g. influencing the budget. 
• Advocating for promotion and protection of women’s rights in their commu-
nities. 
• Monitoring service delivery to ensure that women effectively participate and 
benefit. 
In view of the above stated roles, the functionality of the women leaders was 
gauged by asking whether the leaders knew those roles and were performing 
them. Figure 5.1 indicates that women leaders were generally aware of their 
roles of identifying women’s concerns for development (60.4%) and sensitizing 
women on government programmes (50.6%). However, almost all were not 
aware of their roles of advocacy for women’s rights (87.0%) and monitoring of 
service delivery (94.2%). 
Likewise, many women leaders were mainly performing those roles that they 
know by 62% in linkages to decision makers, 61% sensitization/mobilization  
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Figure 5.1 Knowledge and performance of mandated roles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and 58% on gender advocacy. Yet, most of these women leaders confessed that 
they were only performing these roles without knowing them as their mandated 
roles. 
Skills to perform mandated roles 
In order to translate those roles into winning budget allocation for services 
sectors where women benefit most, the women leaders were also asked whether 
they had the skills to conduct and were engaged in gender-responsive planning 
and budgeting, monitoring and evaluation, and advocacy. These skills where 
considered important because they provide the basis for analyzing and directing 
resource allocations. For instance, to voice the need for budget allocation for 
women’s interest, a woman leader is expected to ally with other LLG leaders to 
support her concern (advocacy). Yet, such concerns must have valid basis (in-
formation drawn from monitoring existing situation) to show the defects of any 
decision that does not support it (gender analysis). 
As Figure 5.2 reveals, many women leaders lack the requisite skills with 
which to effectively perform their mandated roles although as seen above, they 
confessed that they simply find themselves engaged in the use of those skills 
somehow. Thus, their inability to effectively champion women’s needs is cur-
tailed by the lack of civic engagement skills.  
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Figure 5.2 Having and using skills to engender plans and budgets 
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Analysis with them during the focus group discussions showed that while 
many of them are familiar with gender analysis in needs assessment, the ana-
lytical skills required for drawing a work plan, gender mainstreaming, project 
monitoring and strategic pushing of women’s needs among politicians as well 
as technocrats are lacking. 
Drawbacks to women leaders’ effectiveness  
In the various focus group discussions, women leaders attributed their ineffec-
tiveness to the following constraints: 
 
• Limited knowledge about and skills for their roles.  
Women leaders pointed out that foremost majority of them are inadequately in-
formed of their roles. Second, they have been ignored by government in terms 
of capacity building as one WCE member in Parombo pointed out that,  
I have been in this leadership position for two terms now. Yet no single day was I 
invited for any induction or training with regards to my roles as a leader of women. 
Elections are held when the time comes and that is it. When it comes to what those 
elected leaders should do it is not divulged to us. I can confess that what I have done 
and how I did them in the last two years were solely a personal matter. That is why 
many Women leaders even do not want to be called so. We have no unified direction 
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of where to go beyond the title a Women Council Executive. We are wagging like 
headless chicken! 
 
• Lack of facilitation  
Especially the women council leaders noted that unlike women councillors who 
are catered for by LLG budgets, they are not provided for in any LLG plan and 
budget. The only allocation they hear about is that for Women’s Day cele-
bration. Because they are considered a creation of the central government, it is 
also assumed that they should be facilitated separately by that system. In this 
regard the Sub county Chief Erussi hinted that, ‘Women Council structures are 
not provided for in our budgeting guidelines. It will be illegal to fund them!’ 
 
• Failure on the side of the LLGs to implement planned activities  
The Women Council Executives also pointed out that their weakness in part 
stem from the demoralization they get from LLGs. Often, planned for activities 
are not implemented. Funds allocated for such activities, however small, are 
diverted into areas where LLG officials feel they can benefit from. As a result, 
they find it unworthy to continue working without results. A WCE member in 
Pakwach LLG remarked,  
How else would you expect us to continue working when our electorates and us in-
clusive see no results? All the LLG can offer us are disappointments. They say there 
is no money but the LLG offices are not closed. Salaries are paid, for what I cannot 
tell. This is frustrating!’ 
Closing remarks 
This study assessed the effectiveness of women leaders in championing wo-
men’s needs in LLG policy arena. As was hinted in chapters 1, 3 & 4, it found 
that first most of the women leaders were not even aware of the very roles they 
are expected to play. They were simply elected and left to do what they were 
not even inducted into. This confirms Goetz (2007) assertion that women’s 
political participation is only vital to the extent that it provides for simple access 
into political positions. Whether or not the elected leaders are performing their 
roles does not simply matter.  
Second, almost all the women leaders also lack the requisite skills with 
which to engender decentralized governance. They are relying on personal in-
tuition to try and ensure that they represent women constituency in the LLG 
policy arena. What stands out, as the women leaders attributed, is that women 
leaders ineffectiveness are masterminded by local government marginalization 
through ignoring their skills enhancement and failure to facilitate them to per-
form their roles.  
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These findings confirm the earlier assertion that decentralized governance 
despite being closer to the populace is in fact distant to many for whom the 
arena is prohibitive. But the findings also provide a basis for civil society or-
ganization to support political activism. This is a justification upon which 
AFARD, a local NGO, took up to build the political capabilities of women 
leaders so that they can become productive political actors to their constituency. 
The next chapter, therefore, delves into explaining what AFARD did in order to 
build the political capabilities of the women leaders in an attempt to engender 
decentralization. 
 
 
  
 
6 
Building political capabilities  
This chapter focuses on describing the processes of building the political capa-
bilities of women leaders. It presents an overview of the AFARD projects im-
plemented with funding from HURINET and 9th EDF-CSCBP from February 
2005 to July 2008. 
Civic engagement: The missing link 
The two contradictory arguments pointed in Chapter one as the central issue of 
this study have all proved true. The doubt that the provision of mere political 
positions for women is inadequate to ensure that women’s interest receive gov-
ernment support turned to be true. Local government officials simply allocate 
decentralize development funds to suit their interests. Besides, the findings that 
women leaders lack the skills with which to effectively represent women within 
the available political arena justifies the call by practitioners for political capa-
bility building.  
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 reveal that decentralized governance is gendered. The 
available political spaces within which women could demand for services from 
their local governments have become ‘closed space’. Budget allocations are 
neither engendered nor pro-poor responsive. Public funds are spent, without due 
accountability, on administrative costs that benefits power-holders in formal 
government structures. To women who constitute the bulk of the population and 
have for long suffered from hegemonic relations such practices manifest in their 
denied human development.  
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The main stumbling blocks revealed to perpetuate such ineffective participa-
tion of both women and women leaders reside in the fact that women are insti-
tutionally shelved-off the policy arena. They are denied information, capacity 
building, facilitation, and so on to ensure strategically that they do not tamper 
with the status quo which is benefiting a few selected local government official. 
In this way, politicians and their bureaucrats negates the essence of co-govern-
ance. They chose to do as they wish – deciding on projects for the people and 
implementing such projects without accountability.  
These situations justify what Véron et al. (2006: 1926) refers to as ‘decen-
tralization of corruption’ and Heller et al. (2007: 628) as ‘democratic authori-
tarianism’ given that the democratic rights of individuals are replaced by the de 
facto wills of local government officials (Hickey & Mohan 2005: 253). 
That the human rights of women seems not to be adhered to means the claim 
that localized politics enhances the opportunity for the excluded social category 
to claim their rights is questionable. Women’s human rights in this area are 
abused by LLG officials. As Moser & Norton (2001), Mikkelsen (2005) and 
O’Neill (2003) observe such an abuse means that women as a constituency can-
not demand from their duty-bearers in local government to supply and account 
for whatever they need.  
The cardinal missing link to this citizens-state co-governance equation is 
civic engagement. In order to change such exclusionary, autocratic and techno-
cratic approach to decentralized development requires enhancing a ‘participa-
tory public’ (Heller et al. 2007: 643) where women can make claims as citizens 
and not clients thereby challenging their hitherto patronage relations to local 
government officials (Aber 1998). Doing so, Hickey & Mohan notes requires 
‘participation for empowerment’ or ‘participatory citizenship’ which seeks to 
challenge existing power relations rather than negotiating around them. This re-
quires, they reiterate: 
… not only bringing people into political processes, but also to transform and 
democratize the political processes in ways that progressively alter the ‘immanent’ 
processes of inclusion and exclusion that operate within particular political commu-
nities, and which govern the opportunities for individuals and groups to claim their 
rights to participation and resources (Hickey & Mohan 2005: 250-251). 
This collaborative governance is the focus of citizen engagement. Civic en-
gagement is commonly defined as a process of organizing citizens or their 
entrusted representatives to influence and share in public affairs. It is about 
demystifying political and bureaucratic monopoly in public affairs and opening 
space for knowledge about, acceptance of, respect for each actor’s conditions 
and interests. However, civic engagement as the ‘confluence between demo-
cracy and development’ (Cornwall & Coelho 2006: 4) requires space and timely 
and reliable information for effective participation to occur. While space pro-
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vides the arena for negotiation, contestation, and collaboration as different 
actors bring divergent interests for open discussions and decision-making (ibid.: 
1-2), information give meanings to the contents of participation and decisions 
that are made.  
Promoting civic engagement in public policy processes therefore requires, 
first, citizenship building so that people effectively participate in exercising 
their rights. People need to know their rights before they can mobilize to claim 
their political entitlements from any public institution. Second, it entails institu-
tional orientation (in rules and procedures) that should encourage legitimate 
multi-actor participation. Finally, there is need for building a political culture of 
collective responsibilities so that leaders-know-it-all mentality common with 
elite and politician capture is replaced by the we-know-it-all attitude. These 
aspects solidify citizen participation and makes public policy openly debated 
rather than imposed. It also allows each interest group to speak as and for itself 
and to willingly allow for collective decisions made to override its interest (if 
not supported) (Cornwall & Coelho 2006: 6-17). In this way, Gaventa (2005: 
xii-xiv) echoes that the traditional rights and responsibilities hijacked by the 
state is challenged by having citizens who can claim their rights through voicing 
their concerns to which the state has to yield. 
What these discussions point at is the need for ‘collaborative policy making’. 
However, the questions is, if the political space has been provided yet the poli-
tical capabilities in terms of the awareness of roles and responsibilities, skills to 
engage within the space, and the culture and motivation for engagement are 
lacking, which ways forward? Cuthill & Fien (2005: 65) proposes capacity 
building. To them, capacity building is countering power for collective reason-
ing and deliberation inherent in knowledge, ability and energy for collective 
action. 
In regard to this study, it is implied that women leaders need their political 
capabilities to be built so that they can become citizens and effective leaders. 
But what is political capability? Below I present this concept and its cardinal 
aspects. 
Political capabilities explained 
While the initial concept of political capabilities according to Whitehead & 
Gray-Molina (2003) focused on the sustained constructive political interaction 
by the poor with state agencies, Williams (2004) added value to it by critically 
raising the issues of those who were hitherto excluded for public arena, like 
women and women leaders in this case, having a set of skills with which they 
can manoeuvre and re-shape in the political arena available to them. This view 
even extends the quest for political space beyond having mere space or a seat 
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into citizenship building. Such an integration attempts to balance the citizen-
state governance equation so that co-governance is no longer an issue that can 
be treated in an either or fashion but as one body of governance management 
system. That is why others like Haberman (1992) term it as a process of ‘poli-
tical socialization’ and Foucault (2004) as ‘subjectification’. 
Therefore, political capabilities focus at smoothening the citizen-state bal-
ance sheet especially for the poor who had hitherto been denied political experi-
ence. As Whitehead & Gray-Molina (2003: 36) note it is about ‘political learn-
ing’ from which people are ‘encouraged to learn to behave like citizens’ (Rose 
1999) and thereby become able to gain and exercise their individual agency and 
collective control (Appadurai 2002). This learning however pivots on three cri-
tical aspects, namely: 
 
1. Awareness 
Awareness as a capability is concerned with creating responsible citizens who 
know their rights, the opportunities for claiming those rights, the procedures 
involved in making such claims and the actors to co-act with. Doing so helps in 
changing the mindset of those who had been denied rights to become conscious 
of their environments and stand up as citizen and not as beneficiaries to claim 
such rights (Gaventa 2004a; Cornwall 2002). 
 
2. Civic engagement skills 
The intractable rules that govern the management of local governments mean 
that co-governance entails a multi-actor engagement. The involvement of dif-
ferent stakeholders – elected politicians, (schools) technocrats, and other civic 
communities makes co-governance to be marred by actors who all speak differ-
ent languages. Yet to tango on the deliberation floor requires that all actors 
speak with understanding (regardless of the degree) the same language. For the 
poor who are largely unschooled and had been outside this arena it requires 
having the opportunity to be able to understand the various ‘governance lan-
guage’ (Gaventa 2004b). 
The acquisition of various skills that Fung & Wright (2001) consider as 
‘negotiation skills’ and Gaventa (2004b) terms ‘political organizational skills’ is 
pertinent. Women leaders need skills with which to mobilize their constituency, 
put agenda on resource allocation table, generate factual and relevant informa-
tion, and communicate effectively with other actors. They also need managerial 
skills particularly those related to planning, budgeting and monitoring so that 
they are able to see whether or not a given policy will benefit women. Short of 
these skills it is likely they can remain docile in the policy arena (DENIVA 
2002). 
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3. Alliance building 
Finally, being aware and having the skills alone are not sufficient to get a social 
category interest supported. This is because the deliberative democracy ex-
hibited by co-governance involves multi-actors with diverse and competing 
interests; that they all want supported. Thus, in collaborative policy-making 
process there is need to built a network with which an actor can link in order to 
win or provide support. This network has to exist both vertically and horizon-
tally let alone ensuring a strong internal team spirit. 
The calls to action 
In line with the June 2008 NGO Policy and CSO Minimum Agenda1 of pro-
moting a transparent decision-making process based on facts and consensus 
arrived at under a situation of open dialogue and effective participation of 
citizens, AFARD took to build the political capabilities of women leaders. The 
focus on women leaders was for two reasons. First, these are change agents who 
are already legally put in place. Some of the women had been working in office 
for the two 5-year terms. Working with them would therefore sustainably hasten 
their ability to bridge the performance gaps they had been experiencing. Second 
was the fact that given the projects’ short duration (and funding size), it would 
be impractical to reach out effectively to the entire women constituency in the 
district. 
To do so, AFARD, headquartered in Nebbi, responded to the call for pro-
posal from HURINET in 2004 and the European Union (EU) – Government of 
Uganda (GoU) under the Civil Society Capacity Building Programme (CSCBP) 
in 2005. These proposals won the competitive funding bids for projects that 
were implemented in 2005/06 and 2006/2008. The projects were named 
“Strengthening Women Councils in Nebbi district to participate in planning 
and budgeting at sub county and district levels” and “Engendering Services 
Delivery and Accountability in Decentralized Local Governments in Nebbi 
District” respectively. These projects focused on invigorating the engagement 
of women with decentralized power centres to ensure ‘equitable services 
delivery and accountability by local government officials. The project covered 
all the 19 (3 Town Councils and 16 Sub-counties) Lower Local Governments 
(LLGs) in Nebbi district. 
                                                 
1   See DENIVA, CDRN, UJCC and Uganda National NGO Forum (2004). Together 
for Peace and Development. A Civil Society Minimum Agenda for 2006 and Beyond. 
Kampala. The inherent values are: integrity and accountability; transparent decision-
making; active citizen participation; peaceful co-existence, tolerance, reconciliation; 
effective sharing of resources; openness to change and willingness to negotiate; and 
equitable distribution of resources. 
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The projects focused on changing the: (i) continued exclusion of women’s 
voices and needs from the entire planning and budgeting cycle; (ii) weak de-
mand capacity of the women leaders for services that benefit their constituency; 
and (iii) perpetual wrong spending of public funds on non-poor services. That is 
the projects wanted to ensure that first, women become citizens in order to 
secondly compel local governments to become responsive and accountable to 
women.  
Thus, the broad objective of the projects was that, ‘local governments in 
Nebbi district provide gender sensitive and equitable services to the commu-
nity’. This objective was focused at two fronts: first, changing the mindset of 
the people, men and women – politicians, technical staffs, and civil society 
actors towards gender needs as a human right in all services delivery; and 
second, enabling women to engage service delivery policy makers to ensure that 
gender issues are integrated in the processes of service delivery. 
 
The project’s specific objectives were: 
 
1. Women leaders have increased knowledge and skills in gender planning, 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and advocacy/lobbying. 
Women leaders needed specialized skills, with a gender lens, in order to be able 
to meaningfully engage in the entire local government development processes. 
Being trodden over by opportunistic politicians and technocrats under the pre-
text that women are not knowledgeable enough had outlived its justification!  
 
2. Effective participation of women in local government planning and budget-
ing increased. 
The mobilization of women as a constituency to participate, at all levels of local 
governments, in planning and budgeting processes in order to echo (and force if 
need be!) their needs on budget agenda setting was vital. Women’s numerical 
strength needed to be used as a leverage apparatus in decentralized democracy! 
 
3. Local governments are transparent and accountable to their constituents in 
general and to women in particular 
Local government policy makers needed to be advocated and lobbied in order to 
change their mind-set in favour of upholding women’s development, not as a 
privilege but as a human right. In this way, they would willingly promote de-
centralized development from a human rights perspective. Fake promises 
during election times normally termed as ‘air supplies’ would no longer be 
entertained! 
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Inherent in these objectives was the need to secure women’s empowerment 
that would instead compel LLGs to become responsive and accountable thereby 
entrenching a deeper ‘trust and solidarity’ in women to continue partaking in 
co-governance (Andrews & Kouzmin 1999).  
In this view: first, empowerment as Colle & Gonella (2002) note comes with 
voice in public affairs and awareness of the development processes and out-
comes that can lead to demanding for accountability. Second, government res-
ponsiveness was envisaged to come from the realistic allocation of resources to 
meet gender sensitive plans as well as honouring those plans during budget exe-
cution. Finally, accountability was seen beyond the current ‘vertical approach’ 
(Andrews & Kouzmin 1999) practiced in local government but also to include 
vertical and horizontal as well as performance and financial accountability.  
This wider focus on accountability was because first, it was noted that the 
‘ministerial responsibility’ approach of accountability derived from the vote 
power (Levine 1975: 361) has been enmeshed with ‘bureaucratic capture’ 
(Shannon 1987: 195); a process that makes ‘accountability counterfeited’ in the 
words of Brook (1990) by ‘technocratic manipulation’ that ensures leaders 
responsiveness to the needs of their constituency is autocratic (Wlezein 1995). 
Second, Dehn, Reinikka & Svenssen (2001) and Reinikka & Svensson (2002) 
noted that budget allocation alone is not sufficient to guarantee service 
delivery.2 As Figure 3.2 revealed, budget disbursement analysis presents a 
better picture of budget management in local governments. Finally, as Walker 
(2002) notes, the less visible LLG performances are to the people it serves the 
weaker are the people involved in demanding for accountability; a process that 
Moran (2004) encapsulates on as a free-space within which government offi-
cials perpetuates centralized, ritualistic and autocratic practices to their capture 
advantage. That is why Colle & Gonella (2002) and Claibourn & Martin (2007) 
emphasize that demanding for accountability also requires citizens to be aware; 
a process that comes from engaging in the generation or receiving of reliable 
information, timely. 
Project strategies  
Cuthill & Fien (2005) advices that civic engagement demands a civic culture 
that allows people to participate in public life. Where such a culture is missing, 
Kirlin & Kirlin (2002) have argued that capacity building is inevitable. This 
capacity building should however enhance possibilities for ‘dialogue that is 
                                                 
2  They argue that government may spend on unagreed upon issues or spend only 
minimally. Thus, how the budget allocation is done (participation and effectiveness 
of leaders), where the allocated sum is spent (disbursement), and keeping the people 
in the know about it (answerability) needs to be ascertained. 
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essential in multi-stakeholder engagement’ (Colle & Gonella 2002). It should 
also promote a sense of rights as well as roles and obligations for joint action 
(Shotter 1985) so that people agree collectively on what to do and account with 
undue pressure. This is what Walker (2002) argues that social accountability 
should promote collective practices such as consensus, cooperation, and com-
mitment to participation. 
Although the project primarily targeted women leaders, its implementation 
also involved LLG officials (technocrats and politicians alike). The involvement 
of LLG officials were at two levels both as training facilitators especially by 
Community Development Officers and as participants side by women leaders in 
order to have shared knowledge and skills. This last aspect was adopted because 
at the on-set of the project implementation, it was noted that most of the core 
skills for engendering decentralized plans and budgets as well as accountability 
were lacking among local government officials.  
AFARD hinged these projects on a right-based approach (see Table 6.1 
above). Rights-based approaches (RBAs) according to Moser and Norton 
(2001) and Mikkelsen (2005) integrates the norms, standards and principles of 
the international human rights system into the policies and processes of 
development. Such rights, already ratified by many nations, are legally guaran-
teed by human rights law and are enshrined in treaties, declarations, guidelines 
and principles (United Nations 2003). Mikkelsen (2005) and O’Neill (2003) 
however cautions that RBA has a skewed approach that falls into a demand-
driven trap as rights-holders are only enticed to demand for their needs without  
 
 
Table 6.1 The centrality of rights based approach to the project 
Elements Features  
Empowerment   • Right-holders need political capabilities for claiming their rights as 
citizen and not beneficiaries of local government services.   
• Effective participation of right-holders gives responsibility to 
different actors and meaning to development.   
Responsiveness  • Duty-bearers as gate-keepers should ensure that development is 
framed as legally enforceable entitlements of rights-holders.   
Accountability • Development is an obligation and not a privilege.  
• Such obligations are shared between right-holders and duty-bearers. 
• Obligations also include abstinence from violation of rights in favour 
of protecting, promoting and providing for those rights.  
• All actors (state, market, society) are held accountable and subject to 
rights-based standards. 
• A rigorous framework for monitoring implementation and sanction is 
inevitable.  
Source: Adapted from Beall, Lewis & Sutherland (2003). 
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due consideration by rights-holders to supply in whatever form that which can 
enable duty-bearers to deliver to their claims. Therefore, to implement the pro-
jects, AFARD: 
• Adopted a women constituency-driven approach by working primarily with 
women leaders. This was done to ensure specific targeting of both outreach 
and outcome beyond the vague community approach wherein anybody and 
nobody fits; 
• Used relevant and timely information management in order to arm women 
with facts and figures that cannot be disputed. This was the basis for evi-
dence-based advocacy; 
• Ensured that women do not wait for government officials to invite them to 
the already open policy arena. Rather women, as policy beneficiaries, were 
encouraged to take it upon themselves to engage with government officials 
over what is due to them; 
• Ensured that women participated in all planning and budgeting processes so 
that agreed upon plans are the ones for which budgets are allocated and such 
priorities are adhered to in the plan/budget execution as well as account-
ability; 
• Entrenched the culture of transparency and accountability as well as effect-
tive monitoring and evaluation of government programmes from an engen-
dered perspective thereby making government not only to account for ser-
vices provided but also on those who benefited; 
• Broke the ‘symbolic presence conflict’ between Women Councillors and 
Women Council Executives. Alliance was built between these two actors for 
furthering their common front that is women’s interests; and 
• Ensured effective communication at every stage of the project among and 
between local government leaders on the one hand and women leaders and 
grassroots women on the other. 
Project activities  
Publicizing the project 
To ensure that the project was known and supported as widely as possible, 
publicity was done. A brochure detailing the project goal, objectives, activities, 
and implementation strategies was distributed to district and LLG leadership. 
Equally, a radio talk show (in English and Alur language) was hosted on Radio 
Paidha. This was hosted together with the Chairperson District Women Council 
and it explained to the public all about the project. 
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Desk reviews  
To inform the project with the existing practices of grassroots women, women 
leaders and LLG officials, a desk review was conducted on local government 
planning and budgeting processes. The information generated helped to syn-
chronize the district planning calendar as well as lobbying the District and Sub 
county Technical Planning Committee to gazette planning dates. This review 
also explored the existing reporting frameworks. The realization that these in-
struments were technocratic and hence a mechanism of shelving off (semi-)illi-
terate leaders and the population from understanding the contents of their plans/ 
budget led to the formulation of a gender responsiveness audit tool (Annex 4) 
and its utilization to assess the participation of grassroots women, effectiveness 
of women leaders, responsiveness of LLG plans and budgets to women’s needs, 
and LLG accountability for their actions. 
 
Capability assessment and capability building trainings 
In order to build the capacity of women leaders for good governance the capa-
city assessment described in chapter 5 was conducted among women leaders 
representing 30% of the total LLG women leadership positions. The findings 
from the assessment guided the formulation of training goals, objectives, con-
tent, and methodologies. Three training manuals were developed covering the 
Women Council, human and women’s rights, gender budgeting, budget cycle, 
advocacy and participatory gender monitoring and evaluations. Table 6.2 sum-
marizes the key training content. 
Using the manual, 15 trainers derived from AFARD, District Women Coun-
cil Executives and local government staffs were inducted on the manual. This 
induction was done so as to harmonize the approach, methodology, actual train-
ing delivery and reporting. 
Trainings were then conducted for 502 women leaders on their roles and 
human and women’s rights;3 1,358 women leaders and LLG officials in gender  
 
                                                 
3  The criticisms forwarded by local government leaders at the closure of this training 
provided a valuable input for adopting a new integrative approach during the sub-
sequent trainings. The Chairperson Local Council III (Hon. Okumu Robert) in Pan-
yimur noted: 
While it is important to make women know their roles and rights, often it is the 
men who violate those rights starting from our homes into the public spheres. 
Besides, such knowledge is a tool that can be used within local government even 
better because policy makers are not aware of what women council roles are and 
what they aspire for. It would then be vital not to marginalize men during such 
knowledge building events but rather to integrate them so that they can respond 
posivitively both on their own accord or when women demand for such rights. 
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Table 6.2 Summary of the various trainings covered 
At the end of the training sessions participants are: 
• Able to enumerate all the roles of the women council. 
• Able to enumerate at least 3 women’s rights as stipulated in the Constitution of the 
Republic of Uganda. 
• Able to explain development from a human rights perspective and position women’s rights 
as pivotal in local government development process. 
• Able to use a gender responsive budget analytical tool to analyze annual local government 
budgets.  
• Explain the local government planning and budgeting cycle. 
• Enumerate their roles in each of the stages of the cycle. 
• Identify some strategies of strengthening their involvement in the planning and budgeting 
cycle. 
• Able to monitor the lower local government’s plans and budgets  
• Able to use the advocacy/lobbying checklist to influence budgetary allocations for 
women’s constituency. 
Focus Sub topics 
The Women 
Council 
• Why the Women Council? 
• The structure of the women council 
• Roles and functions of the women council 
• Relationship with lower local governments 
 
Human & 
Women’s 
Rights 
• Human Rights in context 
• Development as a Human right  
• Women’s rights in perspective 
• Human rights and good governance – decentralization 
 
Gender 
Budgeting 
• Women, gender and development 
• Key concepts in gender 
• What is gender responsive planning and budgeting 
• LG planning cycle 
• Why do gender responsive planning and budgeting 
• Why a budget approach 
• When to do a gender responsive planning and budgeting 
• How to do a gender responsive planning and budgeting  
• Challenges of doing a gender responsive budgeting  
 
Local 
Government 
Budget cycle 
• Roles of local government 
• Planning & budgeting cycle 
• Roles of actors at each stage 
• Common abuse of the planning & budget cycle 
 
Participatory 
Gender 
Monitoring & 
Evaluation 
• Defining Participatory Gender Monitoring and Evaluation 
• Purpose of Participatory Gender Monitoring and Evaluation 
• Actors involved in Participatory Gender Monitoring and Evaluation 
• Participatory Gender Monitoring and Evaluation Timing 
• Indicators for Participatory Gender Monitoring and Evaluation 
• Tools for conducting Participatory Gender Monitoring and Evaluation 
• Utilization of Participatory Gender Monitoring and Evaluation 
information cont.>> 
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Table 6.2 Summary of the various trainings covered, ctd.   
Advocacy  • Defining advocacy  
• Purpose of advocacy  
• Timing advocacy 
• Steps in undertaking advocacy: Issue identification, research and 
analysis, and planning advocacy 
• Methods of doing advocacy 
• Evaluating advocacy 
• Pitfalls to avoid in advocacy and lobbying 
 
 
responsive planning and budgeting; 723 women leaders and LLG officials in 
participatory gender monitoring and evaluation; and 622 women leaders and 
LLG officials in advocacy skills. These trainings were preceded by multi-
channel mobilization - radio announcements on the local FM radio station 
(Radio Paidha), circulation of letters of invitation, and direct contacts by the 
Project Officer to the local leaderships. As a result, attendances were always 
more than 100% as many people especially women turned up to attend to the 
training even if they would not receive the participants’ per diem.  
Finally, two office-based and 47 field-based training evaluations were con-
ducted to assess the relevance with the trainers and trainees. These assessments 
provided invaluable input for AFARD staff to identify core areas of technical 
backstopping women leaders continue to need in order to effectively use their 
political space. 
 
Mobilization of women to participate in LLG planning/budgeting cycle 
Grassroots women and women leaders needed to take up their space in the poli-
cy arena. To do so, women leaders mobilized grassroots women. Local informa-
tion, education and communication materials were produced and disseminated 
to both women and LLG policy makers. This included 3,500 posters, 3,500 
brochures, 3,000 leaflets, 53 radio talk shows and radio spots, and 19 drama 
shows. Besides, 385 LLG women leaders were provided with cash facilitation 
to participate in LLG closed door budget meetings held in sectoral committees.4  
 
Periodic follow-ups and feedback meetings 
While participating in the planning and budgeting meetings is one thing, adher-
ence to commitments made in budget management is something else. Figure 3.2 
revealed that LLG officials always changed budget priorities when they have 
funds on their accounts. Women leaders therefore needed to be alert to follow 
                                                 
4  The provision of the money was only to pay for their lunch allowances given that in 
those meetings non LLG officials are not catered for in any way while those from 
LLGs receive long day allowances. 
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up and share their findings on how LLG officials are responsive and accounting 
for the approved plans. As such, the project supported 95 LLG follow-up meet-
ings between women leaders and LLG officials, 38 information sharing meet-
ings only for women leaders in order to account to their constituency and strate-
gize on the way forward, and 76 half year LLG review meetings. 
Critical in the follow-up meetings was the use of the gender responsiveness 
audit noted above. The audits aimed at finding out as to whether or not LLGs 
were gender responsive.  
 
Advocating local government officials 
Often follow-ups found delayed responses to commitments made in plans and 
budgets. Also found were manipulations by some LLG officials as usual to 
defraud the women of what had been planned for. As such, 58 advocacy and 
lobbying meetings were held with LLG leaders using facts and figures to win 
non-forthcoming promises. 
 
Technical backstopping 
To reinforce the presence and voices of the women leaders in the various LLG 
meetings, the Project Officer attended 40 various meetings. In such meetings, 
LLG technocrats were put to task to explain what they often hide under tech-
nical jargons (a common tactics used to dub women leaders as well as LLGs 
committee members). They were also asked to provide evidences to back up 
their (in)actions.  
 
Documenting best practices 
The project also documented some of the best practices. Five hundred copies of 
local government gender responsiveness audit reports were produced and cir-
culated and a video documentary (locally known as “Poku Peke” meaning di-
viding the cake) produced. 
Summing up  
In all, the two projects responded to the existing gaps among grassroots women 
and women leaders. They focused on political capabilities building targeting 
only critical aspects that would invigorate civic engagement between women 
and LLG officials. It also instituted a participatory and cost-effective method of 
assessing local government responsiveness and accountability. Further, the 
activities of the projects were harmonized with local government planning and 
budgeting cycle (see Table 6.3). Chapter 7 assessed the returns to these initia-
tives. 
  
 
Table 6.3 LLG harmonized budget cycle and women leaders’ engagement  
Plan & 
budget stages LG activities Women leaders’ key activities 
Women leaders’ (must-have) 
results 
LLG 
timing 
Mobilization • Dissemination of policy and planning guidelines 
• Consultative meeting on implications of policy 
guidelines, planning and budgeting processes, 
participation of development partners and IPFs 
• Dissemination of consultative meeting-planning 
and budgeting programme 
• Meet women to solicit critical issues 
for budget concern 
 
• Mobilize women to participate 
Issues of women concern for 
the year are articulately 
identified 
 
Mass mobilization of 
grassroots women conducted 
September 
- October 
Village 
planning 
• Community level consultations • Participate with grassroots women in 
meetings 
Women’s preferred projects 
accepted 
October 
Parish 
planning 
• Parish level meetings 
• Consolidation and submission of community 
proposals and plans to LLG 
• Advocate Parish Councils 
• Participate in meetings 
Women’s preferred projects 
accepted 
November 
Sub-county 
budget 
conference 
• Planning and budgeting conference to review 
performance and agree on priorities 
• Build alliance with WC 
• Advocate LLG officials 
• Participate in meetings with grassroots 
women 
Women’s preferred projects 
accepted 
November 
Sub-county 
sectoral 
committee 
meetings 
• Consolidation and costing of LG priorities 
• Discussion of LG draft plans and estimates 
• Consolidation and incorporation of sectoral 
committee recommendations into LG three year 
draft plan and annual estimate 
• Build alliance with WC 
• Advocate LLG officials 
• Participate in meetings 
Women’s preferred projects 
accepted 
November 
- May 
Plan 
approval 
• Presentation of LG three year plan and budget 
estimates to council for approval 
• Advocate LLG officials 
• Participate in meetings 
Women’s preferred projects 
included in the plan & budget 
June 
Plan feedback • Dissemination of information in plan and budget to 
HLG and LLGs 
• Demand for information 
• Provide information to constituency 
Constituency know services 
to be delivered in the year 
June/July 
Plan/budget 
execution 
• Plan and budget implementation 
• Plan implementation reviews 
• Demand for information from LLG 
• Build alliance with WC 
• Monitor projects, lobby LLG officials 
and provide information to 
constituency 
Projects committed to are 
implemented and feedback 
given to constituency 
June-May 
  
 
7 
Returns from civic engagement 
In chapter one I presented the counter arguments of development practitioners 
involved in gender advocacy work for political capability building as a valuable 
means for enabling those unable to effectively utilize their political space (such 
as women leaders) to do so. Political capability building, they argue, is a route 
to claiming citizenship, which in turn allows for engendering governance. 
Chapter 6 detailed what AFARD did in this regard. The focus of this chapter is, 
therefore, to assess whether or not the investments made in political capability 
building produced meaningful results on the citizen-state equation of citizenship 
building and transformation of local governance.  
Assessing the effects of political capability building 
While impact evaluation is theoretically contentious (Lakwo 2006: 68-75), 
given the scope of these projects, it is imperative that some ‘outcomes’ are 
traced. Still with nuance issues like budget advocacy, Laney (2003) cautions 
that the focus on ‘influencing change’ typical with the subject warrants ex-
ploring results of interventions from a ‘dimension of change’ approach.  
Basing on this approach, the three core objectives of the projects were con-
sidered as the dimensions along which changes can be assessed. These are sum-
marized in Table 7.1. Evident from it is that first, under empowerment changes 
are envisaged at both women leaders and ordinary women levels. Women 
leaders are expected to know and perform their roles as well as have civic 
 
  73 
 
 
Table 7.1 Dimensions of change envisaged from the projects 
Dimensions of 
change  Empowerment of women LLG responsiveness 
LLG accountability 
practices 
Indicators  • Women leaders 
awareness and 
performance of roles 
• Women leaders 
knowledge & 
application of core 
skills 
• Women’s 
participation in 
policy processes 
• Plans are based on 
gender situation 
analysis 
• Plans & budget 
have gender 
responsive 
statements 
• Budget allocations 
and disbursements 
favor services 
sectors 
• Evidence of 
tangible projects 
• Approved plans and 
budgets are 
communicated to 
all tiers of LLG 
• Cash inflows and 
outflows are 
communicated to 
the population 
• Monitoring are 
participatory 
• Reports are gender 
sensitive 
 
 
engagement skills that they should be using in executing their roles. Such gains 
are expected as they argued in Chapter 5 to translate into having more grass-
roots women participating in policy-making arena. 
By so doing, the traditional institutional setup of LLGs will be under undue 
pressure from the focal voices that women will echo during planning and bud-
geting meetings. As a result, LLGs are expected to circum by formulating, ap-
proving and implementing services sector bias plans and budgets that are 
cognizant of the various development needs of men and women in their areas. 
And that at least some affirmative action budgets for women as well as tangible 
projects must result from such engagement. 
Finally, as participatory processes take firm root in the co-governance of the 
LLGs, transparency practices like communicating approved plans and budgets 
and flow of funds will be adopted. Likewise, LLGs should undertake to dis-
aggregate data in their activity reports so that it can be evidently clear who they 
are working with. These issues therefore became the centre of the review. 
Review objective and questions  
Guided by the argument above, the assessment objective was therefore to ex-
plore the extent to which the political capability building projects empowered 
women and improved local governance. The primary question asked was, ‘to 
what extent did the project empower women and made LLG responsive and 
accountable?’ This question was further broken down into five sub-questions 
below: 
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1. To what extent and in what ways did the project change women leaders’ 
knowledge and skills for effective civic engagement? 
2. To what extent and in what ways did the project change women’s 
participation in the planning and budgeting processes? 
3. To what extent and in what ways did the project change LLG budget res-
ponsiveness? 
4. What tangible benefits have resulted for women from effective participation 
and LLG responsiveness and accountability? 
5. To what extent and in what ways did the project change LLG transparency 
and accountability practices?  
Data collection methods 
In order to answer all the above questions, a number of data collection methods 
were used. Foremost, a staff meeting was held to discuss the need to review the 
project performance (successes and failures). This meeting, also attended by the 
District WCEs, agreed on the review objectives, scope and focus and who 
should do what, when, and with what results. This was followed by literature 
review of the project proposals and implementation reports were conducted. At-
tention in this review was drawn on what was planned to be achieved from the 
logframe and what were actually achieved. 
The inputs from the literature review provided the framework for data col-
lection instrument design. Questionnaires for collecting quantitative information 
from the various respondents were designed and discussed. Finally, a team 
composed of the project staffs, local government officials and the District WCE 
moved to the field to collect data. 
It is important to point out that data was collected through two individual 
surveys as were done in chapter 4 & 5. Data collectors went back to the same 
areas where data was collected during the baseline survey. They also inter-
viewed the same women leaders. In this way, the survey method was able to 
generate information required to answer questions 1 concerned with women 
leaders’ knowledge and application of their roles and core skills in political 
engagement, and question 2 focusing on grassroots women were also inter-
viewed on their participation in LLG planning and budgeting processes.  
Further secondary data reviews were conducted on approved and actual LLG 
plans and budgets as well as their certified Final Accounts and progress reports. 
This method turned out to be the most cumbersome of all given the level of 
poor information management in most LLGs. Some LLGs like Kucwiny and 
Wadelai had actually approved plans and budgets that were not printed out. 
Finally, a district-wide review workshop was conducted in all the 19 LLGs. 
These workshops were attended by WCEs and LLG officials drawn from key 
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decision makers – the political heads of the LLGs (Chairmen LCIII) accompa-
nied by Women Councillors and councillors who head Committees. The tech-
nical staffs were led by the administrative heads of the LLGs (Sub-county 
Chiefs/Town Clerks), accompanied by department heads. 
The various data that were collected where simultaneously analyzed. Differ-
ent teams handled different aspects of the data – quantitative and qualitative. 
However, the teams met routinely to discuss their findings and to agree on the 
reporting framework given that they were also tasked to produce reports for 
their various data sources. Their draft reports were also shared amongst them-
selves and discussed with other WCEs and LLG officials. Below are the find-
ings that the political capability building initiatives yielded. 
Awareness and performance of roles 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 together with Annex 4 reveal that a significant change has 
occurred in the awareness and performance of roles among women leaders. 
Much of those changes (>50%) did occur specifically in the roles regarding 
monitoring of services delivery, advocating for women’s rights, and linking 
women to policy makers. These were areas that women leaders had initially 
reported they did much less work in. 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Women leaders’ awareness of their mandated roles (%) 
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Figure 7.2 Women leaders’ performing their mandated roles (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge and practice of civic engagement skills 
Figures 7.3 & 7.4 above provide evidences of increased skills for civic engage-
ment and the application of such skills among women leaders. As it can be seen, 
during the baseline, women leaders grossly lacked competency with which to 
engage with seasoned LLG officials in order to further women’s interest. Ap-
proximately four years down the road, women leaders have attained a signifi-
cant (see Annex 5) improvement of over 60% point changes on all facets of the 
desired skills. 
In the review workshops that were attended by both the women leaders and 
local government officials, the following were noted as marked changes in the 
ways the women leaders are displaying their engagement skills within the exist-
ing political arena to the advantage of women’s interests. 
• The women leaders who hitherto did not meet at all were now actively 
meeting as leaders with vested interests in what takes place in their local 
governments to discuss about their statutory roles, laying strategies for alli-
ance building, lobbying LLG and NGO leaders, and even taking keen steps 
to meet with grassroots women. To this Zainabu Ayubu from Nebbi LLG 
had this to say: 
I had never known exactly what my roles were. The government just organized 
our elections and left us without support. How could you have expected me to 
perform my roles satisfactorily? After the training, I started to measure myself as 
to whether I am making any progress in executing my roles or not. I ensure that 
we meet regularly to know what is going on, lay out strategies on how best to 
deal with the issues, and if not possible make contacts with our sister leaders in 
other sub counties or even with NGOs. 
Mrs Florencea Anywar, Chairperson WCEs Wadelai LLG pointed out that,  
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Figure 7.3 Women leaders’ having civic engagement skills (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Women leaders’ practicing civic engagement skills (%) 
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four strategies for pushing women’s concern on the policy agenda, namely: 
(i) lobbying elected Women Councillors who are members of sectoral com-
mittees; (ii) lobbying members of the committees individually; (iii) seeking 
formal meetings with the committees; and (iv) seeking permission to attend 
committee meetings. Ms Odero Celly a member of Panyango LLG re-
marked: 
… they (referring to LLG technocrats) used to consider as very illiterate when it 
comes to the issues of especially the budget. They only used to read for us 
figures that I could not truly understand. Now I know what a budget should look 
like and contain such an approach does not work. I want to see for myself what 
the income and expenditure figures are so that I can know where our money 
going and to whose benefit. 
• The WCEs have adopted a relentless pursuit for approved plan and budget 
follow-ups to ensure that commitments made and passed during budget 
approval are honoured during implementation. The rewards of such persist-
ence can be seen from the remark of the Accountant of Nyaravur LLG that, 
The women leaders after the training have become too vigilant. When I was in 
Pakwach LLG I thought that the Chairperson was just over-active when she 
made very frequent follow-ups in my office. When I received my transfer letter, 
I felt relived from her pressure. However, when I reached here, it is the same 
story. Mrs Nezia is even more persistent. Imagine that she walks a very long 
distance without any pay to follow on the commitments made in the plans and 
budget, you simply can not hide any information! Should you try, they will walk 
to the office of the LLG Chairperson and that causes chaos. The only way 
around it is to give them the information but also importantly to work with them 
in implementing the approved plan.  
Some sub-counties have also responded by incorporating WCEs on their 
Poverty Action Fund (PAF) monitoring committees. According to Mr. Oloya 
Michael, Sub-county Chief Pakwach LLG they already work with, “the five (5) 
Sub county WCEs, whom we financially cater for” to ensure that a wider team 
beyond the LLG officials are involved in the periodic monitoring of LLG 
projects. 
• The women leaders have become agents for promoting transparency in 
government budget executions. They provide horizontal and vertical faster 
feedbacks to their fellow WCEs at the lower levels (from Sub county/Town 
Council to especially parish/ward levels). Mrs Margaret Akello of Paidha 
LLG noted that  
We are always at the sub county office to follow disbursements and evaluate 
work done to ensure value for money. For example, we were on the monitoring 
team during the construction of this new office block, right from the start to the 
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end’. In this way, no one was able to tell us any lie about the project. We also 
take this information back to our electorates – the women. This had in the past 
defeated LLG officials but it is easy for us to do so. Should anything go wrong, 
the information can be disseminated quickly downwards. 
• Besides, many women leaders especially the WCEs have adopted a self-
driven initiative of meeting with local government sectoral committees. 
Meeting this committee is considered important for them because it is the 
committees that allocate and approve funds that are simply window dressed 
by the public budget approval meetings. In these meetings women leaders 
are ably raising the issues that women have prioritized to be integrated into 
their LLG plans and budgets. This improved negotiation (lobbying) ability is 
confirmed by Hon. Anewa, Chairman of Nebbi LLG when he said,  
You simply can no longer rubbish off women’s demands. The women leaders 
know all sector heads. They talk to them both individually and collectively. In 
that way, they are able to win support for the issues that they want to be funded. 
Should be in disagreement with their idea, they strategically wait for the bigger 
council meeting and echo their needs justifying why. You just find yourself de-
feated! 
These findings present evidences of the value of political consciousness as a 
vital ingredient in citizenship building. Aware of what they are expected to do 
and armed with the relevant skills, women leaders have taken to dancing in the 
centre other than at the periphery of the hitherto denied political space. They 
have gained, in the words of Rowland (1997), power with other women through 
alliance building for a collective voice on what matters to women’s practical 
and strategic needs. By identifying critical issues as evidence for lobbying for 
support, women leaders have confidence and power to present justified cases for 
consideration by the various sectoral committees. Important is that they are re-
creating informal political spaces as enclaves where they interact with grass-
roots women without encumbrance of the formal local government systems. 
And finally, women leaders are able to shape transparency and accountability 
practices which directly link to their attaining power over their roles. They no 
longer wait for accountability to be invested in the Chairpersons of the LLGs 
and hence are transforming the traditional practice of accountability which was 
the preserve of formal local government officials. 
Women’s participation in policy processes 
The individual survey conducted among grassroots women elicit whether or not 
they were participating in LLG planning and budgeting processes that starts 
from their village and ends at the LLG levels. Figure 7.5 presents the findings. 
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Figure 7.5 Women’s participation in LLG planning and budgeting cycle (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is evident from this figure (and is also corroborated by Annex 7) as 
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engage in project implementation in their villages (27%). 
However, limited changes were recorded in parish to LLG feedback pro-
cesses as well as in the implementation stages. This was because the LLG offi-
cials, as usual, noted that they simply do not have the funds with which to hold 
feedback meetings. Second, they also noted that most project implementation 
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are either technical or contracted out to the private sector. True as such reasons 
may be, worth noting is that using such implementation approach reduces peo-
ple’s ownership of projects meant to benefit them given that often even where 
local materials that they can contribute are all tendered out.  
The key changes pointed out during the review workshops were that: 
• Women are now self-mobilizing fellow women to come for planning meet-
ings thereby short circuiting the former exclusionary mobilization strategy 
practiced by male local councils (LCs) and Parish development Committees 
(PDCs). Yanijo Gabby of Erussi LLG had this to say, 
Before AFARD trained us in gender responsive planning and budgeting, a 
majority of us saw no value in attending such meetings. But today, we attend 
planning and budgeting meetings without fail. We even mobilize grassroots 
women to participate in such meetings and they attend in larger numbers than 
before. 
• ‘Now funds that used not to be there for community planning is starting to 
surface’ remarked one woman leader. Funds for facilitating planning pro-
cesses at the village levels are being provided by some LLGs. To this effect, 
Hon. Hassan Ringtho, Chairman of Paidha LLG and Mr. Olama the Ac-
countant for Akworo LLG echoed,  
So far we have released some money (UGX 500,000 in Paidha and UGX 
800,000 in Akworo) to facilitate lower local government administrative units to 
organize planning meetings at village and parish levels. We are mobilizing more 
funds to facilitate participation during budget conference for all councillors and 
sub-county WCEs.  
• LLG officials have started to appreciate stakeholders’ consensus as an 
effective means for representative democracy. Hon. Anewa Chairman of 
Nebbi LLG pointed out, ‘We ensure that community views are sought from 
grassroots level up to the budget conference by properly mobilizing them 
through the local councillors’. Mr. Michael Oloya the Sub-county Chief of 
Pakwach LLG reaffirmed this when he noted that ‘we ensure that the very 
issues raised by grassroot communities are what make up our plans/budget 
and we do implement the activities when resources are available’.  
From the above observations, it can be said that while initially the exclusion 
of women shelved them off the local policy arena and justifiably build distrust 
in them about their government, through awareness creation and revamping the 
effectiveness of their leadership, gradually women as a constituency are making 
a come-back into the policy arena. They consider their recognition as active 
players vital to co-partake in their own development both in terms of being part 
of the implementation team or overseeing what is going on. This confirms their 
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sentiments expressed during the feedback meeting held after the baseline assess-
ment that they felt their government was distant from them and have lost trust in 
it. 
LLGs plan and budget responsiveness 
While the increased empowerment of women through awareness, skills and 
alliance building are ends in themselves given their returns to the women’s 
political projectivity, they in the view of political capability building advocates 
are also means to another end – engendering local governance. One aspect of 
this engenderment lies in how LLGs transform their institutional practices away 
from the conclave of hitherto hegemonic male-leadership selfish ways of doing 
things into opening up, as is required by deliberative politics, to dialogue with 
others and build consensus on the ways forward. 
In this regard, another focus on how LLG respond in how they manage their 
plans and budget as was shown in Chapter 3 was explored. The approved plans 
and budgets as well as the final accounts and annual reports were reviewed. 
What came out from this exercise and were also confirmed by the review work-
shops were that: 
 
• All LLGs have their plans based on gender sensitive analysis  
Before the advent of the project, plans of all LLGs were almost invariably gen-
der blind or gender neutral. Even reports were presented in terms of “number of 
people reached” without disaggregating outreach data by gender. This is chang-
ing as Mr. Anyolitho, a Councillor heading Production Committee in Parombo 
LLG said,  
“…gendering of data is taking roots. While our plans and activity reports are re-
quired to show who (by gender) we are reaching out to, in the extreme even in 
council and sectoral committee meetings, we are expected to state how many men 
and women are in attendance. Doing so helps us to know who (which gender) is 
dominating the show and why?” 
• Plans of all LLGs have gender responsive statements and considerations for 
affirmative action  
Before the project, hardly any LLG had a gender responsive statement, or even 
the word “gender”. Affirmative action for women, though emphasized by gov-
ernment, rarely meant more than money for Women’s Day Celebrations. It was 
verified during the review that all LLG plans had gender responsive statements 
translated into gender disaggregated targets. All LLGs had affirmative action 
budgets, however little (0.5-1%), specifically to address women’s issues that 
could not fit within the traditional sectoral budgeting approach. A Woman 
Councillor in Paidha Town explained, 
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We refused to pass the budget of this financial year because we could not see some-
thing specifically for affirmative action. We only relented when we were assured 
and shown that our concerns were captured under the various sectors – health, edu-
cation, and production – where specific budget lines were made for women’s special 
needs. 
• LLGs adopted discipline in plan and budget management 
What was celebrated by all the stakeholders was the shift away from the 
manipulation of cash budget management into budget management discipline. 
Figures 7.6, 7.7, & 7.8 below show that from the start of the project (see also 
chapter 3), LLG officials made empty promises to the people that they were 
committed to services delivery. Once they had the funds, spending priorities are 
switched away from services delivery into administrative cost from which the 
officials had their dividends.  
This practice changed from FY2005/06 onwards. Budget planning and 
execution (Figure 7.6) witnessed a turnaround in LLG commitments to services 
delivery. What is evident from the figure is that generally from 2005/06 up to 
2007/08 Services sectors continued to receive a steadily increasing proportion 
of LLG budgets as compared to Administrative sectors. This positive shift is 
contrary to what was happening prior to the project intervention when Admini-
strative sectors received both more allocations and actual disbursement. How-
ever, (male) LLG officials with vested interests in budget management still con-
tinue to practice budget indiscipline during cash budget management. Services 
sectors receive less disbursement than was approved when compared to admi-
nistrative cost. 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Budget management in LLGs in Nebbi district (%) 
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However, this aggregate improvement is not in all LLGs. Some LLGs such 
as Jangokoro, Paidha, Pakwach TC, Akworo and Wadelai still experienced a 
decline in Services sector budget allocation. Likewise, a similar decline in bud-
get disbursement occurred in Pakwach TC, Jangokoro, Wadelai, Panyimur, Zeu 
and Parombo. This downturn makes the LLGs of Jangokoro, Pakwach TC, and 
Wadelai worst performing LLGs in budget management. 
Such changes were attributed to one critical factor; the vigilance of women 
leaders (women councilors and WCEs). The LLG confessed that it was becom-
ing increasingly difficult to single-handedly manage the affairs of their councils 
without the involvement of other stakeholders. The Chairman of Nyaravur had 
this to say, 
We used not to care much how our budget was allocated and spent since we have the 
technocrats who are trained to do so. The technocrats took it for granted that since 
most of us are not schooled enough they can manipulate the budget to suit their 
interest. No more! After the training given by AFARD it became apparent that a 
budget must be scrutinized to show/know who will benefit from it. In this way, even 
the technocrats got scared that their old tricks can no longer work. The arithmetic 
clearly compares administrative and services costs from the budget total. This 
keenness has made things better. More of our funds are now spent on delivering 
services for which we are elected. 
Tangible projects 
The effective participation of women in the planning and budgeting process and 
the reciprocal responsiveness exhibited by LLGs were expected to result into 
tangible benefits to women. Top on the benefit list was having what could be 
flagged as the fruits of women leaders’ efforts. The ultimate question therefore 
was, after all the awareness, skills building, mobilization to participate in the 
planning processes, advocacies, follow-ups, and so on, what could women and 
LLGs point to as visible results?  
To elicit answers to the above question, the review team probed the work-
shop participants so that whatever projects that they mentioned could be un-
doubtedly attributed to the consequences of the women leaders’ work. As a 
result, a dialogue and consensus between Women leaders and LLG officials 
present in the workshop revealed what Women leaders generally pushed for and 
what LLGs finally responded to because of such dialogues.  
The various review meetings revealed that through women’s efforts LLGs 
were able to provide sponsorship of best performing girls in Primary Leaving 
Examinations (in Nebbi Town and Nebbi), distribute sanitary pads to teenage 
girls in schools (in Wadelai) and play balls and drama kits (in Panyimur), 
provide bicycle ambulance (in Pakwach town), and to construct 4 market stalls 
with shades and public VIP latrine (in Akworo). The most important projects 
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were the 4 maternity units constructed and/or equipped with 3 placenta pits, 14 
beds, 10 mattresses, 7 pieces of curtains, and 2 bath shelters (in Nyaravur, 
Nebbi, Pakwach, Panyango, and Paidha). Mrs Zainab Ayub of Nebbi LLG em-
phasized that, 
We met the sectoral committee and lobbied for a better equipped maternity unit in 
our health centres. I am proud that the sub-county equipped maternity units at Kal-
wang and Koch health centers with beds and mattresses in response to our demand. 
Figures 7.7 & 7.8 show a maternity unit and a placenta pit respectively. The 
importance attached to the placenta pit was thrilling, as the Chairperson WCE 
of Nyaravur narrated, 
In the past many women and their children were dying from unsafe deliveries. Many 
women preferred to deliver at home with traditional birth attendants for a very 
simple and less costly reason. They did not want the placentas of their babies to be 
thrown anywhere in the bush after delivery for dogs and fox to eat. Traditionally this 
is assumed to bring bad omen to their children. Yet, no one cared! All the things 
those leaders who controlled our money knew were different from such simple 
needs of ordinary women. 
When we came to the table where resources are shared, we demanded for such a 
simple project to be implemented in our health centre as part of an affirmative 
action. Because it was not costly, many LLG officials supported the idea. There it 
was put.  
When we informed the women in the villages that the health unit now had facilities 
for the disposal of placenta, go and visit and witness for yourselves. The number of 
supervised deliveries has suddenly increased. Women are flocking to come and 
deliver at the health facilities because they know it is safe. 
Meanwhile the groining from deaths has instead reduced. All of us, men and women 
alike, are benefiting. No more wasted labour for digging graves and fewer headaches 
from wailing for the deceased. All we want are such services that make life better 
for us all! 
 
Figure 7.7  Equipped maternity unit  Figure 7.8 A placenta pit in  
 in Kalowang health centre  Nyaravur health centre 
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In response to this remark made above, the Chairperson Nyaravur LLG con-
fessed that,  
If we were serious as leaders, I have come to realize, we can change the lives of 
many people with so little money. But ignorantly, we think people’s needs require a 
lot of money which we do not have. This is our cynicism as political leaders! 
LLG transparency and accountability practices 
While it was recognizable that improvements in core co-governance issues have 
started taking root, the cardinal principles of openness and being responsible for 
(in)actions by LLG officials is equally vital. In this regard, the review work-
shops also asked ‘in what ways, if any, did LLG transparency and account-
ability practices change?’ In answering this question, two critical aspects were 
explored starting with LLG adherence to mandatory regulations that requires 
them to be transparent and accountable to their constituencies. Second, how 
such regulatory practices were engendered and institutionalized. For instance, 
while LLG are supposed to provide feedback on approved plans and budget, do 
they as a norm do it to both men and women? The findings from both the re-
view workshops and documentary reviews revealed that: 
 
• None of the LLGs had popular versions of their approved plans and budgets 
written in a language that an ordinary, moderately literate person, can read 
and understand. Only 3 of the 19 LLGs (Paidha, Pakwach and Pakwach TC) 
shared the full bulky copies of their plans with Women leaders. Unfortu-
nately, many of the Women leaders could not comprehend the plan docu-
ments. Mrs Akello Margaret of Paidha LLG commented that, ‘LLG officials 
need to forget that they are doing us a favor when they give us a copy of the 
approved plan and budget. It is their mandated duty to do so’. Meanwhile 
Mr. Oloya Michael, Sub-county Chief Pakwach noted that ‘due to resource 
constraints, we are unable to provide all stakeholders with copies of ap-
proved plans. However, we make sure that women leaders get a copy at 
least.’ 
 
• Besides, no feedbacks on approved plans and budgets were provided to 
lower administrative units by most LLGs except by only 3 of the 19 LLGs 
(Nyapea, Pakwach and Pakwach TC). In all the remaining LLGs, instead it 
was the WCEs who informed their electorates of approved plans and budgets 
and the expected projects in the financial year. But no LLG specifically 
convened a feedback meeting for WCEs. 
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• Beyond the documents, no LLG shared with their constituency in general 
and Women leaders in particular any report of periodic revenues and expen-
ditures. Details of cash inflows and outflows were jealously and secretly 
guarded as they are considered too sensitive for the ordinary people to know. 
‘The Sub-county Chiefs and Accountants only give copies of financial 
reports to the Chairmen of the LLGs and Secretaries for Finance Commit-
tee’ reported the workshop. Although some LLGs attempt to pin on their 
notice boards summaries of income and expenditures, first, they are too brief 
to show where the money actually went and second, one needed to move 
long distances to the LLG notice boards at the Sub-County offices to access 
the information. Again the usual culprit was lack of funds with which to 
make many copies of the expense reports. 
A worst case scenario was in Wadelai LLG where even the Chairman LC 
III, the political head of that LLG, complained that technocrats were shield-
ing vital information from elected politicians just because the law bars politi-
cians from delving into books of accounts. He said, “since I assumed my 
office, there has been little transparency on the part of the Sub-County Chief 
and the Accountant, yet I feel business is not fine. That is why I took the 
initiative to invite the Inspectorate General of Government to investigate the 
council.” But the fundamental question that should be asked is, ‘if the head 
of a LLG has difficulty accessing information, what chance do simple vil-
lage women have accessing information?  
 
• But on a good note almost all LLGs (except Jangokoro) are producing peri-
odic progress reports with data that are disaggregated by gender. Achieve-
ments are starting to be tracked both against plan and intended outreach to 
women and men. 
Wrapping up 
In this chapter the effects of political capability building on women’s empower-
ment and engendering local governance practices was assessed. The findings 
show more gains occurred in the facets of women leaders’ awareness of their 
roles as well as their acquisition of civic engagement skills. Using both gains, 
they have taken head on performing their roles. They are moving away from a 
state of docility into active change agents within the political space available to 
them. As a result, they have ensured increasing grassroots women’s participa-
tion in decentralized planning and budgeting processes. They have also through 
alliance building ensured that women’s voices are taken up the ladder beyond 
the reach of ordinary village women. They are lobbying strategically for budget 
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support to women’s strategic needs and ensuring that any promises made does 
not slip away. 
Such an unexpected vigilance has met with positive LLG budget manage-
ment practices. More funds are being committed to service delivery and such 
funds are no longer being diverted to meet administrative costs as was before. 
Yet, LLG traditional power-holders who have been for long beneficiaries of 
illegitimate management system still continue to hold information (that is 
power) away from women leaders. They do not provide feedback to the com-
munities they serve. Neither are they willing to circulate cash inflow or outflow 
information. Such kaleidoscopic reactions warranted conducting a gender res-
ponsiveness audit to identify which LLGs were compliant or not. This is the 
focus of the next chapter.  
 
  
8 
Gender responsiveness barometer 
In the preceding chapter, intervention outcomes were presented in the forms of 
dimensions of change in the practices of women leaders, ordinary women, and 
LLG officials. From that analysis, it was not possible to compare and contrast 
different LLG performance. Such a comparison is important in charting the 
roadmap for focal outreach and promoting internal learning. By using a system-
agency analysis approach built on locally sensitive indicators, this chapter ex-
plores how each LLG was performing at the time of the closure of the project 
by asking ‘to what extent are LLGs Gender Responsive?’. The concern herein is 
more on the institutionalization of engendered local governance. Answers to 
this question came from a Gender Responsiveness Audit (GRA) that was con-
ducted in 2008. This chapter, therefore, describes the audit justification, focus, 
processes, and findings. 
What is Gender Responsiveness Audit? 
An effective, responsive, transparent and accountable LLG is required to be 
pro-people (women and men alike) not only in its policy statements per se but 
also in undertaking initiatives that benefit it constituency. The LLG is obliged to 
open public space for its constituency for shared rights and responsibilities in 
demanding for and contributing to the collective implementation, monitoring 
and finally accountability for development programmes (Ackerman 2004). 
Doing so however has to take note of gender concerns beyond the exclusive 
people/community-driven approach. As such, Gender Responsiveness Audit 
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(GRA) also known as ‘Participatory Gender Plan/Budget Tracking’ is, there-
fore, a participatory process of tracking whether or not decentralized develop-
ment in LLGs is conducted through a gender-sensitive citizen-state engagement 
(Lakwo 2006). 
Seen in this way, GRA transcends the myopic financial audit1 and the easily 
manipulated Ministry of Local Government’s annual performance assessment 
exercise. It is a stakeholder-driven user-friendly approach that tracks LLG com-
mitments to gender equality in its participatory and gender-sensitive planning 
and budgeting processes and outcomes.  
Why GRA? 
The commitment of central government to local development is confirmed 
beyond policy statements by its continued provision of funding to local govern-
ments. Nebbi district itself is 99% (see Figure 3.2) dependent on such funding. 
Whether or not such funds reach to the intended beneficiaries is another debate 
altogether. But central government attempts to ascertain this by subjecting its 
funds utilization to: (i) financial audit; and (ii) performance assessment. Both 
these methods as accountability measures as I will show below have fallen short 
of ensuring gender responsiveness, hence the need for the Gender Responsive-
ness Audit. A brief look at the weaknesses of each method is stated hereunder. 
 
Local government financial audit 
To ensure effective and efficient utilization of decentralized funds, financial 
audits (internally and externally) are routinely conducted. SNV (2000: 4) notes 
that financial audit as a management tool is a control measure that investigates 
whether or not an organization complies with external and internal demands. 
Therefore, the preoccupation of financial audit is embedded in certifying and 
approving the legitimacy of financial management in line with the rules and 
regulations of financial management. 
Arising from the above, financial audits are devoid of verifying value-for-
money in terms of returns to the lives of the people it was meant to benefit. 
Rather it is preoccupied with financial procedures (often falsified by paper 
accountability). As such, financial audits do not provide a clear link between 
financial and accounting regulations, financial expenses and the change in the 
lives of women and men who out to benefit from such expenditures. For in-
stance, while the Constitution demands for gender equality; financial audits do 
                                                 
1  Krug & van Staveren in Gender Audit: Whim or Voice (citing Frey, 1994 and Cooter 
& Ginsburg 1997) echo that auditing institutions operate where information asym-
metry makes them to rely on budgetary reviews of good bookkeeping and rule 
keeping.  
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not in any way analyze the gender dimensions of budgets. Such changes in 
people’s lives are always construed to have inherently occurred.  
It can therefore be said that relying on financial audit that gives priority to 
budget management over the relevance of the budget to beneficiary livelihoods 
and of all gender equality is too inadequate to guarantee improvement in ser-
vices delivery and engendered governance.  
 
 
Box 8.1 Objectives of the assessment 
The objectives of the assessment of minimum conditions and performance measures 
are: 
a) To verify local government compliance to the provisions of the law governing their 
operations, thereby ensuring improved service delivery and resource management. 
b) To determine the local government that have the capacity to manage discretionary 
development funds and are eligible to access LDG under LGDP in the following 
financial year. 
c) To provide incentives to local government performance by rewarding good per-
formance and sanctioning poor performance as a strategy for systems, structural 
and institutional strengthening and promotion of efficient and competitive service 
deliveries in local government  
d) To assist local government to identify functional capacity gaps and needs which if 
timely addressed through an enhanced Capacity Building Programme should lead 
to increased outputs, improved service delivery and significant poverty reduction. 
e) To promote good practice in the administration and service delivery (good govern-
ance) at the LLGs by linking all central government transfer to LLGs performance. 
f) To encourage local government to adhere to national sector specific targets and 
standards by incorporating  local  government performance on these targets in the 
reward/penalty scheme of the LGDP II. 
g) To enhance downwards accountability, closer coordination and integration of dev-
elopment activities at the Local government. 
h) To prepare ground and a comparative benchmark for external and final perform-
ance Assessment of local government by the National Assessment that must man-
datorily be pre-informed by the Internal Assessment findings and results. 
 
Source: District Planning Unit, Nebbi: 2005, 2006 
 
 
Local government performance assessment 
Since 2000, Ministry of Local Government has been implementing an institu-
tionalised annual assessment of minimum conditions and performance for all 
local governments in Uganda, with the objectives as are detailed in Box 8.1. 
Initiated as a project modality for Local Government Development Programme 
(LGDP), this assessment later broadened to target all government transfers 
accessed in the form of Local Development Grant (LDG) and Capacity Building 
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Grant (CBG). The minimum conditions and performance assessed (and re-
warded or penalised) are derived from government laws and guidelines such as 
the Local Governments Act (Amended 1997), Local Government Finance and 
Accounting Regulations (1998), Local Government Tendering and Procurement 
Regulations 2000, Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act (2004), 
National Gender Policy, National Environment Policy, HIV/AIDS Policy, as 
well as Guidelines for implementing sector specific conditional grants.2 
This exercise is internally conducted by the District Internal Assessment 
Team composed largely of government staffs. In Nebbi district it was only in 
2006 that civil society participation was enlisted. The National Assessment 
Team finally does the verification, validation, and benchmarking.  
Of importance for this study is the gender mainstreaming aspect. The key 
gender mainstreaming questions asked are summarised in Box 8.2. While the 
results of this assessment have been promising over the years caution is needed 
for its use. Why? Because first, the assessment is a post-mortem exercise which 
does not tell us how the plans and budgets were made. Its focus is on the final 
results. Second, who identified and prioritised the gender issues is also not 
addressed as long as gender issues appear in the final plan even as mere word. 
Yet, chapter 4 demonstrated that how and who manages the process matters in 
the final result. Finally and disheartening is that the exercise is internally done 
exclusively by government personnel. Evidences that it is often compromised 
because many assessors worry about awarding penalty scores given that 
financial fines are the end reward. For instance, Boaz Tumusiime in ‘Ministry 
Accuses Kasese of Forgery’ during a National Assessment exercise revealed 
that Kasese District Local Government forged plans, budgets, minutes, and 
other documents.3 Another shortfall of this assessment is evident from the mi-
nority report that AFARD as a Civil Society organization representative pro-
duced after it participated in the exercise in September 2006. The report re-
vealed that there was: 
• Gender compartmentalization rather than mainstreaming: At both the dis-
trict and LLGs, gender issues were considered an independent affair of Com-
munity Based Services Office as opposed to government policy that requires 
gender issues to be mainstreamed in all sectors/departments. 
                                                 
2  The assessment covers: Development planning; Staff functionality capacity; Moni-
toring and mentoring performance; Communication and accountability; Budget allo-
cation; Procurement capacity and performance; Local revenue performance; Gender 
mainstreaming; Council, Executive and Finance Committee performance; Council 
sector committees’ performance; Operation, maintenance and sustainability of in-
vestment; and Environmental mainstreaming. 
3  See Boaz Tumusiime in ‘Ministry Accuses Kasese of Forgery’ in Daily Monitor 
Newspaper, November 14, 2006: 7. 
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• Planning processes were mostly pegged to Indicative Planning Figures 
(IPFs): Committee arrangements were found to dominate the planning and 
budgeting processes. By implication, the link between the top-bottom (men-
toring) and bottom-up (needs identification and prioritization) approaches 
was lost. Officials on receipt of IPFs first allocated funds to the various 
sectors and activities then did situation analysis and bottom-up planning 
processes to window dress their results. 
• Progress reporting: In almost all local governments (the district level in-
clusive) there were no progress reports. Technical Planning Committee and 
Sectoral Committee meetings were more inclined on budget discussions than 
accountability that should focus on plan, budget, output, challenges, and 
lessons learnt. All local governments neither measured their performance nor 
provided performance accountability to their constituencies for the past years 
through a comprehensive Sub County/Town Council Progress Report. 
 
 
Box 8.2 Performance assessment questions for gender mainstreaming 
1. Investment Plan reflects sound gender analysis including disaggregated data, gen-
der impact analysis, etc. 
2. Investment Plan reflects strategies to address the gender issues identified in the ana-
lysis. 
3. Annual budget reflects budgetary allocations to address gender strategies that were 
raised in the plans. 
4. Evidence that the local government has financed the gender issues identified by the 
plan during planning, monitoring and mentoring activities. 
5. Evidence that gender specific needs were identified and analyzed during the capa-
city building needs assessment. 
6. Specific capacity enhancement strategies and activities for Gender Focal Point Per-
son in the current financial year linked to addressing inequalities between men and 
women. 
7. Skills enhancement training for Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities coun-
cillors undertaken during previous financial year aimed at reducing the inequalities 
between men and women. 
8. Gender awareness training (addressing inequalities between men and women) plan-
ned for and undertaken during the previous financial year. 
9.  Evidence that Gender Focal Point person identified gender issues, designed strate-
gies and mentored other staff on how to deal with inequalities between men and 
women. 
10. Evidence that the gender Focal Person has disseminated gender information (either 
received from the centre or developed within the local government) to technical as 
well as political leaders in the local government. 
 
Source: Ministry of Local Government, 2006 
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Therefore, GRA attempts to fill the gaps of and give meanings to financial 
audits and performance assessment. First, it is conducted in a participatory man-
ner by core stakeholders of the respective LLG without any preserved rights to 
technocrats. Second, it focuses on critical contextualized gender concerns in de-
centralized development management of the LLGs. Third, GRA tracks beyond 
the traditional gender budgeting4 focus on distributive and allocative efficiency 
of government budgets but also the entire planning and budgeting cycle. Fi-
nally, it also explores aspects of transparency and accountability to ensure true 
adherence to commitments to approved plans and budgets. This makes GRA a 
citizen-state managed process of assessing the engenderment of local govern-
ments using mutually agreed upon yardsticks. 
Objective and focus of GRA 
As an approach, this GRA was conducted to assess the extent to which en-
gendered governance was institutionalized in LLGs in Nebbi district as is 
required by the Constitution, National Gender Policy, and the planning and bud-
geting guidelines. The assessment aimed at providing a basis for entrenching 
women’s political entitlements and local government compliance to existing 
laws and regulations that promote gender equality in services delivery. 
The audit looked at the entire approved local government planning and bud-
geting framework and ideally categorized them into two interrelated phases and 
4 themes as is described below and summarized in Table 8.1. 
 
 
                                                 
4  With respect to engendering local governance, the tools used in gender budgeting 
have the following pitfalls: 
1. Some tools like incidence analysis require ‘expert/technocrat skills that is lack-
ing among a majority of the elected leaders and especially women leaders. 
2. Where plans are not target specific and do not have gender disaggregated data 
the analysis of budget benefit to women and men is grossly hampered. 
3. The tools pay more attention to budget outcomes than budget formulation pro-
cesses. Yet, often such outcomes are derived from structural exclusion of women 
like their denied participation in the various budget processes.  
4. In many local governments, plan and budget documents are less synchronized. 
Therefore, by looking at the budget alone one missed the issues raised in the plan 
document. 
5. Finally, the practice of ‘cash budget’ management is characterized by manipula-
tions and ‘closed door transactions’ much to the disadvantage of women leaders. 
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Table 8.1 Gender Responsiveness Audit focus 
 
Focus 
Indicators # 
in 
assessment 
tool 
 
1. Women’s participation  
• Proportion of women to men participating in village planning meetings 
• Proportion of women to men participating in parish planning meetings 
• Proportion of women to men participating in sub county budget conference 
• Proportion of women to men participating in sub county budget approval 
meeting 
 
2-4, 6 
2. Women leaders effectiveness 
• Women leaders identified core women’s issues at all levels before planning 
meetings 
• Women leaders held meetings with sub county Sectoral committees 
• Women leaders involved in expenditure allocation 
• Women leaders met Sectoral committees to follow disbursements 
 
1, 5, 18, 22 
3. LLG responsiveness  
• Sectoral plans have gender disaggregated targets 
• Plans and budgets have affirmative action consideration 
• Budgets have explicit gender responsiveness statements 
• Aggregate budget allocated for services Vs administrative sectors 
• Intra-sector allocation for services Vs administrative costs 
• Share of budget allocated for affirmative action 
• Aggregate budget disbursed for services Vs administrative sectors 
• Intra-sector disbursement for services Vs administrative costs 
• Share of budget disbursed for affirmative action 
 
7-12, 19-21 
4. LLG transparency & accountability practices 
• LLG have popular version of their plans 
• LLG provided WCE with a copy of the approved plan/budget 
• LLG communicated about approved plan/budget to lower units 
• LLGs communicated about approved plan/budget to WCE 
• LLG provide WCE with details of cash inflows/outflows 
• Progress reports include gender disaggregated data 
13-17, 23 
 
 
 
a) Plan and budget formulation processes. The focus herein is on needs assess-
ment and programming. Ideally, the processes are required to be partici-
patory, use gender analytical tools, and should be poverty responsive. The 
eventual outcome should be a gender responsive plan and budget. Pertinent 
also is women’s participation as well as women’s needs. This is because it 
was noted that women start losing out on resource allocation from: (i) their 
inability to identify what their priorities are; (ii) in order to ably rally support 
for such priorities; and (iii) hence, they fail to mobilize other women to take 
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active part in the various meetings where decisions are made. Attention is 
also given to the fact that when needs reprioritization become ‘Sectoral 
Committee’ affairs, Women leaders as the champion of women’s voices 
need to actively pursue women’s needs with the various Sectoral commit-
tees. 
b) Plan and budget implementation and accounting. At this stage, funds 
received from all sources are disbursed for translating plans into procuring 
the agreed upon goods and services that the people needed. It is expected 
that resources should be spent as per the targets agreed upon and any 
revision is done collectively. Equally, the monitoring, review, and reporting 
of progress resulting from the funds utilization are assessed for adherence to 
the promises made. 
Methodological approach 
The GRA exercise was conducted in three stages, namely: 
 
Stage 1: The preparatory phase 
• The audit indicators (as is detailed in Annex 3) were identified in a brain-
storming session attended by the District Planner and the Senior Community 
Development Officer and the Good Governance team of AFARD. 
• The identified indicators were refined during the training of local govern-
ment officials and Women Council Executives in Participatory Gender Mo-
nitoring and Evaluation of local government investments. 
• After the indicators were finally developed, a working team comprising of 
local government and AFARD staffs as well as the District WCEs was set 
up. This team developed a work plan and communicated it to the various 
local governments with clear information on what is expected of them as 
well as the time for assessment. 
 
Stage 2  The field work phase 
• Every local government was assigned one day for the assessment. On the 
scheduled days, the assessment team visited the LLGs and together with the 
local government staffs collected data from the various sources. 
• At the end of each day, a review and summary scoring was done. 
 
Stage 3 Reporting and feedback 
• A draft report was written from the summarized findings in the daily re-
views. 
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• The draft report was discussed in a feedback meeting which analyzed the 
overall findings. This meeting was also attended by officials from local 
government, District WCE office, and peer civil society organizations. 
• A final report was then written. This was shared with the district and local 
government political and technical leaders. 
 
Data collection methods 
As is detailed in the audit instruments, the following main data collection 
methods were used by the team of assessors: 
 
• Documentary reviews: The available documents related to lower local 
government commitments to gender equality and adherence to regulations 
especially in line with the indicators for planning and budgeting (as well as 
accounting) were reviewed. These were mainly the approved and revised 
plans and budgets, activity reports for some central government program-
mes, and minutes of women council meetings. 
• Observations: To ensure that what were reported in the reviewed documents 
were true, verification observations of some documents like copies of vouch-
ers, virement letters requesting for budget re-allocation, and cash flow state-
ments were done and the figures used to cross-check what were stated in 
approved plans and budgets. 
• Interviews: These were held with the Sub county Chiefs, Accountants, and 
Sub-county Women leaders. The focus of the interviews was on the parti-
cipation of women in the planning and budgeting processes and the effect-
iveness of Women Council structures. 
 
Results scoring 
That the GRA is expected to capture both process and outcome performance 
indicators of a given local government in regards to gender planning and bud-
geting, the identified indicators were scored in order to allow for comparison of 
local government performance. This was done by: 
 
Step 1: Having each indicator scored on a 0 - 1 scores because either the 
local government did not meet the requirement (0 score) or it did (1 
score). 
Step 2: Summarizing the actual (observed) score for every local govern-
ment and dividing it with the expected 23 scores that all local 
governments should have scored. The sum was then multiplied by 
100% to get a local government Gender Responsiveness Score. 
Step 3: Categorizing the Gender Responsiveness Score into Gender Res-
ponsiveness Status using Table 8.2 below. 
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Table 8.2 Categorization of gender responsiveness status 
Scale Status 
 
71-100% 
 
Gender responsive status: Represents good performing LLG with engendered 
governance system and to a large degree adheres to gender sensitive 
decentralized development management. 
 
 
36-70% 
 
Fairly gender responsive status: Represents fairly performing LLG that needs 
added effort to improve on their responsiveness status. It is a LLG that is on 
track in engendering its governance system. 
 
 
0-35% 
 
Non-gender responsive status: Represents bad performing LLG that needs 
concerted effort in order to change their responsiveness status. This also means 
that the LLG practices a gendered governance system. 
 
Assessment findings 
Table 8.3 shows the gender responsiveness thematic scores and status of all 
LLGs in Nebbi district in 2008. While overall the LLGs attained a 55% average 
score representing a fairly gender responsive status, no single LLG had a gender 
responsive status. However, 16 of the 19 LLGs scored in the fairly gender 
responsive status and 3 LLGs were non-gender responsive.  
Meanwhile, as is shown in Figure 8.1, there is marked performance in the 
facets of women leaders’ effectiveness, grassroots women participation, and 
LLG plan and budget responsiveness to gender concerns. Concerns remains in 
LLG transparency and accountability practices. 
 
 
Table 8.3 LLG performance by score theme 
Gender responsiveness status Theme 
Gender  
responsive 
Fairly gender  
responsive 
Non-gender 
responsive 
Women leaders effectiveness All 19 LLGs None None 
Women’s participation None Akworo, Panyango, 
Panyimur 
Nebbi, Kucwiny, 
Atyak 
LLG (plan/budget) 
responsiveness 
All 11 other  
LLGs 
Parombo, Nyapea, 
Nebbi TC, Nebbi  
Jangokoro, 
Kucwiny, Atyak, 
Wadelai 
LLG transparency & 
accountability practices 
None Pakwach TC, Pakwach All 17 other LLGs 
Overall performance None All 16 other LLGs Jangokoro, Atyak, 
Kucwiny 
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Figure 8.1 Gender Responsiveness Audit performance 
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Summing up 
From the GRA findings, it can be observed that an improvement in decen-
tralized governance in Nebbi district is largely coming from the citizen side of 
the equation given that the state side of the equation exhibited by LLGs res-
ponses are largely sluggish. The finding reveals that to a greater extent the 
process of engendering local governance in the LLGs will be slow. This poses 
an enormous challenge for majority of women leaders who are for the first time 
securing central political space which they were never allowed before. That 
their growing zeal to work is meted by a lukewarm reception by the traditional 
LLG power-holders, the effectiveness of the political space to yield to co-
governance can be doubted given that whether or not women leaders and LLG 
officials will be ‘dancing to the same tune in the same dancehall’ (Helmsing 
2005). Thus, the process of engendering decentralized governance remains an 
uphill task ahead. 
 
 
  
9 
Learning from actions 
This last chapter focuses on exploring the way forward for building sustainable 
and engendered decentralized governance. It ties a link between the two op-
posing arguments pointed out in Chapter 1 regarding the relevance of the in-
sertion of women in decentralized governance with the practitioners’ call for 
political capability building. While the former provides recognized actors status 
to women leaders the latter catalyzes their effective roles’ execution. As a 
result, integrating the two arguments present a valuable ingredient for en-
hancing effective women’s political participation, in the available policy arena, 
as citizens with rights to demand for both services and accountability. 
In so doing, the chapter explores – as is summarized in Table 9.1 below – 
what lessons can be learned from the success of the AFARD projects in 
triggering women’s political participation. It also delves into factors that are 
impeding LLG commitments to gender equality before finally proposing the 
way forward in deepening engendered decentralized governance. To do so, 
however, the chapter asks a central question, ‘how can decentralized govern-
ance be sustainably engendered?’ This question is answered by further asking 
the following sub-questions: 
• What lessons can be learned from AFARD projects? 
• What challenges continue to hinder engendering decentralized co-govern-
ance? 
• What more needs to be done to sustain the current gains achieved? 
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Lessons to learn 
AFARD projects were initiated to countervail the technocratic and patronizing 
practices of local government development management that had blocked pub-
lic space for duly elected women leaders because some male power-holders 
wanted to conclave the dividends of their political capture. The projects’ logic 
was simple: put the women leaders as the rightful rights holder in front and 
catalyze them to stand firm for their rights and that of their constituency. To a 
greater extent this logic was successful. Why? This part answers this question 
basing on the discussions with the project staffs, women leaders, and some LLG 
officials as well as the information generated during the end-of-project review 
workshops. The following were seen as critical lessons to consider: 
 
• Local politics does not mean local equality 
Bringing power closer to the people and designating special seats for margin-
alized social groups as is done under decentralization in Uganda is no clear 
license for promoting equality. Such an approach is simply an equity approach 
which does not address the deep-seated root causes of discrimination. For wo-
men, it can be said that adopting such an approach only helps to bridge the 
gender gaps in the numbers of politicians rather than the gender discrimination 
that relegates women to the backseat of social development. It is simply not 
automatic that women’s presence means having voice; voice that is heard to 
impact on their lives. 
 
• The public and the private is blurred in governance 
While it is easy to delineate the public and private divide in the lives of state 
power-holders, from a gender perspective this line is blurred in practice. Men 
who have been socialized and are always cheered up by hegemony translates 
such social dividends as normal into the public arena. Unfortunately, within the 
public arena it translates into denial of rights to voice and access to public 
services; something that helps perpetuates inequalities between women and men 
on the one hand and between government officials and the masses on the other. 
 
•  Citizenship is enmeshed with culture; it can only be claimed 
While the legal frameworks in Uganda supports gender equality of women and 
men in all walks of live, to the contrary within local governments the culture of 
‘male superiority’ still lingers in the minds and practices of both male power-
holders as well as women whose voice and rights are denied. Women are often 
reduced to only saying opening and closing prayers without critical deliberation 
in council meetings because of fear of being perceived as behaving abnormally 
by talking in public; a preserve for men. Such a trend makes culture to subdue 
ability to claiming citizenship. 
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• Political capability building is inevitable for claiming citizenship 
Claiming women’s citizenship is not merely a matter of having a good legal 
basis for doing so. Rather, it requires conscientization to ignite political bargain-
ing. This comes when women have the civic competency capacity commensu-
rate with their roles and responsibilities. Short of which a majority of women 
and men who neither know their rights nor have the skills with which to claim 
those rights may find it either hard, or take too long on their own, to stand up in 
defence of their abused rights. 
 
• The license to claiming citizenship is not only a function of literacy  
The tendency that policy arena requires technical skills was found to be re-
dundant because such an arena is not where plan and budget documents are 
written. Rather they are spaces where women and men air out their views as a 
woman leader remarked, ‘do I have to go to school in order to say I need 
medicine in the hospital?’ Thus, the exclusion of women in the policy arena 
because they are not highly schooled to master technical jargons is simply a 
scapegoat to enable elites capture local governance. Equally among the women 
such a reason was because they had lost trust in their LLGs. Given public 
support many women leaders who are not schooled ably championed women’s 
causes within their LLG policy arena. 
 
• Civil society has a role to play in claiming citizenship  
The big bang therefore does not simply occur with claiming citizenship. It has 
to be initiated by someone or an institution. That majority of women do not 
know that their rights are tramped on and that LLG power-holders are simply 
unwilling to let go of their benefits, civil society organizations (CSOs) can 
catalyze the process and let those affected take the show. CSOs can mobilize the 
participation of the excluded, facilitate their civic awareness, and also provide 
technical backstopping. 
 
• Rights-based approach enhances engendering decentralized governance and 
development  
This approach is vital because first, it enlists women leaders to know that they 
have rights and duties. This awareness ignited their latent power to demand for 
recognized inclusion in the arena as well as to demand for services and ac-
countability from government power-holders. Meanwhile for LLG officials the 
approach was reported to have ‘clipped their manoeuvres of patronizing devel-
opment’. It challenged their hitherto unquestioned powers and reduced them to 
duty-bearers entitled to listen to people’s needs and account for their actions. 
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• The affected constituency are better forerunners in claiming their citizenship  
A LLG official remarked that ‘you cannot mourn more than the bereaved’ 
meaning that women leaders know the plight of women better and are the right 
category whose rights are abused. Their standing up to claim what was theirs 
was more justified and indeed compelled LLG power-holders not to dispute 
their demand for representation and support to women’s needs.  
 
• Winning political support has more payoffs  
While political and elite captures were found to operate concurrently, in areas 
where political capture was detached the elites became vulnerable to the pres-
sure of women leaders. Thus political support to co-governance and pro-poor 
budget is vital in ensuring that plans and budget are responsive to services 
sectors and affirmative action support.  
 
• Alliance building strengthens voice and information flow  
For women leaders to effectively play in the policy arena they need the support 
of other actors. The alliance built with women councillors and community 
development officers enhanced women’s access to ‘confidential information’ as 
well as developing rightful strategies for advocating for their needs. 
 
• Citizenship building takes time  
For women to gain the acceptance to claim their rights and for initial power-
holders to recognize women’s vitality in the policy arena, time is need. This 
project demonstrated that even if the first project started in the FY 2004/05 it is 
not until 2005/06 that budget responsiveness started to take root (see Figure 
7.6). 
 
• Information is important  
Effective civic engagement also requires timely and relevant information to 
support a given human right that is being demanded. By showing the local 
government leadership the extent to which women were excluded from the 
policy arena contrary to the legal requirements and by linking such acts with the 
inability to deliver services given that no one was there to ask enabled women 
leaders to win most political power-holders to support their course. 
 
• Accountability question is double-edged for women leaders 
While in community participation the link between rights-holders and duty-
bearers is straight for accountability flow, for women leaders this is double-
edged in the sense that their constituency requires them to account to them just 
like they require LLG officials to account for the commitments made in the 
plans and budget. As such, engendering decentralized governance widens the 
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accountability frontiers and increases the flow of information as well as the 
participation of citizens. 
 
• Effective mobilization requires multi-communication channel  
Effective participation of women is dependent on how they are mobilized. One 
approach like the interpersonal communication alone was found to be inade-
quate in reaching out to many women. A woman in Zeu pointed out that, ‘to get 
women together for a meeting you have to use as many ways of reaching out to 
them as possible, for instance, through contact leaders, announcements in 
churches, during public gathering, over the radio, and so forth’. This also goes 
for general awareness creation. 
 
• Having a woman chaired committee hastens rights claiming  
Many committees headed by men were found to be slow in accepting women 
leaders as co-actors in those committees as compared to where the committees 
were headed by women. It was easier for women to integrate in these latter 
committees and speak out their minds easily that was in the former.  
Challenges impeding engendering decentralized governance 
The following were also revealed as slowing down the pace of engendering de-
centralized governance: 
 
• Rigidity on resource-based planning  
While collaborative policy-making is evidence-based and needs-driven, LLGs 
were found to be exclusively rigidly attached to ministry resource envelops and 
focused on input-output oriented plans and budgets. In this way, attention is 
drawn to how many people are reached with little concern for inequalities em-
bedded in causes and outcomes of such interventions. 
 
• Ignorance of gender policies 
It was also echoed that while the need for gender mainstreaming was really not 
new, many leaders were ignorant of policies governing gender issues. For in-
stance, the National Gender Policy and Action Plan was noted to have remained 
as a buzz-framework only known by national level actors. Many LLG and Wo-
men Council leaders were too ignorant about it and how to get it operation-
alized. In areas where the leaders knew of the policy requirements, women’s 
participation and needs were accorded due attention as the Assistant Town 
Clerk, Nebbi Town Council said, 
Despite our resource limitations, we try very much to consider issues raised by 
women in our budget for implementation. We also do so because it is a policy issue 
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by government to cater for gender concerns in plans/budgets as well as in the quality 
of life of the people we serve.  
• Weak institutionalization of Women Council 
Although the government established a parallel structure of women council to 
reinforce the women councilors, this structure is largely not recognized by 
LLGs. They are seen as a central government business and at times as com-
petitors and not as complementary support agency of LLG operations. Jeska 
Okori, Woman Councilor Pakwach Town Council summed this challenge when 
she stated that,  
The women council leaders do not have working space and their activities are not 
funded by LLGs. They are expected to work principally on voluntarism basis and no 
LLGs seem to recognize their presence and importance in bringing women’s issues 
to the fore. So, how effective would you expect them to be beyond what they are 
doing now; more so apparently they are beggars?  
• Limited local government resource envelop  
It was noted that many LLGs do not have enough funds with which to fund all 
the needs of collaborative policy-making. LLG officials echoed that they lack 
funds to undertake village-based planning, produce copies of plans/budget, pro-
duce accountability reports, and finally to effectively respond to the various pro-
ject needs of their constituencies. The consequences are that many women are 
excluded from this policy arena together with the very needs they should have 
brought forth. Equally, many women simply see no reason to continue partici-
pating in a non-responsive policy arena as Mr. Onyongocok Peter a councillor 
from Pakwach put it, 
Women’s lack of interest in participation in planning and budgeting processes is 
simply because their prioritized needs are not implemented by government. They 
ask themselves, why they must demand for the same things over and over without 
any of them implemented. 
Public reliance on representative politics underscores the hidden interest 
such representatives have (Goetz & Jenkin 2005: 28). Besides, as Robinson 
(1998) notes such mediated voice through indirect participation distorts part of 
the political strength the near-dominant actors should have attained. 
 
• Inability to tap into community potentials 
It was also noted that in the few LLGs that have opened up for their commu-
nities to participate in the various processes of decentralized development, 
attention is only focused on central and donor funds. Discussions all rotate on 
what is to be done with funds from other sources. Little attention is drawn on 
catalyzing people to not only claim their rights but also become responsible by 
contributing towards their needs.  
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• Livelihood insecurity 
While collective action is important for the common good of society, a woman 
asked, ‘how do I reach that public space when I am hungry? Would I not need 
to have the food and energy first? This is a fundamental question to claiming 
citizenship. Often women leaders find it difficult to mobilize women to engage 
with their council collectively as a women’s constituency because many women 
give preference to their livelihood activities. Mrs Ngamita Molly of Panyimur 
voiced this sentiment when she said: 
I am a mother of four children who cannot afford to sacrifice getting bread for my 
children to go for public meetings in which no allowances are even paid. How 
would you feel when you come back home after the meeting and your children are 
sleeping under the veranda hungry? Would you be a successful mother or just a 
laughing stock? I prefer my fish business to Women Council’s affairs. 
• Competitive politics between women council and women councillors 
Having a parallel women structure has also in some cases fuelled competition 
for recognition. Women councillors especially find that the coming in of WCEs 
to co-partake with them in furthering women’s interest is an encroachment on 
their initial powers and dominance of women presence in the policy arena (even 
if they were not effective). Mrs. Bithum Nester of Nyaravur contended that, 
Some Women Councillors actively frustrate our lobbying efforts. Instead of working 
with us as a team they turn around to de-campaign our efforts. Some even insist that 
only elected politicians must sit in sector committee meetings thereby excluding us 
and the spaces we have already won with male politicians.  
As a result, Mrs. Zainabu Ayub of Nebbi and Mrs. Ociba Serefina of Pak-
wach pointed out that often male politicians and technical staff take advantage 
of such squabbles to under look women’s efforts. Some, in fear of the asserti-
veness of WCE, side with Women Councillors to block the effective partici-
pation of WCEs. They deny them information about whatever is taking place in 
the LLG and when asked only say that they have already passed the information 
through women councillors. 
  
• Limited awareness of human rights 
It was also noted that majority of women and men alike are not aware of their 
rights. In this limbo of lack of knowledge duty-bearers take advantage to make 
it appear normal that others are not mandated to know what is happening in 
their council and also to be part of the processes. 
 
• One-sides and one-off capacity building approach 
Participants in the review workshops also pointed out that often times many 
CSOs wrongly construe that LLG officials already have skills for doing what-
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ever tasks they are expected to do. For instance, the skills to undertake gender 
responsive planning and budgeting, monitoring, and even writing reports in a 
gender neutral language is lacking among many LLG officials. Therefore, 
‘expecting LLG officials to achieve the needs of engendering their plans with-
out the skills would indeed be demanding for too much’, the Community Devel-
opment Officer concluded. 
Meanwhile the women leaders also argued that one-off trainings are not very 
effective. Without refresher courses many people forget their acquired skills 
given that they do not use those skills on a daily basis. 
 
• Lack of effective communication strategy  
Lack of free flow of information among active stakeholders continues to inhibit 
coordination for collective actions. Often, such a weakness has been used to 
deliberately make decisions without the correct information (Robinson 2006: 
12) and also to deny access to budget information (Goetz & Jenkins 2005: 89) 
thereby hampering people’s demand for accountability.. 
 
• Contraction in the 1997 Local Governments Act 
Some LLG leaders were noted to be uncooperative because they see women 
leaders entry into their dominated policy arena as ‘stepping on their toes’ 
remarked the Accountant of Akworo. To defend their interest (Robinson, 2006: 
12), they ensure that almost all planning and budgeting activities are completed 
at the sectoral committee levels using the LLG Act that only permits elected 
councillors to sit on sectoral committee as their shield remarked the Sub county 
Chief Kango. 
Ways forward 
In order to sustain the current gains made, it is imperative that: 
• LLG resource envelops are widened. This can be done by increasing remit-
tance from central government on the one hand and by ensuring that citizens 
are enlightened to claim their rights as well as exhibit the accompanying res-
ponsibilities on the other hand. 
• Increased political capability building is undertaken to strengthen grassroots 
women’s civic competence through human rights awareness creation as well 
as skills training for women leaders and LLG officials. 
• The alliances and networking between women councillors and WCE basing 
on their common purpose of championing women’s needs in their constitu-
encies is strengthened. However, the wider women constituency would also 
need to be enlightened to hold the women leaders jointly accountable. 
 
  
Table 9.1 Learning from action analysis 
To improve: Success factors Inherent challenges Lessons learned 
WCE 
effectiveness 
• Skills training 
• Support with allowances 
• Technical backstopping 
support by AFARD 
• Having women on key LLG 
committees 
• Political will 
 
• One-off capacity building approach 
• Illiteracy of many members 
• Lack of facilitation 
• Weak national Women Council structure 
• Rivalry with Women Councillors 
• Civic competence and skills building are inevitable for effective 
advocacy 
• Alliance between different women leaders’ institutions 
promotes the effectiveness of demanding for women’s rights 
Women’s 
participation 
• Multimedia communication  
for mobilization 
• Vigilance of WCE 
• Alliance with Women 
Councillors 
 
• Cultural inhibition of women’s public demands 
• Livelihood insecurity 
• Low awareness of rights 
• LGA 1997 restrictions on committee participation 
• LLG selective mobilization strategy  
• LLG avoidance of village planning meetings 
 
• Effective mobilization by women leaders energizes women’s 
participation 
• Unfulfilled promises discourage continued participation 
• Illiteracy is wrongly used as a roadblock to women’s 
participation 
LLG responsive-
ness 
• Alliance with WC 
• Evidence-based advocacy by 
women themselves 
• Promoting development as a 
human right  
• Political will 
• Illiteracy of many women leaders 
• Inadequate skills for GRPB 
• Inadequate revenue of LLGs 
• Sectoral committee approach to budgeting 
• Arrogance of sub accountants  
• CSO technical backstopping reduces elitist machination of 
budget cycles 
• Better budget lobbying is done in the sectoral committee 
meetings 
• Affirmative action budget support hasten balancing the gender 
inequality scale 
 
LLG 
transparency & 
accountability 
practices 
• WCE vigilance 
• Conducting joint GRA 
• Political will 
• Poor (gender sensitive) data management 
• Lack of effective communication strategy  
• Inadequate understanding of accountability (e.g., it is 
taken for witch-hunt, mere information dissemination, or 
all about money) 
• Weak demand by women for accountability 
• Lack of linkage with Anti-corruption institutions  
• Credible advocacy requires the affected people to take the 
frontline seat and use valid information 
• Accountability is a double edge principle that requires the 
people to demand for it and the duty bearer to find value in 
accounting. Besides it is beyond mere information 
dissemination but also involves direct participation in decision 
making processes 
• Data dis-aggregation by sex improves lobbying for budget 
equity and ability to account for engendered benefits 
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• Information sharing channels are improved. This will allow all women 
leaders and LLG officials to have correct information on, and confidence in, 
each other thereby building trust and cordial working relations. 
• CSOs in the district should take-up building private-public partnership to 
ensure effective coordination of planning, outreach and accounting. By so 
doing, the culture of input-output and outcome-impact driven planning will 
be shared and institutionalized; and resource envelop for tackling livelihood 
insecurity will increase. 
A concluding reflection 
In all, this study explored the processes of engendering local governance. It 
questioned the relevance of the insertion of women in democratic decentrali-
zation on the one hand and the fad with political capability building on the 
other. Its central argument was how these two divergent appeals translate into 
better life for women who have and continue to suffer from hegemonic gender 
relations more so that local governance is gendered in its management.  
Answers from the various empirical chapters drawn from Nebbi district re-
vealed that inserting women into decentralized political offices is no panacea to 
gender equality. Such a strategy was found to only open the symbolic door to 
political space for both grassroots women and women leaders without any 
guarantee of their effective political participation in such arena. Decentralized 
governance was found to be gendered. Majority male political leaders and tech-
nocrats socialized and cheered by hegemony were perpetuating their gendered 
interests into public policy arena.  
Without recognition and voice of the women constituency, it also became 
visible why women are denied public services from LLGs due to ‘sins of com-
mission’ (Mehta 2005). To challenge the status quo of exclusionary local gov-
ernance called for citizenship building. Yet, citizenship is not given but claimed 
because no power-holder who has been gaining dividends from exclusion can 
willingly handover such power position.  
Importantly, the study showed that citizenship is better claimed by those 
affected by political exclusion. It also showed that to balance state-citizen 
equation through claiming citizenship political capability building is inevitable. 
By facilitating the politicization and reactivation of citizens, political capability 
building was found to enhance the engagement between citizens in demanding 
for services and accountability from their state leaders. By ‘(re)positioning 
citizens’ as actors, capability building allows for the ‘creation, opening and 
reshaping’ of policy arena (Cornwall 2002a) whereby women who were simply 
beneficiaries of LLG services offered to them as and how LLG experts deemed 
wise became shapers and markers of the key services they need.  
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However, the meek receptivity of LLG power-holders in this re-defined 
political arena as well as the gaps in women’s participation and political capa-
bilities means that an uphill task of half the battle won stands ahead to be fought 
with determination for gender equality to be institutionalized in local govern-
ance. Civil society organizations have competitive edge in leading this process. 
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Annex 1: About AFARD: The implementing agency 
 
 
AFARD’s Functional Mandates 
Vision “A Prosperous, Healthy, and Informed People of West 
Nile”. 
Mission “To contribute to the molding of a region in which the 
local people, including those who are marginalized, 
are able to participate effectively and sustainably and 
take a lead in the development of the region”. 
Im
pact 
Objective
s 
1. To harness the knowledge, skills and 
experiences of development practitioners within 
the region and channel it for the accelerated, 
equitable and sustainable development of the 
region. 
2. To act as a midwife, an interim link between the 
grass roots and sources of new information, 
innovations, expertise and funds required for the 
type of development that places people firmly in 
the center of all development efforts. 
3. To avail of our expertise by way of consultancy 
to other development stakeholders interested in 
the region. 
Thematic 
Areas 
 Food and income 
security  
 Community health 
 Community 
empowerment   
 
Cross cutting issues 
- Institutional 
development 
- Gender 
- Environment  
 
 Key strategies  
 Skills development 
 Participatory action 
research 
 Resource 
mobilization 
 Information 
dissemination 
 Advocacy and 
lobbying 
 Networking and 
linkages 
 
O
utcom
e 
Main 
benefici-
aries 
 Community based groups. 
 Disadvantaged community especially women. 
System  Operational guidelines. 
 Action plans. 
Structure  The Board of Directors. 
 The Management team. 
 Independent partner groups. 
V
al
ue
s/P
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
• 
R
es
pe
ct
in
g 
hu
m
an
 d
ig
ni
ty
, e
qu
al
ity
, j
us
tic
e 
an
d 
fr
ee
do
m
. 
• 
Th
e 
en
sh
rin
em
en
t o
f t
he
 e
m
po
w
er
m
en
t a
pp
ro
ac
h 
to
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t  
• 
A
do
pt
in
g 
an
 in
te
ra
ct
iv
e 
an
d 
fle
xi
bl
e 
ap
pr
oa
ch
; 
• 
Lo
ca
l o
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
by
 g
ro
up
s o
f w
ha
te
ve
r i
ni
tia
tiv
es
 th
ey
 a
re
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
;  
• 
U
se
 o
f p
ar
tic
ip
at
or
y 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
es
 in
 a
ll 
ac
tiv
iti
es
; 
• 
R
el
ia
nc
e 
on
 lo
ca
l r
es
ou
rc
es
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
IT
K
, h
um
an
 a
nd
 p
hy
si
ca
l r
es
ou
rc
es
;  
• 
Lo
ca
liz
in
g 
re
se
ar
ch
 a
im
ed
 a
t g
en
er
at
in
g 
lo
ca
l a
re
a 
se
ns
iti
ve
 in
te
rv
en
tio
ns
;  
• 
G
en
ui
ne
 p
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
m
ut
ua
l t
ru
st
, r
es
pe
ct
 a
nd
 h
on
es
ty
;  
Alliances 
 
 
 Local governments. 
 Donor community. 
 Private sector institutions. 
 Members of Civil Society Organizations. 
O
perations 
 
 
AFARD, a local professional, not-for-profit, and non-denominational NGO 
currently operating in West Nile region, Uganda, was formed in July 2000. 
AFARD’s formation was motivated by numerous reasons. First, the West Nile 
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region is the poorest in Uganda with over 6 in 10 people living below US$ 1 a 
day. Second, many development interventions have been ‘external to local con-
text’ and imposed leaving behind a people hardly changed. Third, given the 
hitch of democratic machination by government, the people are reduced to 
subjects and not citizen of the state. They only matter during election. Finally, 
that many sons and daughters of the region prefer to work elsewhere limited 
enthusiasms to work for self development. 
AFARD’s focus 
AFARD is engaged in a number of activities. These are implemented using a 
participatory approach right from the needs identification through execution to 
monitoring progress. Below are the interventions. 
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AFARD thematic focuses 
Theme 1  Food and Income Security 
Sustainable agriculture enhancement 
To fight food insecurity due to the poor 
farmer-extension-researcher linkage, 
AFARD focuses on increasing household 
food production and purchasing power. 
Improved agro-technologies like high-value 
crops and livestock have been introduced for 
group-based multiplication. Field-based 
extension services are routinely provided. 
These are complemented by agri-business 
skills and nutrition education. 
Community microenterprise development 
To increase household income and groups’ 
self-funding capacity, AFARD integrates 
entrepreneurship and group savings and 
credit schemes promotion. Income 
generation and savings mobilization and 
credit management skills are provided to all 
partner group members. Loan committees 
are established and trained. Boaster funds 
are preferred as top-ups onto what the 
groups have.  
Theme 2   Community Health 
HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation 
Herein multi-channel communication is used 
for behaviour change promotion. And for 
mitigation a family centered approach is 
adopted. Direct supports are provided for 
Orphans and Vulnerable Children in schools. 
Support families’ abilities to generate income 
for their basic needs are also enhanced. For 
Persons living with AIDS a post test club 
approach to community care and support is 
emphasized. Herein issues related to 
economic independence, counselling, life 
skills, and community dialogue are 
mainstreamed. 
Safe water and sanitation promotion 
With a focus on fishing communities where 
access to and utilization of safe water and 
sanitation practices are poor, AFARD 
provides access to safe facilities, community 
education and hygiene competitions as baits 
for entrenching community policing to be 
enforced by the community. This is pivoted 
on the locally agreed upon standards (also 
approved by the sub county local 
government council). 
 
Theme 3   Community empowerment 
Institutional development 
To build sustainability of partner community 
based organizations (CBOs), AFARD 
facilitate both their programme enhancement 
and organizational growths hinging on 
participatory capacity self-assessment, 
agreed upon capacity building plan, and 
periodic review where CBOs ably chart their 
growth paths and identify their areas of 
persistent weaknesses for continued support. 
Good governance 
To promote gender equality, AFARD 
focuses on widening political space for, and 
entitlements of women by increasing 
women’s participation and voice in decision-
making in local government planning and 
budgeting processes through skills training, 
participatory M+E, information sharing, 
alliance building, technical and financial 
backstopping and advocacy and lobbying. 
Source: Annual Reports and Strategic Plan 
  
Annex 2: Nebbi district local government budget performance, 1995-2008 
 
 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 
Income             
Local revenue  416,745,982  215,015,666 244,096,969 696,065,464 312,413,848 195,647,245 
Central government transfers  2,686,681,933 2,371,532,891 4,093,941,359 5,455,160,655 5,927,906,850 9,077,994,195 
Donor funds  143,641,600 398,265,458 315,690,857 321,391,198 640,424,312 1,951,815,572 
Total  3,247,069,515 2,984,814,015 4,653,729,185 6,472,617,317 6,880,745,010 11,225,457,012  
 
Expenditures 
Council, Boards, & Commission  53,709,968 24,320,541 48,659,023 122,071,265 190,503,058 151,892,204 
Finance & Planning 217,300,019 282,903,939 165,250,605 139,613,643 203,618,327 171,510,881 
Management support services  741,330,242 435,412,476 655,472,914 895,086,579 583,943,083 4,585,218,256 
Education & sports  1,225,903,030 1,631,499,551 2,379,174,097 3,451,449,572 4,303,232,774 3,664,608,193 
Production & Marketing  136,472,516 94,375,067 118,664,572 135,683,779 227,197,804 179,560,265 
Health & Environment  494,715,144 334,727,582 776,994,857 934,885,541 1,052,470,694 1,325,878,889 
Community Based Services  27,735,300 9,887,584 28,054,865 32,629,290 40,042,165 39,879,157 
Technical Services & Works  275,076,976 231,154,737 320,831,354 609,877,157 535,546,024 882,265,953 
Natural Resources - - - - - - 
Total 3,172,243,195 3,044,281,477 4,493,102,287 6,321,296,826 7,136,553,929 11,000,813,798  
 
  
Annex 2: Nebbi district local government budget performance, 1995-2008  
     (continued) 
 
  2001/02  2002/03  2003/04  2004/05  2005/06  2006/07  2007/08 
Income                
Local revenue  19,795,570 360,547,246 362,414,033 279,220,749 95,258,945 99,936,150 181,353,031 
Central government  
     transfers  12,147,043,288 10,679,800,622 13,113,825,680 13,799,170,375 14,586,716,224 15,291,526,633 15,961,128,120 
Donor funds  1,957,820,373 2,705,546,514 983,165,030 1,482,633,812 1,061,202,453 1,627,428,137 2,408,842,440 
Total 14,124,659,231 13,745,894,382 14,459,404,743 15,561,024,936 15,743,177,622 17,018,890,920 18,551,323,591 
 
Expenditures 
Council, Boards, &  
     Commission 173,501,714 223,190,102 282,729,334 141,444,713 128,375,194 102,123,771 225,510,108 
Finance & Planning  327,156,572 110,756,698 133,435,150 220,176,329 219,409,651 215,009,717 425,338,479 
Management support  
     services  3,527,835,653 8,349,587,149 8,136,972,485 9,215,236,737 10,869,607,743 11,932,754,001 4,562,200,493 
Education & sports  5,240,346,541 1,896,493,669 2,017,090,623 2,266,669,164 1,613,515,361 625,350,233 7,381,904,968 
Production & Marketing  601,234,640 333,062,673 353,039,322 388,642,195 356,399,871 938,845,690 1,138,237,487 
Health & Environment  2,458,180,917 1,600,634,586 1,872,279,475 1,968,039,672 1,450,476,498 1,765,096,529 2,916,030,133 
Community Based  
     Services  87,438,825 64,190,342 81,321,760 88,255,714 69,676,977 85,399,335 171,388,094 
Technical Services &  
     Works 1,456,654,654 1,216,990,235 1,395,683,204 1,754,573,081 1,013,935,575 920,005,853 1,454,953,843 
Natural Resources  - - - - 20,146,022 31,560,437 84,859,803 
Total 13,872,349,516 13,794,905,454 14,272,551,353 16,043,037,605 15,741,542,892 16,616,145,566 18,360,423,408 
  
Annex 3: Gender responsiveness audit focus 
 
Cy-
cle Critical indicators 
Source of 
information 
Method of data 
collection How to conduct the assessment Use 
1. WCE identified core 
women’s issues at all 
levels before LG 
planning meetings 
Minutes of 
WCE 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the chairperson WCE, ask for a copy of their pre-planning 
minute.  
∗ Verify whether or not they identified core women’s issue. Also 
verify whether or not they communicated to lower WCEs 
∗ If an issue is identified score 1 otherwise 0.  
Evid-
ence of 
women 
council 
effect-
iveness 
 
Pursue 
specific 
gender 
needs in 
the 
budget 
2. Proportion of women 
to men participating in 
village planning 
meeting 
Attendance 
list with 
PDCs i/c 
planning 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the PDC i/c planning get a summary of planning attendants  
∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated 
∗ For proportion equal to 50% or more score 1 otherwise 0 
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
P
l
a
n
n
i
n
g
 
3. Proportion of women 
to men participating in 
parish planning 
meeting 
Attendance 
list with 
PDCs i/c 
planning 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the PDC i/c planning get a summary of planning attendants  
∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated 
∗ For proportion equal to 50% or more score 1 otherwise 0 
Mobi-
lize 
women 
to 
partici-
pate in 
the 
plannin
  
Cy-
cle Critical indicators 
Source of 
information 
Method of data 
collection How to conduct the assessment Use 
4. Proportion of women 
to men participating in 
sub county budget 
conference 
Attendance 
list with sub 
accountant 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the PDC i/c planning get a summary of planning attendants  
∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated 
∗ For proportion equal to 50% or more score 1 otherwise 0 
5. WCE held meeting 
with sub county 
Sectoral committees 
Attendance 
list with sub 
accountant 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the i/c planning in the LLG get a summary of planning 
attendants  
∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated 
∗ If they did score 1 otherwise 0 
Push for 
fairness 
of 
budget 
allo-
cation  
6. Proportion of women 
to men participating in 
sub county budget 
approval meeting 
Minutes of 
WCE 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the i/c planning in the LLG get a summary of planning 
attendants  
∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated 
∗ For proportion equal to 50% score 1 otherwise 0 
Push for 
women’
s needs 
7. Sectoral plans have 
gender disaggregated 
targets 
Approved 
plan 
Observation ∗ From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved 
plan 
∗ Look at sector analysis in problem statement, target setting and 
monitoring plan 
∗ Ascertain whether or not they contain gender blind, neutral or 
sensitive analysis 
∗ If so score 1 otherwise 0 
8. Plans and budgets have 
affirmative action 
consideration 
Approved 
plan & 
budget 
Observation ∗ From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved 
plan and budget 
∗ Look at affirmative actions in the approved priority project list  
∗ Ascertain whether or not the approved budget have allocations for 
those priorities 
∗ If so score 1 otherwise 0 
Policy 
commit-
ment to 
engen-
dered 
develop
ment 
   
Cy-
cle Critical indicators 
Source of 
information 
Method of data 
collection How to conduct the assessment Use 
9. Budgets have explicit 
gender responsiveness 
statements 
Approved 
budget 
Observation ∗ From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved 
budget 
∗ Look at the budget statement if it contains explicit  gender 
responsiveness statements 
∗  If so, score 1 otherwise 0 
10. Aggregate budget 
allocated for services 
Vs administrative 
sectors 
Approved 
budget 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved 
budget 
∗ Compute the budget allocation for services sectors (education, 
health, agriculture, community development, environment and 
technical services) 
∗ Compute the budget allocation for administrative sector 
(management support and finance, councils and planning) 
∗ Compute the percent for services and administrative sectors 
∗ For allocation equal to 50% or more score 1 otherwise 0 
11. Intra-sector allocation 
for services Vs 
administrative costs 
Approved 
budget 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved 
budget 
∗ Compute the Sectoral budget allocation for services sectors 
(education, health, agriculture, community development, 
environment and technical services) in terms of recurrent and 
development cost 
∗ Compute the sector budget allocation for administrative sector 
(management support and finance, councils and planning) in terms 
of recurrent and development cost 
∗ Compute the percent for recurrent and development budget 
allocation for services and administrative sectors 
∗ For allocation equal to 90% or more score 1 otherwise 0 
Policy 
trans-
lation 
into 
budget 
commit-
ment 
  
Cy-
cle Critical indicators 
Source of 
information 
Method of data 
collection How to conduct the assessment Use 
 
12. Share of budget 
allocated for 
affirmative action 
Approved 
budget 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved 
budget 
∗ Compute the budget allocation for affirmative action  
∗ Compute the percent of affirmative action from the total budget 
∗ For allocation equal to 5% or more score 1 otherwise 0 
 
13. LLG have popular 
version of their plans 
Sub county 
chief 
Observation ∗ Ask (and see it)the sub county chief whether or not they have a 
popular version of their approved plan and budget 
∗ If so score 1 otherwise 0 
14. LLG provided WCE 
with a copy of the 
approved plan/budget 
Copy of 
plan/budget 
Observation ∗ Ask (and see it) the Chairperson of sub county WCE whether or not 
they have a popular version of their approved plan and budget 
∗ If so score 1 otherwise 0 
Measure 
of feed-
back 
process 
15. LLG communicated 
about approved 
plan/budget to lower 
units 
Feedback 
report 
Observation ∗ Ask (and see it) the sub county chief whether or not they 
communicated to lower units about the approved plan and budget  
∗ If so score 1 otherwise 0 
16. LLGs communicated 
about approved 
plan/budget to WCE 
Feedback 
report 
Observation ∗ Ask (and see it) the sub county chief whether or not they 
communicated to WCE about the approved plan and budget  
∗ If so score 1 otherwise 0 
Engage-
ment in 
resource 
manage-
ment 
17. LLG provide WCE 
with details of cash 
inflows/outflows 
Disburseme
nt reports 
Observation ∗ Ask (and see it) the sub county chief whether or not they have 
copies of budget inflows and outflows  
∗ If so score 1 otherwise 0 
18. WCE involved in 
expenditure allocation 
Committee 
reports 
Interview ∗ Ask WCE whether or not they are involved in expenditure 
allocation  
∗ If so score 1 otherwise 0 
 
19. Aggregate budget 
disbursed for services 
Vs administrative 
sectors 
Expenditure 
ledgers 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved 
budget 
∗ Compute the actual budget disbursed for services sectors (education, 
health, agriculture, community development, environment and 
Trace 
commit-
ment to 
appro-
ved 
plans 
and 
budget 
   
Cy-
cle Critical indicators 
Source of 
information 
Method of data 
collection How to conduct the assessment Use 
technical services) 
∗ Compute the actual budget disbursed for administrative sector 
(management support and finance, councils and planning) 
∗ Compute the percent of disbursement for services and 
administrative sectors 
∗ For allocation equal to 50% or more score 1 otherwise 0 
20. Intra-sector 
disbursement for 
services Vs 
administrative costs 
Expenditure 
ledgers 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved 
budget 
∗ Compute the Sectoral actual budget disbursed for services sectors 
(education, health, agriculture, community development, 
environment and technical services) in terms of recurrent and 
development cost 
∗ Compute the sector actual budget disbursed for administrative 
sector (management support and finance, councils and planning) in 
terms of recurrent and development cost 
∗ Compute the percent disbursement for recurrent and development 
budget for services and administrative sectors 
∗ For allocation equal to 90% or more score 1 otherwise 0 
21. Share of budget 
disbursed for 
affirmative action 
Expenditure 
ledgers 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved 
budget 
∗ Compute the actual budget disbursed for affirmative action  
∗ Compute the percent disbursement of affirmative action from the 
total budget disbursed 
∗ For allocation equal to 5% or more score 1 otherwise 0 
 
22. WCE met Sectoral 
committees to follow 
disbursements 
Minutes of 
WCE 
Documentary 
review 
∗ Ask the chairperson WCE for a minute of their meeting with 
Sectoral committee on budget disbursement 
∗ If so score 1 otherwise 0 
Hold 
leaders 
account-
able 
  
Cy-
cle Critical indicators 
Source of 
information 
Method of data 
collection How to conduct the assessment Use 
23. Progress reports 
include gender 
disaggregated data 
Plan review 
reports 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the sub county chief, obtain a copy of quarterly progress 
report 
∗ Look through the various sectors for gender disaggregated data in 
the reports for outputs and outcomes 
∗ Ascertain whether or not they contain gender blind, neutral or 
sensitive analysis 
∗ If so score 1 otherwise 0 
Measure 
progress 
made 
   
Annex 3, continued 
Cy
cle
Critical indicators Source of 
information 
Method of 
data 
collection 
How to conduct the assessment Use 
24. WCE identified core 
women’s issues at all 
levels before LG 
planning meetings 
Minutes of 
WCE 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the chairperson WCE, ask for a copy of their 
pre-planning minute.  
∗ Verify whether or not they identified core 
women’s issues. Also verify whether or not they 
communicated to lower WCEs 
∗ If an issue is identified score 1 otherwise 0.  
Evidence of women 
council effectiveness 
 
Pursue specific 
gender needs in the 
budget 
25. Proportion of women 
to men participating 
in village planning 
meeting 
Attendance 
list with PDCs 
i/c planning 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the PDC i/c planning get a summary of 
planning attendants  
∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated 
∗ For proportion equal to 50% or more score 1 
otherwise 0 
26. Proportion of women 
to men participating 
in parish planning 
meeting 
Attendance 
list with PDCs 
i/c planning 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the PDC i/c planning get a summary of 
planning attendants  
∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated 
∗ For proportion equal to 50% or more score 1 
otherwise 0 
27. Proportion of women 
to men participating 
in sub county budget 
conference 
Attendance 
list with sub 
accountant 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the PDC i/c planning get a summary of 
planning attendants  
∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated 
∗ For proportion equal to 50% or more score 1 
otherwise 0 
Mobilize women to 
participate in the 
planning processes so 
that they can  echo 
their needs 
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
P
l
a
n
n
i
n
g
 
28. WCE held meeting 
with sub county 
Sectoral committees 
Attendance 
list with sub 
accountant 
Documentary 
review 
∗ From the i/c planning in the LLG get a summary 
of planning attendants  
∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated 
∗ If they did score 1 otherwise 0 
Push for fairness of 
budget allocation  
Source: Lakwo (2006 
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Annex 4: Change in knowledge and performance of  
     roles  
 
 Percentage change Cramer’s V measure 
  End of   Signifi- 
 Baseline project   cance 
Indicators (2005.06) (2007/8) Variance Value level 
1. Knowledge of mandatory roles 
Indentifying women’s concern 60.4 97.0 36.6 0.472 0.000* 
Policiy sensitization 50.6 89.8 39.2 0.438 0.000* 
Linkage of women to policy makers 40.9 96.2 55.3 0.618 0.000* 
Monotoring government projects 11.7 91.1 79.4 0.791 0.000* 
Advocacy and lobbying 4.5 98.7 94.2 0.946 0.000* 
 
2. Performing mandatory roles  
Identifying women’s concern 57.8 93.6 35.8 0.433 0.000* 
Policy sensitization 61.0 84.7 23.7 0.268 0.000* 
Linkage of women to policy makers 62.3 89.4 27.1 0.323 0.000* 
Monitoring government projects 24.0 78.3 54.3 0.536 0.000* 
Advocacy and lobbying 20.1 89.8 69.7 0.703 0.000* 
* denotes statistically significance at 5%   
Source: Individual evaluation survey data, 2008 
 
 
 
Annex 5: Change in skills for and performance of  
 civic engagement  
 
 Percentage change Cramer’s V measure 
  End of   Signifi- 
 Baseline project   cance 
Indicators (2005.06) (2007/8) Variance Value level 
1. Skilled in civic engagement 
Participatory gender planning &  
budgeting 11.7 81.3 69.6 0.683 0.000* 
Participatory gender monitoring 
& evaluation 8.4 73.2 64.8 0.634 0.000* 
Advocacy and lobbying 6.5 71.1 64.6 0.634 0.000* 
 
2. Practicing civic engagement skills  
Participatory gender planning &  
budgeting 20.1 81.3 61.2 0.604 0.000* 
Participatory gender monitoring 
& evaluation 11.7 74.5 62.8 0.614 0.000* 
Advocacy and lobbying 7.1 67.7 60.6 0.597 0.000* 
* denotes statistically significance at 5%   
Source: Individual evaluation survey data, 2008 
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Annex 6: Change in grassroots women’s participation  
 in policy processes  
 
 Percentage change Cramer’s V measure 
Indictors of participation  End of   Signifi- 
(yes response to did you participated Baseline project   cance 
participated in?) (2005.06) (2007/8) Variance Value level 
Mobilization 5.5 79.5 74.0 0.755 0.000* 
Village meetings 8.1 74.9 66.8 0.684 0.000* 
Parish meetings 2.6 65.8 63.2 0.680 0.000* 
LLG budget conference 3.1 58.4 55.3 0.610 0.000* 
LLG plan approval 1.5 58.9 57.4 0.642 0.000* 
Village feedback meetings 3.7 33.8 30.1 0.397 0.000* 
Parish feedback meetings 1.5 22.8 21.3 0.339 0.000* 
Village project implementation 14.8 42.0 2.2 0.305 0.000* 
Parish project implementation 3.3 20.1 16.8 0.268 0.000* 
LLG project implementation 2.6 14.2 11.6 0.215 0.000* 
Vilage project monitoring 7.7 44.3 36.6 0.425 0.000* 
Parish project monitoring 2.2 29.2 27.0 0.384 0.000* 
LLG projct monitoring 3.3 16.0 12.7 0.220 0.000* 
LLG budget monitoring -  12.3 12.3 0.269 0.000* 
PIC monitoring -  17.8 17.8 0.327 0.000* 
* denotes statistically significance at 5%   
Source: Individual evaluation survey data, 2008 
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Annex 7: LLG gender responsiveness audit  
     performance 
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